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INTRODUCTION
David Smith, Alexander Calder, and Georgia O'Keeffe expressed
their artistic creativity in distinct and novel ways.' To varying degrees,
each experienced the financial success that accompanies recognition of
artistic merit in today's art world.2 Their status as successful artists led to a
common result after their deaths: litigation over federal transfer taxes in-
volving the valuation of large blocks of their art.
3
Artists and their estates confront two problems in connection with the
valuation of large blocks of art for federal gift and estate tax purposes.
4
1. See Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701 (1992)
("O'Keeffe's diverse range of subject matters, such as flowers, trees and leaves, landscapes
(New Mexico and New York), and abstractions (early and late), and her various 'periods'
appealed to different segments of the public."); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
650, 651 (1972), afftd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 827 (1975) ("Most
of his [Smith's] work is of the abstract, nonrepresentational variety and fashioned out of
welded steel and other metals, a technique which Smith pioneered."). Robert Hughes, The
Iron Age of Sculpture, TIME, May 3, 19.93, at 63, opined that:
[Alexander] Calder's genius in the '20s and '30s was for making extraordinarily deli-
cate and literally "wiry" sculptures that danced at a breath....
By 1951 ... [David] Smith's pre-eminence in American sculpture was complete:
he could draw with steel in space with as much fluency as with pencil on paper,
creating metaphors that mingle the organic and the mechanical in an unstoppable
lyric eloquence.... Sculpture's iron age, in such hands, was also a golden one.
Id. at 64.
2. Gallery sales of 75 of David Smith's works between 1940 and his death in 1965
grossed $218,080.50. Smith, 57 T.C. at 651-52. Georgia O'Keeffe was an extremely successful
artist. The average price of paintings she sold personally reached a high of $631,250.00 in
1983 and auction sales of her works at the major houses from 1979 through 1985 totaled
$4,474,000.00. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2700-01.
3. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2699; Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985);
Smith, 57 T.C. at 650.
4. Consideration of income tax issues that confront artists and their estates is beyond
the scope of this article. See generally RALPH E. LERNER & JuoDrrH BRESLER, ART LAw: THE
GUIDE FOR CoLLEcroRs, INVUSroRs, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992); Jef-
frey C. McCarthy, Federal Income Taxation of Fine Art, 2 CAlDozo ARrs & Er. L. J. 1 (1983);




First, individual artworks5 must be valued. Second, it must be determined
whether the aggregate value of the works should be reduced because of
the large number transferred or included in the estate.6 While similar
issues arise in the taxation of nonartists, these issues present particular
problems for artists and their estates because of the difficulties in the valu-
ation of art and the unique nature of the art market.
7
The Internal Revenue Code ("Code") imposes federal estate and gift
taxess on the transfer of property which are determined by reference to
the value of the property transferred.9 Value for transfer tax purposes
means fair market value-"the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
5. All references in this article to "art," "art objects," "artworks," and "works of art" are
to the tangible items produced by artists. Consideration of copyright issues is beyond the
scope of this article. Consequently, no attempt has been made to distinguish between art
objects (tangible property) and works of art (intangible property rights).
A distinction must be made between ownership of the material object in which
the copyrighted work is embodied and ownership of the copyright itself. A copy-
righted work may be "a literary work printed on the pages of a book," for example,
or "pigment painted on a canvas, or a musical work pressed into the grooves of a
phonorecord." Under today's law, sale of the material object, such as a book, paint-
ing, or phonorecord of the copyrighted work, does not convey ownership of copy-
right in and to that work or transfer any rights under copyright.
LERNER & BRFSLER, supra note 4, at 357 (footnotes omitted); David W. Schaaf, Estate Planning
for Authors and Artists, 423 TAX MGMr. (BNA) 1, A-4(1) (1990) ("A copyright is essentially an
aggregation of intangible rights, including the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribu-
tion, the rights of public performance and display, and the right to prepare derivative
works.") (footnote omitted); Peter H. Karlen, Appraiser's Responsibility for Determining Fair Mar-
ket Value: A Question of Economics, Aesthetics and Ethics, 13 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 185, 210
n.157 (1989).
6. It may not always be in the best interests of estate beneficiaries that the value of
property for estate tax purposes be reduced by all available discounts. Under I.R.C.
§ 1014(a) (1) (1986), the basis of property acquired from a decedent is its fair market value at
the date of the decedent's death or, if alternate or special use value is elected, its value under
§ 2032 or 2032A. A discount will decrease not only the value of the property for estate tax
purposes, but the basis of the property to the successor. See Nelson E. Weiss, Using Blockage to
Obtain a Lower Value for Stock Is Not Always to the Taxpayer's Advantage, 32 TAX'N FOR Accr. 356,
357 (1984) (suggesting that it may be more advantageous in some circumstances to gain the
step-up in basis than to reduce value through use of blockage).
All references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in
effect on the date of this article, unless otherwise indicated.
7. See O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2702 ("Appraising, buying, or selling a large group
of works by a single artist is considerably different from appraising, buying, or selling a single
work. This difference is a result of the nature of the art market.").
8. The federal government imposes a generation-skipping transfer tax in addition to
the estate and gift taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1986). Transfers at death and by gift dur-
ing life may, consequently, be subject not only to estate and gift tax, but to the generation-
skipping transfer tax. Valuation issues that may arise in connection with the generation-
skipping transfer tax are not considered in this article. See I.R.C. §§ 2621-2624 (1986) (pro-
viding rules for determining the taxable amount for purposes of the tax and for the valuation
of property).
9. See I.R.C. § 2001 (a) (imposing an estate tax on the transfer of the taxable estate of
every decedent) and § 2501 (a) (imposing a gift tax on the transfer of property by gift); Rei-
necke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347 (1929); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658
F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Treas.
Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(b) (as amended in 1992).
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relevant facts." 10 This measure of value generally applies to all property
for federal estate and gift tax purposes.11
Some types of property, however, are more easily valued than others.
Shares of stock regularly traded on established exchanges are relatively
easy to value objectively by reference to actual sales of identical shares on
or near the valuation date. 12 Valuation of artworks, however, offers no
such ease or certainty. Artworks are not fungible; each is unique. Sales of
the particular work to be valued, or of comparable pieces, may occur infre-
quently.1 3 Sale prices of similar works by the same artist, moreover, may
have much different values than the item to be valued.14 The difficulty of
valuing art is increased by the fact that art is bought and sold in private
sales, galleries, and at auctions. 15 Expert opinions, consequently, usually
must establish the value of art. While most of the factors upon which the
experts base their opinions are objective, 16 valuation of art is an inherently
subjective process 17 and experts' opinions often vary dramatically.
18
The difficulty of valuing art for estate tax purposes is often com-
pounded by the fact that many artists die owning significant numbers of
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965); accord United States v. Cartwright,
411 U.S. 546, 551 (1974) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b)); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992); Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B. 13.
11. Property is not always valued at fair market value for estate and gift tax purposes.
I.R.C. § 2032A (1986) permits executors to elect to value certain real property at its special
use, rather than fair market value. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1986) provide special valuation rules
which can result in valuation of property at other than fair market value.
12. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2 (as
amended in 1976); but see Harrop A. Freeman & Stephen P. Vinciguerra, Blockage Valuation in
Federal Tax Law, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 376 (1945-46) ("The most objective test of all, namely,
actual market rate, is nothing less than a series of individual subjective estimates by those who
do trade.").
13. See Furstenberg v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 83,545, 83,545 (Ct. Cl.
1978) ("Unlike such things as fungible goods or corporate stocks that are traded daily in
substantial quantities at markets that provide readily available price statistics as indications of
value, [Jean Baptiste Camille] Corot's figure paintings are rare, they are bought and sold
infrequently .... .").
14. William M. Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers of Art, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
214, 227 (1980) (-To determine fair market value one first looks to sales of similar works by
the same artist. Yet even similar works will differ in quality, size, subject matter, condition,
provenance, and rarity. Such differences can result in substantial variations in fair market
value.") (footnotes omitted).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 557-87.
16. See Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258 ("It is only where expert opinion is
supported by facts having strong probative value, that the opinion testimony will in itself be
given appropriate weight. The underlying facts must corroborate the opinion; otherwise
such opinion will be discounted or disregarded."); see also Karlen, supra note 5, at 189 (sug-
gesting that the appraisal of art "is objective because most of the factors, whether physical or
'market,' are already objective, such as size, condition, past sales prices, and other appraisals.
Even 'subjective' elements of the appraisal, such as aesthetic value and artistic value, are
relatively objective . . ").
17. See Debra B. Homer, Fine Art Appraisers: The Art, the Craft, and the Legal Design, 8
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 457, 462 (1984) (suggesting that the subjective aspects of the art
valuation process increase the chances for valuation errors); but see Karlen, supra note 5, at
189 (suggesting that the appraisal of art is an objective process).
18. See, e.g., Furstenberg v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 83,545, 83,548 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (noting that three experts with impressive qualifications valued "La Meditation" by
Jean Baptiste Camille Corot at $40,000, $90,000, and $250,000).
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unsold works. 19 Self-created artworks may represent the single greatest
component of value in an artist's estate.20 If the entire block of art were
offered for sale immediately after the artist's death, supply would almost
always exceed demand, and the prices of all the works would suffer.2 1 The
transfer of a substantial block of art by gift may present the same prob-
lem.22 Similarly, if a large block of listed securities (large in relation to the
number of shares typically traded during a reasonable period of time)
were offered for sale, the forces of supply and demand would depress the
market and all shares would command a reduced price.
23
The concept of blockage in tax law recognizes the impact of supply
and demand on value. Blockage acknowledges the realities of the market-
place. Supply and demand determine the price at which any item will
exchange hands in a market economy. Supply and price tend to be in-
versely correlated: decreasing supply increases price, while increasing sup-
ply decreases price.24 This factor has been accepted as relevant in the
valuation of large blocks of securities for more than fifty years, 25 and re-
cently has been used in the valuation of large blocks of art.
2 6
The Tax Court's recent decision in Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissionery
7
provides the occasion to consider the proper application of blockage in
the valuation of large blocks of art. Examination of the issue requires an
understanding of the valuation of property for transfer tax purposes,
blockage, and the valuation of art. Parts I, II, and III provide the necessary
foundation. I conclude that the value of large blocks of art should be
determined by reference to the price at which the block, as such, could be
sold outside the usual retail art market.
19. See, e.g., Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2700 (1992)
(artist who produced between 1,100 and 1,200 substantial works died owning approximately
400); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 650-53 (1972), affd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (artist who sold only 75 pieces of art through
galleries during his life died owning 425 pieces).
20. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mulli-
gan, J., dissenting) (noting that the art in David Smith's estate represented approximately
93% of the value of the total estate).
21. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2700; Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650,
653 (1972), afl'd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub non. 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
22. See Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985).
23. See infra note 280.
24. See Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938) ("It is a matter of
common knowledge that the value of any product or commodity, whether it be wheat, hogs
or otherwise, is affected by the law of supply and demand, and that where the former far
exceeds the latter, it has a depressing effect upon value."); Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251,
253 (D. Conn. 1937) ("Since market value varies with the quantity offered, (in this respect
differing from intrinsic value), the effect of placing the 17,679 shares in the market at one
time is a factor of great importance.").
25. See infra notes 282-325 and accompanying text.
26. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992); Calder v. Com-
missioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aff-d, 510
F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
27. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
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I. VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PURPOSES
Federal estate and gift taxes function as taxes on the transfer of prop-
erty,28 not taxes on property.29 Consequently, the value of the property
transferred must be determined in order to calculate the tax.3°
A. Time of Valuation
The value of property is not static; it changes with time as economic
conditions shift and perceptions about the future change.31 The value of
property for estate tax purposes is generally determined at the time of
death. 32 Although the Code purports to require valuation as of the time of
death, value is determined as of the date of death, without regard to the
hour of demise.33 The executor of the estate, however, can elect in cer-
tain cases to value property other than as of the date of death under alter-
nate valuation.3 4 The value of property for gift tax purposes is determined
at the date of gift.
3 5
The value of property, however, is not always the same immediately
before and immediately after death. A term life insurance policy in the
hands of an insured-owner may have little value before death, but have
value equal to the face amount of the policy to the beneficiary immedi-
ately after the insured's death.3 6 The death of a business partner may
adversely affect the value of a business.
3 7
Similarly, the value of property is not always the same the moment
before and the moment after transfer by gift. Shares of stock in a closely
held corporation which are part of a control block in the hands of a donor
may have a value greater than their pro rata share of the corporation's
value.3 8 If only a few shares are transferred by gift, however, the shares in
28. See supra note 9.
29. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962);
Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1 (b) (as amended in 1992).
The distinction is important because of the constitutional prohibition against unapportioned
direct taxes. Land, 303 F.2d at 172.
30. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2512 (1986).
3i. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238.
32. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1986); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-1 (a) (as amended in 1965).
33. See David E. Watts, The Fair Market Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 Tax LAw. 51,
57 (1976).
34. I.RC. § 2032 (1986).
35. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1986).
36. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862
(1962).
37. Id. at 172 ("It is only in the few cases where death alters value, as well as ownership,
that it is necessary to determine whether the value at the time of death reflects the change
caused by death, for example, loss of services of a valuable partner to a small business.");
Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102, 103-04 (7th Cir. 1933) (holding that a reduction
should have been made in the valuation of a company to reflect the loss of a key person);
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 239.
38. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1975) (the market
price of stock which carries control should be adjusted to reflect a control premium); Estate
of Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577, 1581 (1987); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as




the hands of the donee would constitute a minority interest and have less
than a pro rata share of the corporation's value.3 9 At what time and in
whose hands is value determined for estate and gift tax purposes?
The Fifth Circuit rejected "before-and-after" and "in-whose-hands" ap-
proaches to valuation in United States v. Land:
Brief as is the instant of death, the court must pinpoint its valu-
ation at this instant-the moment of truth, when the ownership
of the decedent ends and the ownership of the successors begins.
It is a fallacy, therefore, to argue value before-or-after death on
the notion that valuation must be determined by the value either
of the interest that ceases or of the interest that begins. Instead,
the valuation is determined by the interest that passes, and the
value of the interest before or after death is pertinent only as it
serves to indicate the value at death.
40
Accordingly, where the value of property after death is different from its
value before death, courts have given full effect to changes in value that
occurred at death.
4 1
Similarly, the gift tax regulations recognize that the value of property
transferred by gift is to be determined by valuing the property at the mo-
ment of transfer, without reference to its value in the hands of the donor
or donee:
The gift tax is not imposed upon the receipt of the property by
the donee, nor is it necessarily determined by the measure of
enrichment resulting to the donee from the transfer, nor is it
conditioned upon ability to identify the donee at the time of
transfer. On the contrary, the tax is a primary and personal lia-
bility of the donor, is an excise upon his act of making the trans-
fer, is measured by the value of the property passing from the
donor, and attaches regardless of the fact that the identity of the
donee may not then be known or ascertainable.
42
Valuing property as of the moment of the taxable event, the moment
of transfer, without reference to its value in the hands of the transferor or
the transferee, afforded taxpayers substantial tax avoidance opportuni-
ties43 and led to some dramatic results. In Estate of Harrison v. Commis-
sioner,44 the Tax Court valued a limited partnership interest, which had a
value in decedent's hands before death of $59,555,020, at $33,000,000 for
39. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing
cases in which minority discounts had been allowed for estate and gift taxes).
40. 303 F.2d at 172; accord Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957) ("The [estate] tax is measured by the value of assets transferred by reason
of death, the critical value being that which is determined as of the time of death."). Not all
courts, however, have found focus on the moment of transfer enlightening. See Citizens Bank
& Trust v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Nor do we get much help
from being told that 'brief as is the instant of death, the court must pinpoint its valuation at
this instant'-the much-cited but enigmatic formulation in United States v. Land. . . .").
41. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981); Land, 303
F.2d at 172.
42. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1983).
43. SeeJohn A. Wallace, Now You See It, Now You Don't-Valuation Conundrums in Estate
Planning, 24 INST. ON Esr. PLkN. 8-1 (1990).
44. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1987).
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estate tax purposes because the decedent's right as a general partner to
dissolve the partnership ceased to exist at death.4 5 Congress enacted
§ 2704(a) in response to the result of Estate of Harrison.46 Section 2704(a)
provides that the lapse of certain voting or liquidation rights will be
treated as additional transfers for tax purposes. Consequently, some of
the tax avoidance opportunities that existed under prior law have been
curtailed.
Congress, however, did not change the moment at which property is
valued for estate and gift tax purposes. The value of the transferred prop-
erty is still determined as of the moment of the taxable event, without
regard to the value it had in the hands of the transferor or will have in the
hands of the transferee. 47 This principle is consistent with the meaning of
fair market value that has developed over the years.48 Valuation as of the
taxable event and the current concept of fair market value provide the
foundation for the allowance of minority and blockage discounts.
49
45. Id. at 1308. The Tax Court relied upon the decision in Land. It valued the property
interest that was transferred at the moment of death; not the interest that the decedent had
owned. Id. at 1308-09. The value of the partnership interest, consequently, was the amount a
potential buyer would pay for the limited partnership interest which did not possess a liqui-
dation right. Id. at 1309.
46. See S. Stacy Eastland, Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, 7 PROB. & PROP.
59 (1993); Benton C. Strauss &James K. Shaw, Final Chapter 14 Regs. Clarify GRATs, Business
Planning, 19 EsT. PLAN. 259, 265-66 (1992).
47. Joseph M. Dodge has suggested a change from the current valuation approach:
(T]he best approach is the pragmatic one of including in the tax base the greater of
what the transferor had or what the transferee received. Such a rule is justified, not
so much by revenue maximizing considerations, but rather by the fact that any
other rule would create a situation wherein tax considerations would distort eco-
nomic and family decisions. Thus, any rule allowing a reduction in the tax base
with reference to what the transferee receives relative to what the transferor had
would encourage economic destruction and waste-or at least assertions to that
effect-and any rule actually producing such a result embodies silly policy.
Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAx L. REv. 241, 254 (1988).
48. See infra part I.B.
49. Not all tax reduction opportunities have been eliminated. See Wallace, supra note 43.
Courts, however, have sometimes refused to allow minority discounts, notwithstanding
the fact that a minority interest was transferred. In Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court refused to allow a minority discount for a 49.65% stock interest where the dece-
dent "implemented a plan [involving the gift of 1.76% of a company's stock] 18 days before
her death with the sole and explicit purpose to obtain a minority discount." 1990 T.C.M. (P-
H) 1 90,472, at 2243, 2257 (1990). The Court found the facts "extreme" and held that "[a]
minority discount should not be applied if the explicit purpose and effect of fragmenting the
control block of stock was solely to reduce Federal tax." Id. (citations omitted). The court
found that a clear understanding existed between the parties "to maintain family control of
the corporation." Id. at 2263. It also found that decedent had enjoyed the power of control
until death notwithstanding her transfer. Id. at 2265. The substance over form doctrine was
also relied upon by the court. Id. at 2260-61. But see Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-16:
Absent proof of an express prior agreement concerning the future of the trans-
ferred stock between the donor and the donee, however, the failure to accord sepa-
rate and distinct transfers of minority interests a discount runs contrary to the gift
and estate tax regulations, which focus upon the property actually passing between
a given donor and donee.
Id.
Several commentators have suggested changes that would prevent control from escaping
taxation. Dodge, supra note 47, at 255 (suggesting that minority discounts be disallowed for
transfers which were originally part of a control block and that value be determined by refer-
ence to the largest interest in the property ever owned by the transferor); Mary Louise Fel-
lows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A
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B. Fair Market Value
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the "value" of certain prop-
erty be included in decedents' gross estates for estate tax purposes50 and
that the "value" of gifted property is the amount of the gift for gift tax
purposes. 5 1 The Code, however, does not define "value" or specify how it
is to be determined.5 2 The Treasury by its regulations has interpreted
"value" to mean "fair market value"53 and the courts have approved that
interpretation. 54 Treasury Regulations and case law, consequently, must
be reviewed to determine the meaning of fair market value.
55
Initial Treasury Regulations relating to the 1916 estate tax gave no
indication as to how value was to be determined for estate tax purposes.5 6
Regulations issued in 1919, however, specified that "[t]he value to be ascer-
tained is the market, or sale, value of the property."5 7 Value as the price
which a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property5 8 and the
term "fair market value"59 were introduced by the 1922 regulations. In
1924, the term "fair market value" was first defined in the gift and estate
tax regulations and absence of compulsion to buy or sell was added to the
formula.60 The requirement that both the willing buyer and willing seller
have reasonable knowledge of relevant facts was added in 1958.61 Finally,
a 1965 amendment directed that property be valued in the market in
which it is most commonly sold to the public.
62
Current Treasury Regulations use fair market value as the measure of
value for tax purposes 63 and define the term as follows:
[Flair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market
Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAr. L. REV. 895, 923 (1978) (propos-
ing "statutory modifications to provide that any gratuitous transfer of shares from a donor
who originally owned a controlling interest in a corporation shall be valued as if they were
part of the controlling block").
50. I.R.C. § 2031 (1986).
51. I.R.C. § 2512 (1986).
52. Kom v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1071, 1076 (1937).
53. Id. at 1077.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
55. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 48 n.14 (1987).
56. See Treas. Reg. 37, T.D. 2378, 18 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182 (1916).
57. Treas. Reg. 37, Art 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
58. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 13, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1922).
59. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2), 14(8), 14(9)(c), T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. 1036, 1048,
1050, 1052 (1922).
60. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924) ("The
fair market value is the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell."); Treas. Reg. 68,
Art. 13(a)(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1924).
61. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 479); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 650).
62. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369).
63. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
1994]
DENVER /VERSITY LAW REVIEW
value of a particular item of property includible in the decedent's
gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is
the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by
the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which
such item is most commonly sold to the public, taking into ac-
count the location of the item wherever appropriate. Thus, in
the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross
estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail mar-
ket, the fair market value of such an item of property is the price
at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail.
64
Fair market value is best understood by examining its components.
1. Price at Which Property Would Change Hands
Treasury Regulations define fair market value by reference to a hypo-
thetical sale in the marketplace. 65 It is "what-you-could-have-got-for-it-in-
money-if-you-had-sold-it,"6 6 in other words, the cash price at which a trade
would occur.
67
Value in the marketplace is forward-looking and reflects opinions, ex-
pectations, and prophecies about the future. In 1929 Justice Holmes
observed:
[T] he value of property at a given time depends upon the relative
intensity of the social desire for it at that time, expressed in the
money that it would bring in the market. Like all values, as the
word is used by the law, it depends largely on more or less certain
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time
if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out
true.
68
Judge Hand similarly noted that "[iln the end value is no more than the
opinions of those who have, and those who have not, when they
coincide."
69
While fair market value is the price that would result if the property
changed hands, the regulations sometimes require value be determined
by reference to actual sale prices of comparable property. Current regula-
64. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
65. [No. 115] FED. EsT. & Girr TAx REP. (CCH) 8 (Oct. 14, 1985) (containing text of IRS
training material titled IRS Valuation Guide for Income, Estate and Gift Taxes) [hereinafter IRS
Valuation Guide]. The IRS Valuation Guide was:
[DIesigned primarily to benefit IRS officials who negotiate settlements of income,
estate and gift tax cases in which valuation of real or personal property is necessary,
but it also gives taxpayers and tax advisors a valuable insight into the major valua-
tion problem areas and the accepted methods and approaches applied by IRS Ap-
peals Officers in considering valuation questions.
Id. at 1.
66. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748
(1943).
67. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 8.
68. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (citations omitted).
69. Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1926), cet. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927);
accord United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); see
also Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 (noting that "valuation is not an exact science").
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tions generally require the value of stocks and bonds traded in active mar-
kets be determined on the basis of actual sales of identical securities.
70
The value of property for which special rules have not been provided,
however, is to be determined on the basis of a hypothetical sale consider-
ing "[a]ll relevant facts and elements of value."
71
Resort to the market and use of the price at which the property would
have sold in an arm's length sale provides a reasonable approach to deter-
mining value for transfer tax purposes.72 Sale prices in active markets re-
flect the consensus of the public as to value and the prospects for the
property.73 The property, moreover, presumably could have been sold at
fair market value and the cash proceeds, rather than the property, could
have been transferred.
7 4
2. Willing Buyer and Willing Seller
Fair market value is the price at which both a willing buyer and a
willing seller would have traded. The "willing" nature of the parties ap-
pears to have been the Treasury's initial attempt to postulate a voluntary
sale; one made without coercion. 7- "Willingness" on the part of the par-
ties, therefore, is related to the requirement that value not be determined
in a forced sale or a sale under compulsion.
76
70. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b) (as amended in 1992); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(b)
(as amended in 1976) (providing that the fair market value of stocks or bonds traded on
exchanges is generally the mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the
valuation date).
71. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
72. See Emanuel L. Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAx L. Rev. 35, 37 (1952) ("In
the light of the difficulties involved in determining intrinsic value, [fair market value] ... is,
in fact, a more acceptable and practical administrative device, whatever its relative theoretical
deficiencies may be.").
73. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238.
74. See Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 551, 556 (1941) (noting that the
securities to be valued could have been sold at a comparable price with the stock which had
actually traded had they been offered); Gordon, supra note 72, at 38.
75. See infra part I.B.3.
76. The IRS views willingness as a state of mind, different from the absence of a compul-
sion, if only in degree:
What exactly is a willing buyer or seller? Basically, it is a state of mind--so this
hypothetical sale starts out with someone who wants to buy the property and some-
one who wants to sell the property. Why is this important? Because if the buyer
doesn't want to buy, and the seller doesn't want to sell, either no sale would take
place, or the sale that did take place would not be representative of fair market
value.
Please note that the presence of a willing buyer and a willing seller is different from
the absence of a compulsion to buy or sell-the difference is one of degree.
IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 8-9. See also Gordon, supra note 72, at 46 ("[T]he term
'willing' has generally come into issue only in cases of a sharp departure from sales in the
ordinary course. A sale which is part of a complete sellout of some activity or is a forced sale
is disqualified by the 'willing' requirement.") (footnotes omitted).
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a. Hypothetical Nature of Buyer and Seller
i. Relationship Between the Transferor and Transferee
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") long maintained
that the relationship between the transferor and transferee was a factor to
be considered in valuing property for estate and gift tax purposes.7 7 If a
donor made gifts of stock within his family, the Service presumed the fam-
ily would act in concert to maximize value. Further, if the family's owner-
ship provided control, the Service valued the gifts as a pro rata share of the
value of the family's controlling interest under a "unity of ownership"
theory.
78
The Fifth Circuit soundly rejected the Service's position in Estate of
Bright v. United States.79 In Bright, a husband and wife owned 55% of a
company's stock as community property.8 0 Upon the wife's death, the
stock was divided under local law8 l and the wife's 27.5% interest was de-
vised in trust naming the husband as trustee.8 2 The IRS argued that the
55% control block should be valued and that one-half of this control block
value should be included in the wife's gross estate.
8 3
The Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS's argument and determined that
only decedent's 27.5% interest was to be valued.84 Family attribution was
rejected for three reasons. First, it was not supported by the case law.
85
Second, attribution was "logically inconsistent" with the willing buyer,
willing seller rule contemplated by the regulations.8 6 Third, rejection of
attribution advanced the policy that the law should be stable and pre-
dictable.
8 7
The court held that the willing buyer and willing seller in the fair
market value formulation were hypothetical persons, unrelated to each
other:
The notion of the "willing seller" as being hypothetical is
also supported by the theory that the estate tax is an excise tax on
the transfer of property at death and accordingly that the valua-
tion is to be made as of the moment of death and is to be mea-
sured by the interest that passes, as contrasted with the interest
held by the decedent before death or the interest held by the
legatee after death.... It would be strange indeed if the estate
77. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1001 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981); see also IRS
Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88.
78. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188; IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88. The
IRS revoked Rev. Rul. 81-253 in 1993. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.RB. 13, 14.
79. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1000.
81. Id. at 1001.
82. Id. at 1000.
83. Id. at 1001.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1005.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1006.
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tax value of a block of stock would vary depending upon the lega-
tee to whom it was devised.
8 8
The decision not only precluded valuation of decedent's 27.5% interest as
part of a control block, but opened the door to the possibility that a mi-
nority discount might be allowed.8 9
The Service issued Revenue Ruling 81-25390 in response to Bright and
maintained that minority discounts were not ordinarily allowable in the
valuation of stock transferred among family members where the family
possessed control. 9 1 The Service justified its position on the basis that the
judicial authority was inconsistent 92 and it was unlikely that shares that
were part of a controlling interest would be sold outside the family other
than as a unit.93 According to the Service, "where a controlling interest in
stock is owned by a family, the value per share of stock owned by one
family member is the same as stock owned by any other family member
and is the same value that would exist if all the stock were held by one
person."
9 4
The weak judicial authority relied upon by the Service, however, soon
disappeared entirely as courts followed Bright.95 The Ninth Circuitjoined
the Fifth in rejecting the Service's "unity of ownership" theory and held
that determining value by reference to hypothetical buyers and sellers pro-
vided a desirable objective standard of valuation.9 6 Similarly, the Tax
Court held that it was improper to place any weight upon the identity of
the parties in determining fair market value.
97
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1000 n.1 ("The [district court's] order did not mandate a minority discount; it
held only that the interest to be valued was in fact a 27 1/2% interest, which of course left
open for proof at trial whether or not the taxpayer would in fact adduce proof to support a
minority discount.").
90. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. Several commentators have suggested that the cases relied upon by the Service
provided weak support for the ruling. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-16 ("The Service cited
several cases in Revenue Ruling 81-253 in support of its position, all of which involved trans-
actions where the members of the family in question were rather obviously undertaking con-
certed action with respect to the transfers in question."); Sandra S. Kramer, Questions Remain
in the Valuation of Blocks of Stock, 16 TAX ADvisoR 630, 637 (Oct. 1985). The Tax Court, in a
decision rendered after issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-253, found two of the cases relied
upon by the Service provided "at best weak support" for denial of minority discounts. Estate
of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 955-56 (1982).
93. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Andrews, 79 T.C.
938.
96. The use of an objective standard avoids the uncertainties that would otherwise
be inherent if valuation methods attempted to account for the likelihood that es-
tates, legatees, or heirs would sell their interests together with others who hold un-
divided interests in the property. Executors will not have to make delicate inquiries
into the feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior of those holding undivided
interests in the property in question.
Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1252.
97. Andrews, 79 T.C. at 954-56; Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470,
486 (1985).
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Confronted with judicial rejection of its position, the IRS acknowl-
edged defeat in Revenue Ruling 93-12.98 The Service revoked Revenue
Ruling 81-253 and ruled that in valuing shares of stock transferred to fam-
ily members for gift tax purposes, shares of other family members would
not be aggregated with the transferred shares to determine whether they
should be valued as part of a controlling interest. 99 The IRS also ruled
that "a minority discount will not be disallowed solely because a trans-
ferred interest, when aggregated with interests held by family members,
would be a part of a controlling interest."10 0 The ruling recognized that
fair market value should be determined by valuing the interest transferred
at the moment of the taxable event, without reference to the relationship
between the transferor and transferee, and without regard to the prop-
erty's value in the hands of the transferor or transferee.
ii. Identity of Willing Buyers
Although case law establishes that the willing buyer and willing seller
are hypothetical, unrelated parties, is the fact that the group of potential
buyers contains a particular person to whom the property has greater
value relevant in determining value? If fifty-one shares of stock provide
control of a closely held corporation, the owner of fifty shares would place
a greater value on one share offered for sale than would someone who
owned no shares. The additional share would provide control to the
owner of fifty shares and increase the value of his other shares, but to the
nonshareholder, it would merely represent a minority interest in a closely
held business.
10 1
The IRS argued in Bright that a factor to consider in determining
value was whether the property might have greater value to some buyers
than to others.' 0 2 The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether such evidence
was relevant, however, because the issue had not been raised prior to ap-
peal.1 03 The court noted, nonetheless, that a "few cases had acknowl-
edged the relevance of such facts." 10 4 The IRS read the court's discussion
of this issue as suggesting its position might have merit.10 5
Determination of fair market value, however, should not be made by
reference to the property's value to particular individuals, but by reference
98. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B. 13.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
101. The Tax Court has recognized that two separate discounts, a minority shareholder
discount and a lack of marketability discount, may apply in the valuation of a minority inter-
est. Andrews, 79 T.C. at 953; accord Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 1990 T.C.M. (P-H)
90,472, at 2243, 2255-56 (1990); see also Fellows & Painter, supra note 49, at 920-21 (discussing
the minority and lack of marketability discounts as separate discounts).
102. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 1008.
104. Id. at 1007 (citations omitted).
105. One argument raised but not considered by the Court [in Bright] (because it was
not timely raised) appears to have merit based upon the discussion in the opinion.
The argument is that within the group of "willing buyers" is that shareholder who
has a minority interest, but, with the interest being valued, would have control.
IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88 (footnote omitted).
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to its value to members of the general public. A contrary conclusion
would emasculate Bright and its progeny.
Consider a corporation capitalized with 100 shares of stock owned by
parent (30), child (50), and unrelated investor (20). Assume that control
of the corporation would be provided by ownership of fifty-one shares. If
parent makes a gift of one share to child, case law and Revenue Ruling 93-
12 preclude aggregation of parent's and child's shares to value the trans-
ferred share as part of a controlling interest. But if the IRS could consider
child (to whom the share would provide control and have greater value
than to the general public) as a member of the group of willing buyers, a
valuation similar to that which would be derived under the "unity of own-
ership" theory would result; the transferred share would be valued as part
of a control block.
Such an approach, carried to its logical extreme, would have addi-
tional unjustified results. What if parent (owner of thirty shares) gave one
share to a valuable employee? What would the fair market value of that
share be for gift tax purposes? The single share represents a minority in-
terest in the closely held business. It was not part of a control block in the
hands of the transferor and will not be part of a control block in the hands
of the transferee. Fair market value is the price at which the share would
trade hands in a hypothetical sale. If child (owner of fifty shares) is in-
cluded in the group of willing buyers for purposes of determining value,
the share would be valued as part of a control block. The valuable em-
ployee, after all, could resell the share to child to whom the share would
provide the margin of control.
10 6
Fair market value should be established by reference to the price that
a member of the general public would pay for the property. The price
that a particularly motivated buyer would pay could be disregarded on the
grounds that he "is acting unreasonably if he cannot make a purchase with
confidence that the . . . [property] could be immediately resold for the
same or similar price."10 7 If child (owner of fifty shares) purchased the
additional share and thereafter offered the single share for resale, what
price would a willing buyer, who could not obtain control, be willing to
pay?
The Tax Court has correctly rejected consideration of the price par-
ticularly motivated buyers would pay in the valuation of property:
Respondent's approach would have us tailor "hypothetical" so
that the willing seller and willing buyer were seen as the particu-
lar persons who would most likely undertake the transaction.
However, the case law and regulations require a truly hypotheti-
cal willing seller and willing buyer. We must assume these hypo-
thetical parties exist even though the reality of the situation may
106. This is essentially the argument made by the IRS in Bright. 658 F.2d at 1007.
107. Karlen, supra note 5, at 202; cf. Fellows & Painter, supra note 49, at 919-20.
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be that the stock will most probably be sold to a particular party
or type of person.
10 8
The price that a particularly motivated buyer would pay does not establish
fair market value because it is an artificially high value not obtainable in a
sale to a member of the general public.
3. Neither Being Under any Compulsion to Buy or to Sell
The notion that fair market value is the price that would be obtaina-
ble in a voluntary sale emerged as successive Treasury Regulations were
promulgated. Regulations adopted in 1922 provided that value was the
price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for property.10 9 Two years
later, the requirement that neither buyer nor seller be under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell was added.'1 0 In 1933, the regulations provided that
fair market value was not to be determined by a "forced sale.""'
A price in a forced sale is obviously not one for fair market value" 12
and should not be used to determine transfer taxes. The IRS Valuation
Guide provides that "[a] sale under which one party or the other would be
compelled would not be representative of fair market value, because if the
buyer is compelled to buy, the price would be artificially high, and if the
seller is compelled to sell, the price would be artificially low."
113
But is this requirement not inconsistent with the statutory require-
ment that value be determined as of a particular date?1' 4 If value must be
determined as of a certain date, is the price that would be obtained in a
sale on that date, even if in a forced sale, not the value required by the
Code?
Not surprisingly, taxpayers have argued that value must be deter-
mined by what the property would have sold for on the valuation date."
5
108. Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 956 (1982); accord Estate of Gallo v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 486 (1985) (rejecting an IRS argument that presumed
shares being valued would be purchased by members of decedent's family as being "inconsis-
tent with the holding of Estate of Bright v. United States, expressly adopted by both the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court. For our purposes, the assumed purchaser of
the shares in issue must be hypothetical, not a Gallo family member.") (citations omitted).
109. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 13, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1922).
110. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924); see
also Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1925).
111. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19 (1) (1933 ed.), reprinted in 139 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs OF ThE
UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams,Jr., ed. 1979); see also Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1)
(1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrrERNA REVENUE Acrs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 (Ber-
nard D. Reams, Jr., ed. 1979).
112. See Korn v. Commissioner, 35 B.TA 1071, 1079 (1937) (holding that the limited
market price of a remainder interest did not establish fair market value, where taxpayer's
witness did not believe the sale prices were fair and had a forced sale character).
113. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 9.
114. See supra part I.A.
115. Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 598, 599 (3d Cir. 1935).
The petitioners argue that, had they dumped on the market large blocks of the
listed stock, they could not have obtained prices even approximating those deter-
mined by the Commissioner. They contend that the listed stock should be valued at




Indeed, a district court adopted such an approach in an early case,' 16 but
other courts have correctly rejected forced sale single-date valuations.
117
Fair market value is to be determined by what the property would have
sold for if offered for sale in a prudent manner for a reasonable period of
time.
1 18
4. Both Parties Having Reasonable Knowledge of Relevant Facts
The willing buyer and willing seller in the hypothetical sale used to
determine fair market value are required to have reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. A purchase or sale made without such knowledge cannot be
said to be "fair" except by coincidence. 1 9 However, only "reasonable
knowledge" is required; neither equal nor complete knowledge is man-
dated. The seller will almost always have more complete and accurate in-
formation regarding the property than will the buyer.
Courts have recognized that not all participants in markets will be
equally well-informed. 120 But where markets exist, as is the case for pub-
licly traded stocks, it has been held that the market should be considered
as having assimilated the available information. 12 1 Attempts to disregard
quoted prices on the basis that relevant information had been concealed,
and thus the market price did not reflect a "fair" value, have been re-
jected. 122 Organized markets normally produce prices which an owner
Id. Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 224 (1984), afftd, 795 F.2d 45
(8th Cir. 1986).
116. Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1937).
117. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946):
[Niothing in the law or common sense requires the trier to attempt to ascertain
what the property in question would have fetched at a sale through a sales effort
begun and ended on the critical date. Surely the fair market value of, say, a resi-
dence is not measured by the price which the owner could have obtained for it on
the very day upon which he first decided to sell. Rather, the measure there, as in
the case here, is what "a skillful broker could within a reasonable period have
realized."
Id. at 103; Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938) ("It would
have been improper of course to have adopted as the true value of the stock the price obtain-
able by forcing or dumping the whole block on the market at one time .... ."); Laird, 85 F.2d
at 599 ("[P]rices obtained upon a sacrifice sale do not necessarily represent the true value of
the listed stock."); Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225 ("[W]e are not required to assume that
the entire block was dumped on the market at one time on the valuation date."); see also
Weston Vernon, Jr. & Robert T. Molloy, Blockage and the Invested Capital Credit, 8 TAx L. REv.
131, 144 (1953).
118. Richardson, 151 F.2d at 103; Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
119. Gordon, supra note 72, at 36.
120. See, e.g., Rogers v. Helvering, 107 F.2d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
121. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 55 (1987). But see Watts, supra note 33,
at 65 (suggesting that information that has a substantial market impact and which becomes
available on the valuation date, but which is not fully reflected in selling prices, should result
in valuation adjustments).
122.. In Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, the taxpayer contended that prices at which stock
traded on an exchange should not be used for estate tax purposes because the prices re-
sulted from misrepresentations and concealments of facts of which sellers and purchasers
were unaware. 43 B.T.A. 551, 555 (1941). The Board rejected that argument on the basis
that the estate's shares could have been sold at the market prices. Id. at 555. The conse-
quences that would follow acceptance of the taxpayer's argument also warranted rejection:
[T] he administrative and judicial difficulties which would be involved in the adop-
tion of any different rule convince us that petitioner's position is untenable. If it
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could have received had he sold on the date on which price is deter-
mined.1 23 The ability to have sold the property in the market justifies use
of market prices even if the market was "rigged."
124
a. Post-Valuation Date Events and Information
The value of property for federal transfer tax- purposes is generally
determined as of the date of death or gift. Treasury Regulations provide
that all relevant facts and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date
shall be considered in determining value. 12 5 But must all events occurring
thereafter and information learned thereafter be ignored in the valuation
process? What if the property is sold after the valuation date? Shouldn't
the actual price obtained in a bona fide sale within a reasonable period
after the valuation date be relevant in determining value? What better
evidences "fair market value" than an actual sale in the marketplace?
12 6
Why hypothesize a sale price when the actual sale price is known?
Early Treasury Regulations recognized that the price at which prop-
erty sold after death might be the best evidence of value. 12 7 The 1919
regulations provided that the sale price of property sold within a reason-
able time after the decedent's death would be accepted as the estate tax
value, if the sale was made in a manner that would "insure the best price
obtainable under existing circumstances." 128 Regulations promulgated in
1924, however, limited the use of selling prices by requiring a showing that
the sale price reflected fair market value as of the valuation date. 12 9 The
regulations did not, however, specify how far removed a sale could be
from the valuation date and still have been made within a reasonable time.
Early on the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether post-
death events should be considered in determining estate taxes. In Ithaca
were always necessary to discover whether every material fact was known to the pub-
lic before stock exchange prices could be relied upon in fixing fair market value,
and indeed to determine what factors are and what are not material in the opera-
dons of the whole body of the trading public, it would, we think, be impossible for
administrative officers or taxpayers to make an intelligent approximation of their
own situation.
Id. at 556. See also Watts, supra note 33, at 62-63 (suggesting that the convenience and simplic-
ity of using stock market quotations to establish value justifies refusals to permit challenges to
the use of market prices, except in unusual circumstances, and that adjustments to market
prices might not produce a more reliable valuation than the market quotations).
123. Wright, 43 B.T.A. at 555; Gordon, supra note 72, at 37.
124. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748
(1943).
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
126. SeeEstate of Kaplin v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1984) ("In deter-
mining the fair market value of property, little evidence could be more probative than the
direct sale of the property in question."); Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985)
("[W]e have what has been described as the most reliable evidence of value, to wit, sales of the
same property within a short period of time prior to the valuation date."); IRS Valuation
Guide, supra note 65, at 8 ("Obviously, an actual sale of the property would be the best indica-
tor of value . . ").
127. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
128. Id.
129. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924);
Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1925).
[Vol. 71:2
FAIR MARKET VALUE
Trust Co. v. United States,'30 the decedent devised the residue of his estate
to his spouse for life with remainder in trust for charities. 3 1 Decedent's
spouse died within six months of his death 3 2 and the Court had to decide
the effect, if any, that her death had on the amount of the charitable de-
duction. Should the value of the wife's life estate be calculated using mor-
tality tables, or on the basis that she had died within six months of
decedent?133 The Court relied upon the nature of the estate tax in an-
swering the question:
The [estate] tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of
property by the legatees. Therefore the value of the thing to be
taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done....
Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now
certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done, but that
the value of wife's life interest must be estimated by the mortality
tables.1
3 4
The subsequent event was not to be considered.
135
Consideration of post-valuation date events or information not avail-
able on date of valuation may impact the value of property included in the
gross estate, the amount of a charitable or marital deduction, and the
amount of deductible claims against an estate. Ithaca Trust is frequently
cited in cases involving these diverse issues. 13 6 While Ithaca Trust might
suggest that subsequent events are irrelevant for all estate tax purposes,
the correct reading of Ithaca Trust is the subject of differing views.
13 7
Courts have not always read the decision broadly.'
3 8
The Tax Court has suggested that the conflicting case law can be un-
derstood if decisions are separated into "valuation" and "enforceability"
cases. 1
39
In First National Bank of Kenosha v. United States,' 40 a valuation case, the
Seventh Circuit characterized the principle of Ithaca Trust as a rule of rele-
130. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
131. Id. at 154.
132. Id. at 155.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1988)
(amount of claim); First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir.
1985) (value of property); Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1983) (amount of claim); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982)
(amount of claim); Estate of Cafaro v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) 89,348 at 1759,
1762 (1989) (amount of claim).
137. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160 (noting that in the Eighth Circuit the date-of-death rule of
Ithaca Trust had been limited to the valuation of charitable bequests); Cafaro, 1989 T.C.M. (P-
H) at 1762 (observing that the cases are apparently divided on how Ithaca Trust applies to
deductions other than charitable ones).
138. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160 (Ithaca Trust rule limited to valuation of charitable be-
quests); Estate of Kyle v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 829, 849 (1990) (noting that lower courts
frequently considered post-death events notwithstanding Ithaca Trust).
139. Cafaro, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1763.
140. 763 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1985).
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vance. 14 1  The court found subsequent sale information generally
admissible:
[C] ourts have not been reluctant to admit evidence of actual sales
prices received for property after the date of death, so long as the
sale occurred within a reasonable time after death and no inter-
vening events drastically changed the value of the property....
Moreover, evidence of actual price received for property in the
estate after the date of death is generally admitted without any
discussion of the rule against admission of post-valuation date
events.
This seeming inconsistency is explained by looking to the
purposes of the rule. The rule against admission of subsequent
events is, simply stated, a rule of relevance.
142
Evidence of a post-death sale could be relevant to the question of date of
death value, whereas evidence of most post-valuation date events would
not.
1 43
Evidence of subsequent sales, consequently, is generally admissi-
ble. 144 But such evidence is not determinative of value, 1 45 nor by itself
does it establish value. 146 Subsequent sales may be used to confirm that a
valuation as of the valuation date was correct. 14 7 But not all such sales are
relevant. In order for a subsequent sale to be relevant the sale must be at
arm's length, for reasonable consideration, not have been forced or made
under distress conditions, and have been made reasonably close in time to
the valuation date. 1 48 Factors affecting value that arise after the valuation
date must be carefully considered; 14 9 the proximity of a sale to the valua-
tion date affects the weight to be given the sale. 150 Although no rule exists
as to when a reasonable time will be exceeded, 15 1 the "question should be
resolved by a consideration of the amount of activity in the particular mar-
ket for the asset involved, the trend of the market, and the overall change
in economic conditions between the dates of reference.
1 52




145. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 450 (1980).
146. See Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 510 (1967); Buffalo Tool &Die, 74 T.C. at
450.
147. Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 318 (6th Cir. 1943); Estate of Larson v. Com-
missioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 481, 486 (1944); Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. Conn.
1937); Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12, at 374.
148. LAWRENCE H. AvW~iLL, JR., ESTATE VALUATION HANDBOOK § 2.11, at 46-47 (1983).
149. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883, 893 (1978).
150. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 928, 932 (1980); Wheeler,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 893.
151. See, e.g., Estate of Kaplin v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Tax Court erred in not considering the sale of property made approximately two years after
the valuation date, but Tax Court's refusal to consider sale of the property five and one-half
years after the valuation date was not error); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
883, 893 (1978) (sale of property in the year following the valuation date was highly proba-
tive evidence of value on the valuation date).
152. Michael F. Beausang, Jr., Valuation: General and Real Estate, 132-3rd Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) at A-5 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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The IRS provided guidance on the use of post-death sale prices of
certain tangible personal property in Revenue Procedure 65-19.153 The
Service recognized that certain items of tangible personal property, while
available at retail stores, are often obtained through public auctions or
sales advertised in classified advertisements.1 5 4 This ruling provides that
the price at which such property sells in a bona fide sale as a result of a
newspaper classified ad or at a public auction will be presumed to be the
retail sales price of the item at the time of sale.' 55 More importantly, the
sales price will be presumed to be the value as of the applicable valuation
date provided the sale is made within a reasonable time after decedent's
death and market conditions and other circumstances affecting value have
not changed substantially since death. 156 The ruling comports with the
approach courts have taken in considering subsequent sale evidence.
Evidence other than of subsequent sales prices learned after the valu-
ation date may also be relevant in determining value. But the only rele-
vant facts are those that the hypothetical buyer and seller could reasonably
have been expected to know at the valuation date.157 Subsequent events
are not to be considered, except to the extent they were reasonably fore-
seeable on that date.' 5 8 Use of information unknown or unavailable on
the valuation date would result in valuation on a later date, rather than on
the date of the taxable event.
159
5. In a Market in Which Such Item is Most Commonly Sold to the
Public
Two issues arise in connection with identification of the market in
which the hypothetical sale used to determine value takes place. First, in
what market is value determined? Is it the retail or wholesale market?
The answer is important because the market in which property is sold af-
fects price; 160 retail prices tend to exceed wholesale prices. Second, from
whose perspective is value determined? Is value determined by the price
the willing buyer would pay or by the amount the willing seller would re-
ceive in the hypothetical sale? While there may be no difference in these
amounts in a private sale, transactional costs payable by the buyer or the
seller may cause these amounts to vary significantly.
153. Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1003.
157. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1985);
Estate of Mosher v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C.M. (P-H) 145, 147 (1988); see Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 (value of securities to be determined on the basis of facts available at the
required valuation date).
158. First Nat', 763 F.2d at 894; Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987).
159. See First Nat'! 763 F.2d at 894 ("Information that the hypothetical willing buyer could
not have known is obviously irrelevant to this calculation [of value]."); Watts, supra note 33, at
63 ("Subsequently discovered facts relating to conditions existing at the date of valuation but
not then known to any person, such as an unsuspected mineral deposit, should not constitute
a basis for adjustments to the relevant trading data.").
160. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115, 2120 (1986).
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Early estate tax regulations provided that "[t] he highest price obtaina-
ble for the property within a reasonable period of the decedent's death"
was its value for estate tax purposes. 16 1 The market in which the hypothet-
ical sale was to be made was not specified and the regulations failed to
distinguish between retail and wholesale markets.162 The regulations rec-
ognized that sales could be made by several methods and required that
value be determined under the method that produced the best price.
1 63
In 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that in some circumstances
neither the amount that a willing buyer would pay, nor the amount that a
willing seller would receive adequately establishes value for gift tax pur-
poses. In Guggenheim v. Rasquin,1 6 4 the taxpayer paid $852,438.50 for sev-
eral single-premium life insurance policies on her life. 165 She assigned
the policies simultaneously upon issuance. 16 6 The taxpayer argued that
the market for the policies was limited and that their value was the amount
which could be obtained in a sale in that limited market under the willing
buyer and willing seller test.167 According to the taxpayer, the market
consisted of the issuing company or a lender and neither would pay more
than the amount realizable by the owner: the policies' cash surrender
value ($717,344.81).168
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's approach overlooked the
nature of the property to be valued. 169 The Court found that the owner of
a life insurance policy did not merely have the right to receive its cash
surrender value, but could hold it until the insured's death and receive
the face amount of the insurance. 170 The difference between the cost of
the policy and its cash surrender value was evidence that purchasers of
insurance deemed these other rights to have substantial value. 17 1 The
Court held that the value of the policies was their cost even though "[(c] ost
in this situation is not market price in the normal sense of the term."
172
The Court appeared to recognize the tax avoidance possibilities that
would exist if cash surrender value established value for gift tax
purposes.1
73
161. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
162. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 19, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 766 (1919) (permit-
ting certain tangible personal property to be appraised at what it would sell for in a "bona
fide sale to individual purchasers, to dealers, or upon a well-advertised auction sale.").
163. Treas. Reg. 39, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
164. 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
165. Id. at 256.
166. Id. at 255.
167. Id. at 256-57.
168. Id. at 256.
169. Id. at 257.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 258.
173. Id. at 257-58 ("Certainly the petitioner here did not expend $852,438.50 to make an
immediate gift limited to $717,344.81. Presumptively the value of these policies at the date of
the gift was the amount which the insured had expended to acquire them. Cost is cogent
evidence of value."). If the Court had not adopted replacement cost as the measure of value
in this situation, taxpayers could remove value from the estate and gift tax system without
taxation. The taxpayer in Guggenheim v. Rasquin had two options. First, she could acquire
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In Publicker v. Commissioner,174 the idea of cost as value for gift tax
purposes was expanded to include excise taxes paid upon purchase. Pub-
licker purchased a diamond ring for $45,000 and paid a ten percent fed-
eral excise tax of $4,500.175 Five years later she gave the ring to her
daughter. 176 The ring was reported as having a value of $50,000 on the
gift tax return.1 77 The IRS, however, valued the ring at $100,000.178 The
Tax Court determined value by adding together the cost paid ($45,000),
twenty percent for appreciation ($9,000), and the excise tax that had been
paid ($4,500). 179 On appeal, the Third Circuit relied on Guggenheim v.
Rasquin for the principle that cost could be used to establish value. 180 The
court held that the excise tax should be added in determining value be-
cause the gift tax regulations provided value was the price at which the
property would exchange hands in a hypothetical sale.18 ' The court con-
cluded that "valuing the property as a sale, the amount of the excise tax
must be included for both the buyer and the seller would have in mind
and necessarily would calculate the amount of the excise tax as part of the
cost of the property."'
82
These cases did not, however, consider whether amount receivable or
replacement cost was the measure of value for estate tax purposes. Tax
avoidance opportunities, for example, eluding tax on acquisition costs, are
less likely to be exploited in connection with the estate tax. Use of an
amount receivable approach could be justified in determining values for
estate tax purposes.'
8 3
In Revenue Ruling 55-71,184 the Service determined that excise taxes
paid on jewelry, furs, and related articles of personal property are relevant
in the determination of value for both gift and estate tax purposes.'
8 5
Three years later, in 1958, the Treasury amended the gift, but not estate,
the policies and assign ownership or, second, she could transfer cash to the donees who
could purchase the policies. Unless the gift tax consequences to the taxpayer are identical in
both situations, taxpayers will be encouraged to purchase property, incur sales commissions,
taxes, and other costs, then transfer the property to the donee at a lower value determined
under the willing buyer willing seller construct. See LERNER & BR.sLER, supra note 4, at 534;
Recent Case, Gift Tax-Valuation-Sale or Replacement Value, 7 VAN. L. REv. 292, 294 (1954)
("Certainly when the article is purchased with the intent to make a gift, cost should be the
primary criterion.") (footnote omitted).
174. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
175. Id. at 251.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 252.
179. Id. at 252-53.
180. Id. at 254 ("If [ Guggenheim] ... is the applicable law, the Tax Court's approach in the
instant case is correct, for here cost and market value realizable on sale of the diamonds to
an individual for his personal use might well have been substantially the same.").
181. Id. at 256.
182. Id.
183. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 534-36 (suggesting the estate tax value of
property should normally be determined by the amount receivable rather than by reference
to decedent's cost); Recent Case, Gift Tax-Valuation--Sale or Replacement Value, supra note
173, at 294 (suggesting that it would be unfair to determine estate tax value on the basis of
cost where cost exceeded current sale value).
184. Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 C.B. 110.
185. Id. at 111.
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tax regulations to address the effect of excise taxes on valuation.1 8 6 The
Treasury provided that the value of property purchased at retail and trans-
ferred by gift within a reasonable time is generally the purchase price plus
the excise tax paid. 187 If the transfer is made beyond a reasonable time
after purchase, the excise tax is considered only to the extent it affects the
price at which the property would be sold in a hypothetical sale.
188
In 1965, the Treasury amended the estate and gift tax regulations to
provide that fair market value is determined in the market in which the
property is most commonly sold to the public.18 9 Value is determined in a
retail rather than wholesale market for items generally obtained by the
public at retail. 190 An example in the regulations provided that the value
of a used automobile is the price at which a similar automobile could be
purchased by a member of the general public. 19 1 The regulations gener-
ally adopted a replacement cost, or buyer's perspective, rather than an
amount receivable, or seller's perspective approach to valuation. 192 The
Treasury thus addressed both issues that arise in connection with identifi-
cation of the market. First, it provided that value is generally determined
in the retail, rather than the wholesale market. Second, it adopted a re-
placement cost approach to value.
A retail sale normally is one made to the ultimate consumer 9 3 who
does not hold the item for resale. 194 Sales to dealers or wholesalers, con-
sequently, will not ordinarily establish fair market value for items generally
obtained by the public at retail.195 Retail market sales may sometimes be
made by several methods. In Revenue Procedure 65-19,196 the Service rec-
ognized that certain tangible personal property generally obtained by the
public in the retail market, while available at retail stores, was frequently
obtained through public auctions or by sales resulting from classified
186. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-7 (T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 659).
187. Id. Failure of the Treasury to provide a similar rule in the estate tax regulations may
have been in recognition of the fact that the potential for tax abuse is less likely in connec-
tion with the estate tax.
188. Id.
189. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369); Note, FederalEstate and
Gift Taxation: Amended Regulations Change Valuation for Estate and Gift Taxes, 1966 DuKE LJ.
248, 248-49 (1966).
190. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369).
191. Id.
192. Joslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 382
(9th Cir. 1974); Dodge, supra note 47, at 253 ("The basic willing buyer, willing seller test for
valuing gift and estate transfers is oriented towards what the transferee would have to pay to
acquire the item, not what the decedent would have obtained by selling it."); Note, supra
note 189, at 254.
193. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115, 2120 (1986);
Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 322 (1985); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872,
882 (1983).
194. Biagiotti, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2120.
195. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
196. Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002.
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newspaper advertisements.19 7 Similarly, art may be purchased in the retail
market through private sales, galleries, or at auctions.198 But if property
can be acquired by several methods, alternative markets, not merely alter-
native sale methods, may be involved. 199
A seller will not always receive what a buyer pays in a sale because
transactional costs reduce the amount received. It is the price that the
willing buyer would pay, however, not the net amount receivable by the
seller, that must generally be included in a decedent's gross estate for es-
tate tax purposes. If the estate sells property and incurs selling expenses,
taxation based upon value under the replacement cost approach results in
taxation of amounts that are not being transferred by the decedent.
Some relief is provided by § 2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides a deduction in the computation of the estate tax for ad-
ministration expenses allowable under local law.20 0 Treasury Regulations,
however, limit the deduction for selling expenses to those incurred in
sales that are necessary "to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of adminis-
tration, or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution."20 1 These
regulations also provide that if a sale is "necessary" under the regulation, a
sale to a dealer at less than fair market value can result in an administra-
tion expense deduction equal to the difference.20 2 While similar relief is
not provided in connection with the gift tax (there being no administra-
tion), the donor can achieve an equivalent result by selling the item and
making a gift of the net sale proceeds, effectively converting the gift tax
from a tax measured by replacement cost to one determined by the
amount receivable.
20 3
C. Burden of Proof and Procedural Issues
The value of property is a question of fact. 204 The Commissioner's
valuation carries a presumption of correctness that the taxpayer has the
197. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 557-87.
199. See Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2121. The court held auction sales of pre-Colum-
bian art did not reflect sales in the retail market because such sales were composed of whole-
sale and retail transactions.
200. I.RC. § 2053(a) (1986).
201. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (2) (as amended in 1979); see infra notes 531-33 and ac-
companying text.
202. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (2) (as amended in 1979); see Note, supra note 189, at 250-
51.
203. Several reasons may explain why donors might not sell the property and transfer the
cash proceeds. First, the donor may not desire to complete an income taxable event because
the item's fair market value exceeds the donor's basis. Second, the donee may desire the
particular property rather than its net realizable value. Third, the donor may be concerned
that the donee might more readily spend a cash gift.
204. E.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Propstra v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982); Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 62 (8th
Cir.), cert. denid, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
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burden of proving incorrect.20 5 The Tax Court has discussed the effect of
the presumption and burden of proof as follows:
This presumption is a procedural device which requires peti-
tioner [taxpayer] to come forward with enough evidence to sup-
port a finding contrary to the [Commissioner's] determination.
Petitioner also bears the burden of proof.... This burden is a
burden of persuasion; it requires petitioner to demonstrate the
merits of its claim by at least a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent's presumption and petitioner's burden of proof thus
impose two separate and distinct obligations: (1) The burden of
going forward, and (2) the burden of persuasion.
To rebut respondent's presumption, petitioner must intro-
duce some substantial evidence tending to show that respondent
was wrong.
2 0 6
If the taxpayer introduces sufficient evidence, the burden of going for-
ward, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the Commissioner. 20 7
The burden of proof is also upon the taxpayer in tax refund litigation in
the district courts and U.S. Claims Court.
20 8
The Tax Court, as the trier of fact, must weigh all the evidence and
draw appropriate inferences in determining value.20 9 No formula exists
which can be used to determine value in every case. 2 10 All relevant facts
and elements of value are to be considered. 2 11 Relevant factors are those
that a buyer and seller would wish to know 2 12 and could reasonably have
been expected to know as of the valuation date.
2 15
Tax Court determinations of value are infrequently overturned on ap-
peal. This is because the standard of review for findings of fact, originally
whether the determination was supported by "substantial evidence," 214 is
now whether the court's conclusion of value is "clearly erroneous."21 5 A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when: 1) based upon substantial error
205. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Hamm v. Commissioner, 325
F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1963), cer. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Gamble v. Commissioner, 101
F.2d 565, 567 (6th Cir.), cert. denieA, 306 U.S. 664 (1939).
206. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 51 (1987) (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 61.
208. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 776 (9th Cir. 1981); Meyers v.
United States, 134 F. Supp. 520, 522 (Ct. Cl. 1955); see Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d
882, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
209. Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294 (1938); Hamm, 325 F.2d at 938.
210. Harm, 325 F.2d at 938; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 ("No formula can be
devised that will be generally applicable to the multitude of different valuation issues arising
in estate and gift tax cases.").
211. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
212. Hamm, 325 F.2d at 938.
213. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1985);
Estate of Mosher v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C.M. (P-H) 88,024, at 145, 147 (1988).
214. E.g., Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294 (1938); Elmhurst Cemetery
Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 37, 40 (1937); Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131 (1934);
Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d
214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942).
215. E.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Estate of Kaplin v.
Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1110 (6th Cir. 1984); Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88,
95 (5th Cir. 1974); Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1951).
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in the proceeding, 2) unsupported by any substantial evidence, 3) con-
trary to the clear weight of all the evidence, or 4) supported by evidence
but the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed upon reviewing the evidence. 21
6
Challenging a Tax Court's determination of value is indeed difficult.
Absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the Tax Court took
all evidence into consideration and gave it the weight to which it was enti-
tled.2 17 Furthermore, the value determined need only be within the range
of values that may be deduced from the evidence and need not be a figure
as to which there was specific testimony.2 18 These precepts reflect recog-
nition that valuations are "inherently imprecise"2 19 and that appellate
courts should not retry factual issues.
While value is a question of fact, the criterion used to determine value
is a question of law. 220 Determinations of value may be overturned if an
incorrect rule of valuation was applied.22 ' Determinations of value will
not be reversed, however, even if based upon an erroneous rule of law, "if
the findings of fact, governed by the correct rule of law, were sufficient to
sustain the decision and had adequate support in the evidence."2 2
Tax Court decisions often contain lengthy recitations of evidence and
statements that the court considered all the evidence in determining
value.2 23 Such recitations and conclusory statements may preclude suc-
cessful appellate challenge because of the limited scope of appellate re-
view.2 24  But the Tax Court's mere recital of evidence and its
determination of value will not always withstand challenge. The Sixth Cir-
cuit has held that the Tax Court must reveal its valuation method so that
the appellate court may perform its function.225
216. Maytag, 187 F.2d at 964.
217. Id. at 966.
218. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958); Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934, 939-41 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 993 (1964).
219. See, e.g., Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 50 (1985); Messing v. Com-
missioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 655
(1972), affd 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
220. E.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259, 260 (1941); Morris v. Commissioner,
761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 82
(3d Cir.), cert. denie/A 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 964 (10th
Cir. 1951).
221. Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1962).
222. Maytag, 187 F.2d at 964; see also Clinton Cotton Mills v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 292,
295 (4th Cir. 1935).
223. E.g., Estate ofO'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2707 (1992); Estate
of Smith, 57 T.C. at 660.
224. Sandra S. Kramer, Blockage: Valuation of Large Blocks of Publicly Traded Stocks for Tax
Purposes, 57 Accr. Ray. 70, 76 (1982) ("Because failure to consider relevant data is a revers-
ible error in the court system under examination, judges are strongly encouraged to record
their consideration of all relevant data in their written opinion to lessen the likelihood of
reversal by a higher court.").
225. Akers v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 92,284, at 1398, 1407 (1992); Estate of Gilford v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 38, 50 (1987).
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D. Role of Expert Appraiser2 26
Determining fair market value often requires an expert's appraisal.
Early Treasury Regulations required that expert appraisals support the
value of certain property,22 7 and cautioned taxpayers to select carefully
appraisers of recognized competence.2 28 Current regulations mandate
appraisals, under oath, for articles of artistic value having a value in excess
of $3,000.229 These regulations direct that if "expert appraisers are em-
ployed, care shall be taken to see that they are reputable and of recog-
nized competency to appraise the particular class of property involved."
23 0
Executors are required to submit statements, under penalties of perjury, as
to the qualifications and disinterested character of the expert appraisers
employed.
23 1
If a valuation dispute with the IRS is not settled, expert appraisers will
usually testify in the ensuing litigation. Over the years courts have articu-
lated numerous maxims regarding expert opinion evidence. Such testi-
mony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence that will determine a fact in issue.232 Courts, however, are not
bound by expert testimony and can accept or reject it as they determine
appropriate. 2 33 Expert testimony is to be weighed in light of the expert's
qualifications as well as all the other credible evidence in the record.
234
Courts can accept the opinion of one expert in its entirety to the exclusion
of others.2 35 Testimony which is so exaggerated as to not be credible may
be rejected. 236 These maxims are consistent with the trier of fact's role in
determining value.
Because expert opinion is central to the determination of the value of
much property, what is the proper role of appraisers in the process? Is
226. See NinaJ. Crimm, A Role for "Expert Arbitrators" in Resolving Valuation Issues Before the
United States Tax Court: A Remedy to Plaguing Problems, 26 INn. L. REv. 41 (1992).
227. Treas. Reg. 37, Arts. 17, 18, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765 (1919)
(value of jewelry or silverware of more than ordinary value and of articles having marked
artistic value, such as paintings, engravings, statuary, vases, oriental rugs, or antiques, was to
be supported by expert appraisals).
228. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 19, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765-66 (1919).
229. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
230. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(d) (1958); see Avajuu, supra note 148, § 2.3, at 40 (sug-
gesting that the expert's experience, the amount and quality of his appraisal study or train-
ing, the relationship between the expert's experience and training and the property to be
appraised, and the appraiser's commitment to the art of appraising should be considered in
selecting an appraiser).
231. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
232. E.g., Adair v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 707 (1987); Estate of Gallo v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 480 (1985).
233. E.g., Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938); Silverman v. Commis-
sioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226,
359 (1991).
234. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958); Sundstrand, 96 T.C. at 359; Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985).
235. E.g., Sundstrand, 96 T.C. at 359; Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
441, 452 (1980).
236. Chiu, 84 T.C. at 730; Dean v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 56, 75 (1984).
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their role consistent with the expectations of the parties that retain
them? 23 7 Are appraisers advocates?
The Tax Court considered the role of appraisers at length in Estate of
Halas v. Commissioner.238 The court rejected the assertion that profes-
sional appraisers serve a role analogous to that of attorneys. 23 9 Attorneys
owe their clients undivided loyalty and are to persuade ajudge and jury to
uphold their client's position.240 Appraisers, in contrast, are not advo-
cates and play a much different role.24 1 The court noted that advocacy is
strictly forbidden by the Code of Ethics of the American Society of Ap-
praisers. 242 The Code bars appraisers from presenting facts in a manner
calculated to favor their clients' positions.243 The appraised value is to be
"objective and unrelated to the desires, wishes, or needs of the client who
engages the appraiser to perform the work."
244
The court held that appraisers have a duty to the Court that exceeds
their duty to their client. They are not to:
suppress any facts, data, or opinions which are adverse to the case
his client is trying to establish; or to over-emphasize any facts,
data, or opinions which are favorable to his client's case.... It is
the appraiser's obligation to present the data, analysis, and value
without bias, regardless of the effect of such unbiased presenta-
tion on his client's case.
245
The Tax Court concluded that the testimony of an expert, under the Code
of Ethics, should be essentially the same regardless of which party retained
him.2
4 6
Courts have recognized that not all appraisers act as impartially as
suggested in Estate of Halas. If appraisers serve as advocates, they lose cred-
ibility and their testimony may be rejected. 24 7 Such experts may be viewed
only as hired guns2 48 and their advocacy may preclude them from assisting
the court in determining value.
2 4 9
E. Valuation Restraints
Transfer tax valuation disputes often resemble "horse-trading" or
"car-haggling" in which the value reported on the tax return may be seen
as the opening bid.250 Valuations that are challenged by the IRS may,
237. See Crimm, supra note 226, at 44 ("Partisan expert witnesses are hired to contribute
the best observations, reasoning, and opinions to support the hiring party's position. Stated
in the extreme, an expert witness can become a party's 'hired champion' or 'hired gun'.").
238. 94 T.C. 570 (1990).
239. Id. at 576-77.
240. Id. at 577.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 578.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. Id.
247. E.g., id at 577-78; Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985).
248. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) 89,606, at 3061, 3065 (1989).
249. Id.; Estate of Halas, 94 T.C. at 577 n.3 (1990).
250. Chelcie C. Bosland, Tax Valuation By Compromise, 19 TAx L. Rrv. 77, 78 (1963).
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
through negotiations, result in a compromise settlement.25 1 But if the
parties are unable to agree on value, the matter is settled in the courts
where a compromise valuation may result.
252 What restrains taxpayers253
from taking extreme valuation positions?
1. Tax Court Risk
In Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing v. Commissioner,25 4 the Tax Court,
as it has done frequently,2 55 expressed frustration at having to determine
valuation issues better resolved by the parties.256 The court, "recognizing
the possibility that ajudicial tendency to find a middle ground in conclud-
ing valuation controversies tended to encourage the Service and taxpayers
to advocate overzealous positions,"257 suggested it might find one party's
evidence more convincing and not reach a compromise valuation antici-
pated by the parties:
[E]ach of the parties should keep in mind that, in the final analy-
sis, the Court may find the evidence of valuation by one of the
parties sufficiently more convincing than that of the other party,
so that the final result will produce a significant financial defeat
for one or the other, rather than a middle-of-the-road compro-
mise which we suspect each of the parties expects the Court to
reach.258
The court announced it would continue to determine value when re-
quired to do so, but was seeking to administer its responsibilities more
efficiently.
259
The Tax Court has frequently cited Buffalo Tool in deciding valuation
cases.260 In one case, finding one party's evidence more convincing than
251. See id. at 78.
252. See Bosland, supra note 250 (reviewing the question of whether courts determine
value by compromise at amounts between the claims of the parties).
253. Appraisers may be restrained from overvaluing or undervaluing property by penal-
ties that may be imposed for aiding or abetting the understatement of a tax liability. I.RC.
§ 6701; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 557:
An appraiser may be subject to a $1,000 penalty under section 6701 if he or she
aids or assists in the preparation or presentation of an appraisal in connection with
the tax laws if the appraiser (1) knew that the appraisal would be used in connec-
tion with the tax laws and (2) knew that it would result in an understatement of the
tax liability of another person.
Id. (footnote omitted).
254. 74 T.C. 441 (1980).
255. E.g., Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 62 (1987); Adair v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 707 (1987); Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
256. Buffalo Tool 74 T.C. at 452 ("We are convinced that the valuation issue is capable of
resolution by the parties themselves through an agreement which will reflect a compromise
Solomon-like adjustment, thereby saving the expenditure of time, effort, and money by the
parties and the Court-a process not likely to produce a better result.").
257. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-39.
258. Buffalo Tool, 74 T.C. at 452.
259. Id.
260. E.g., Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985); Estate of Watts v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60, 63 (1985); Sirloin Stockade, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 928, 934 (1980).
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the other's, the court asserted that the wisdom of Buffalo Tool had been
demonstrated.
2 61
In Estate of Kaplin v. Commissioner,26 2 a taxpayer argued that the Tax
Court (which had adopted the government's valuation) had applied Buf-
falo Tool and sanctioned it for not settling the case. 263 The Sixth Circuit
held that the Tax Court cannot sanction taxpayers for seeking a judicial
determination of their cases, but found no evidence that a sanction had
been imposed.2 64 The Tax Court itself has cautioned against too broad a
reading of Buffalo Tool, suggesting that Buffalo Tool simply indicated that
one reason for rejecting an expert's testimony is that another's is more
persuasive.
2 6 5
How have taxpayers fared in valuation cases decided by the Tax Court
after Buffalo Tool? Buffalo Tool inspired an empirical study of the use of
partisan expert witnesses in Tax Court valuation cases decided from 1985
through 1990.266 The study revealed the Tax Court's determination of
value coincided with the opinion of a single expert witness in 34.8% of the
cases studied.26 7 The court's valuation was consistent with the opinion of
the IRS expert in 67.2% of those cases.2 68 The study also revealed that in
the remaining cases "most of the valuation amounts finally determined by
the judge were closer to the figure suggested by the IRS's expert witness
than by the taxpayer's expert."2 69 The statistics led to the conclusion that
the financial defeat suggested in Buffalo Tool more often than not was suf-
fered by the taxpayer.270 Another commentator, however, suggested that
the Tax Court has referred to Buffalo Tool far more often to the delight of
the taxpayer than to the advantage of the Service.
2 71
If the Tax Court rejects evidence presented by both the taxpayer and
the Service, it may "leave the Court with no factual basis for determining
the fair market value, resulting in a determination based solely upon bur-
den of proof."2 72 Because the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer, this
will result in a determination of value in favor of the Service.
2. Undervaluation Penalties
I.R.C. § 6662 provides for the imposition of accuracy-related penal-
ties. A penalty may be imposed where a substantial understatement of
value results in the underpayment of estate or gift tax.273 No penalty is
261. Strutz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 757, 762 (1980).
262. 748 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984).
263. Id. at 1111-12.
264. Id. at 1112.
265. Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 480-81 (1985).
266. Crimm, supra note 226, at 46.
267. Id. at 50.
268. Id. at 51.
269. Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
270. Id. at 54.
271. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-40.
272. Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 326 (1985); see Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 872, 885-86 (1983).
273. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(5), (g) (1986).
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imposed, however, unless the undervaluation resulted in the underpay-
ment of more than $5,000 of tax.
2 74
If the tax underpayment attributable to the undervaluation exceeds
$5,000, the amount of the possible penalty depends on the amount of the
undervaluation. 2 75 If the value reported on the tax return is fifty percent
or less of the amount finally determined, a penalty equal to twenty percent
of the tax understatement attributable to the undervaluation is im-
posed.2 76 If the value reported on the tax return is twenty-five percent or
less of the amount finally determined, a penalty equal to forty percent of
the tax underpayment attributable to the undervaluation is imposed.
277
No penalty is to be imposed, however, if it is shown that a reasonable cause
existed for the undervaluation and the taxpayer acted in good faith.
278
These possible penalties "are stiff and should act as a sobering restraint on
both overenthusiastic taxpayers and return preparers."
2 79
II. BLOCKAGE
The idea that value established by reference to market prices on a
unit basis should be adjusted because of the size of a block of items reflects
the realities of the marketplace and the dynamics of supply and de-
mand. 280 In order to attract buyers when supply increases, price declines
so that trades occur at a lower per item price.
28 '
A. Recognition of Blockage
Estate tax regulations issued in 1919 provided that the value of listed
stocks generally was to be determined by the mean between the highest
and lowest sale prices on the date of death.28 2 The regulations precluded
consideration of the number of shares owned by a decedent by providing
274. I.R.C. § 6662(g) (2) (1986).
275. See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (1986).
276. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (g) (1986).
277. I.R.C. § 6662(g) (2) (C) (1986).
278. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (1986). This represents a departure from prior law which au-
thorized the Service to waive the undervaluation penalties if there was a reasonable basis for
the valuation claimed on the return and the claim was made in good faith. See I.RC.
§ 6660(e) (1986) (repealed for returns the original due date for which is after Dec. 31, 1989
by Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7 721(c)(2) (1989)); Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-44 to 8-45 ("Now,
accuracy-related penalties simply do not apply in the case of returns due after 1989 if there
was a 'reasonable cause' for the underpayment and the taxpayer 'acted in good faith.' Thus,
the question of avoiding the undervaluation and overvaluation penalties in the Code is no
longer completely a matter of administrative grace.").
279. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-45. These penalties do not serve to restrain the IRS from
overzealous positions because they do not apply to the Service. Id. at 8-46.
280. See Ralph E. Badger, Blockage as a Valuation Problem, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 587
(1962); Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12; C.W. Hughes, "Blockage" in Valuation of Assets
for Federal Tax Purposes, 25 FoP.DHA L. REviw 702 (1956-57); Kramer, supra note 224;Judith
F. Todd & Roy F. King, Valuation of Publicly Traded Securities: Blockage and Related Matters, 248-
2nd TAX MGMor. (BNA) (1990); Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117; Thomas W. Wiley, Valuing
Large Holdings of Publicly Traded Stock: The "Blockage" Problem, 8 INST. ON Esr. PLAN. 8-1 (1974);
Donald S. Chisum, Note, A Reconstruction of Taxation's Blockage Doctrine, 20 STAN. L. REv. 336
(1967-68); James M. Barrett, Jr., Valuation of Stocks by the Blockage Rule, 29 TAXES 465 (1951).
281. Kramer, supra note 92, at 631.
282. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 15(2), T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 762 (1919).
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that "such sale price obtains irrespective of the number of shares held by
the estate."
28 3
The Treasury reversed itself three years later.28 4 Regulations promul-
gated in 1922 provided that a decedent's shares should be valued using
the willing buyer - willing seller construct in cases where the shares were
large in relation to the number of shares traded within a reasonable pe-
riod.28 5 This exception to the usual valuation rule recognized that market
prices for small lots of stock might not accurately reflect the value of
shares in a large block. The regulations also permitted estates, under cer-
tain circumstances, to use actual sale prices where market sales were "seri-
ously disproportionate in number of shares sold to the holdings of the
decedent.-
28 6
Two years later, however, the Treasury commenced a retreat from its
early recognition of blockage. Provisions authorizing consideration of the
size of a donor's gift were not included in the first gift tax regulations.
28 7
The regulations did not, however, preclude consideration of blockage in
determining value. Donors who believed the value determined under the
usual method did not reflect fair market value could introduce evidence
to the contrary.288 If market prices did not provide a proper valuation, all
relevant factors were to be considered.
2 89
In 1934, the Treasury attempted to close the door on blockage. Regu-
lations issued in that year expressly precluded consideration of the size of
the block by providing that fair market value was not to be determined by:
[A] n estimate of what a whole block or aggregate would fetch if
placed upon the market at one and the Same time. Such value is
to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value
at the time of the decedent's death of each unit of the property.
For example, in the case of shares of stock or bonds, such unit of
property is a share or a bond.
2 90
While the regulation purported to permit consideration of all relevant
facts in every case,29 1 it provided that the size of a holding was not a rele-
vant factor and was not to be considered in the determination of value. 29 2
283. Id.
284. See Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2) paras. 4, 6, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036,
1048 (1922). Blockage discounts of from five to twenty percent apparently were allowed by
the Service in the 1920s. C. LOWELL HARRiSS, GiFT TAXATiON IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1940).
285. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2), T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1048 (1922).
286. Id.
287. See Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(3), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166-67
(1924).
288. See Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(3) para. 4, T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1167
(1924).
289. Id.
290. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1) (1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrERNAL REVENUE Acrs OF THE
UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
291. Id.
292. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(3) para. 7 (1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS
OF THE UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). Gift tax regulations
adopted in 1936 contained similar provisions precluding consideration of the size of the
block. See Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(1), (3) para. 6 (1936 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrrERNAL REVE-
NUE AcTS OF THE UNrrFm STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
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Several trial court decisions in the 1930's valued blocks of stock on
the basis of market prices in a manner consistent with the regulations.
293
These valuations were upheld on appeal on the basis that the trial courts'
determinations were supported by substantial evidence.2 9 4 In 1937, how-
ever, the trend turned as several trial courts considered the size of the
holding a relevant factor in determining value.
2 9 5
In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissione ,296 the Board of Tax Ap-
peals refused to be bound by the estate tax regulation and considered the
size of a block of shares in determining value.2 97 The Board concluded
that the evidence demonstrated that the valuation method set forth in the
regulations (mean price) was not consistent with reality regarding a tax-
payer's large block of stock.2 98 The Board pointed out that its decision
was not the result of application of a "blockage" rule under which large
blocks of shares are always to be valued without regard to the value of
shares in a smaller block.2 99 Blockage, it held, is not a "law of economics,
a principle of law, or a rule of evidence."30 0 Whether the size of the block
would influence value was a matter to be decided on the facts of each
case.
30 1
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.30 2 The court refused to enforce the es-
tate tax regulation because it did not permit consideration of a relevant
factor (size of the block) in the determination of value:
The essential basis for the determination to be made in the in-
stant case is the fair market value of the property at the time of
the decedent's death. But the regulation makes such a determi-
nation impossible because it declares that the size of the holding
is not a relevant factor and should not be considered in the de-
termination of value .... 303
The Board's consideration of the size of the block did not result in valua-
tion at forced sale prices because the size of the block was only one of
several relevant factors considered.30 4 The court agreed that the Board
"could not ignore the pregnant fact, having found it to exist, that a large
block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money as readily as a
few shares."
30 5
293. See Roth v. Wardell, 15 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 995, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1934), aftd, 77 F.2d 124
(9th Cir. 1935); Richardson v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 245, 248 (1934), affd in par and rev'd
in pat, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
294. See Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Roth v. Wardell, 77
F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1935).
295. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Helvering, 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937), affd, 95 F.2d 806
(4th Cir. 1938); Shattuck v. Commissioner, 1937 B.TAM. (P-H) 133, 135 (1937);Jenkins v.
Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
296. 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937), affd, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
297. Id. at 263-64.
298. Id. at 262-63.
299. Id. at 263.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
303. Id. at 811.




Three months after having decided Safe Deposit & Trust Co., the
Board, in a consolidated case, similarly rejected the gift tax regulation.3 0 6
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits affirmed on appeal.30 7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed on the basis of its decision in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 30 8 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that the gift tax imposed a tax mea-
sured by the value of property and no regulation can preclude considera-
tion of a factor which is relevant to the determination of value.3s 9
In 1939, the Treasury eliminated the language prohibiting considera-
tion of the size of the block from the regulations, 3 10 "[e]videntlyconclud-
ing that regulations which courts refuse to honor are the equivalent of no
regulations at all." 3 1' The amended regulations, however, continued to
provide that value was to be determined on the basis of the fair market
value of each unit of property.
3 12
Additional circuits soon recognized blockage as a relevant factor in
the determination of value.3 13 By 1942, "[a]s well as any controverted
question of administrative law may be settled without declaration by the
Supreme Court, it is established that the size of a block of listed stock may
be a factor to be considered in its valuation for gift! and estate tax
purposes."
3 14
The IRS, nonetheless, did not concede that the size of the holding
should be considered in determining value. At times it tried to avoid con-
sideration of blockage by arguing that the concept of fair market value
assumed an increase in demand equal to the available supply.3 15 In a few
cases in which blockage adjustments were denied, one of the reasons given
for denial was that the definition of fair market value assumed the exist-
ence of a willing buyer.3 16 But if a buyer willing to purchase any and all
shares offered at the price established in the market for smaller lots is
assumed to exist, a blockage discount could never be justified.3 17 The as-
sumed buyer would provide the demand needed to absorb the additional
supply.
3 18
306. Shattuck v. Commissioner, 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 133, 135 (1937).
307. Helvering v. Kimberly, 97 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1938) (per curiam); Commissioner v.
Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1938).
308. Kimberly, 97 F.2d at 434.
309. Shattuck, 97 F.2d at 792.
310. T.D. 4901, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 74 (1939); T.D. 4902, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 76
(1939).
311. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir. 1974).
312. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(1), T.D. 4901, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 74 (1939); Treas. Reg.
80, Art. 10(a), T.D. 4902, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 76 (1939).
313. See, e.g., Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941); Page v. Howell, 116 F.2d
158, 159 (5th Cir. 1940).
314. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
315. See Maytag v. Commissioner, 1940 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 249, 258 (1940).
316. Estate of McKitterick v. Commissioner, 42 B.TA 130, 137 (1940); Newberry v. Com-
missioner, 39 B.T.A. 1123, 1132 (1939); Gordon, supra note 72, at 55 & n.80 (1952).
317. Gordon, supra note 72, at 55; see Maytag v. Commissioner, 1940 B.TA.M. (P-H) 249,
258 (1940).
318. See Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 145 ("If the presence of a buyer for such
block, as willing to purchase as the seller is to dispose of it, were assumed, then the number
of shares being valued could logically possess no relevance whatever.").
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In 1946, the Second Circuit in Richardson v. Commissioner 19 rejected
opinions of value based upon an assumed increase in demand as not rele-
vant to the determination of value.3 20 The court held that the issue to be
decided was the existence of demand for the stock and that it contributed
nothing "to assume the fact which is the main point at issue."32 1 The es-
tablished role of the assumed willing buyer is to preclude a finding of no
value, rather than to determine the amount of that value.
3 22
In 1958, the Treasury conceded defeat and promulgated new regula-
tions explicitly recognizing the possibility of a blockage discount:
3 23
In certain exceptional cases, the size of the block of stock to be
valued in relation to the number of shares changing hands in
sales may be relevant in determining whether selling prices re-
flect the fair market value of the block of stock to be valued. If
the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so
large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it
could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing
the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such
outside the usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a
more accurate indication of value than market quotations.
3 24
This regulation remains unchanged to this date.
325
B. Identification of the Block
The property that constitutes a block must be identified before it can
be determined whether the block is sufficiently large to be relevant in de-
termining value. In many cases identification presents no difficulty be-
cause the block encompasses either the property owned by a decedent at
death devised to one individual or the property gifted en bloc to a single
donee. Identifying the block in other cases presents more difficulties.
1. Estate Tax
Should identification of the block depend on the reason property is
included in a decedent's gross estate or the number of beneficiaries of the
property?
An example will illustrate the issues that exist in identification of the
relevant block. Assume that a blockage discount would not be justified
unless the block to be valued consisted of 52,000 shares of X Company
319. 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946).
320. Id. at 104.
321. Id.
322. Gordon, supra note 72, at 56.
323. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir. 1974).
324. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 480); see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 652) (making compa-
rable changes in the gift tax regulation and providing that the relevant block was to be deter-
mined on the basis of "each separate gift"). Both regulations also provided that, if a block of
stock represented a controlling interest, the price at which other lots traded might not accu-
rately reflect the fair market value of the controlling interest.




stock. Decedent died owning 10,000 shares individually, possessed a gen-
eral power of appointment over 20,000 shares held in Irrevocable Trust,
and was the beneficiary of a qualified terminable interest property trust
(QTIP Trust) that owned 30,000 shares. The value of all 60,000 shares is
included in decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes under various
Code sections. 326 Assume, further, that decedent's 10,000 shares are de-
vised to A, the 20,000 shares in Irrevocable Trust are appointed to B, and
the 30,000 shares in the QTIP Trust will be distributed to C. Is decedent's
estate entitled to consider blockage as a factor in the valuation of the
60,000 shares? Or will the three blocks of stock be considered separate
blocks and valued independently?
The rule for estate tax purposes is that the block includes all shares
required to be included in the decedent's gross estate. 32 7 All property
included in the gross estate is to be aggregated for purposes of valuation
regardless of the reason for inclusion and regardless of the number of
beneficiaries. This rule results from the nature of the estate tax as a tax
upon a single taxable event (transfer at death) and from determination of
value under the hypothetical sale posited by fair market value. This rule
also is necessary to preclude tax avoidance that would be possible if prop-
erty in the gross estate was not aggregated for valuation.
The estate tax aggregation rule applies regardless of the reason prop-
erty is included in the gross estate. Section 2001 imposes an estate tax "on
the transfer of the taxable estate" of decedents. The estate tax is a single-
taxable-event tax imposed upon the transfer of property at death. The
taxable estate is defined in § 2051 as the gross estate reduced by deduc-
tions allowed under the Code. Section 2031 provides that the value of the
gross estate is determined by including the value of all the property at the
time of decedent's death, on occurrence of the taxable event.
The determination of fair market value under § 2031 requires the ag-
gregation of property included in a decedent's estate for valuation pur-
poses.3 28 Fair market value hypothesizes a sale of the property included in
the gross estate on the valuation date to a willing buyer possessing reason-
able knowledge of relevant facts. One of the relevant facts is that all prop-
erty included in a decedent's gross estate, regardless of the reason for
inclusion, is in the market for sale. In the example, a willing buyer would
know that 60,000 shares were being offered for sale.
326. See I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2041, and 2044 (1986).
327. Kramer, supra note 92, at 631 (noting that the relevant block consisted of the total
number of shares transferred in every estate tax case the author found).
328. Cf Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1983). In Cury, the
decedent owned a sufficient number of shares of voting common stock to possess control. Id.
at 1427. Decedent also owned shares of non-votiig common stock. Id. at 1425. The estate
contended that the two blocks of stock should be valued separately. Id. The Seventh Circuit
held that "both the law and common sense compel the conclusion that the fair market value
of the non-voting stock in the hands of an estate with sufficient shares of voting stock to
ensure the estate's control cannot be less than the value of the estate's voting stock." Id. at
1427. Aggregation of the interests formed "the only basis for valuation which rationally com-
ports with the purpose of the tax at issue." Id. at 1428.
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Revenue Ruling 79-7329 supports the estate tax aggregation rule. The
IRS held in that ruling that stock included in a decedent's gross estate
under § 2035 (property, transferred in contemplation of death) should be
combined with shares included under § 2033 (property owned at death)
to determine whether the stock should be valued as two minority blocks or
as one controlling block.330 The Service ruled that stock included under
§ 2035 should be taxed as if the decedent had retained it until death.
33 1
The two blocks, consequently, were treated as one for valuation
purposes.
3 32
Four years after issuing Revenue Ruling 79-7, the Service ruled that
stock includible in a decedent's gross estate under § 2041 (general power
of appointment property) should be aggregated with stock included
under § 2033 for purposes of determining the extent (minority or con-
trol) of a decedent's interest.3 33 Similarly, in 1991, the Service ruled that
an undivided interest in real property included in a decedent's estate
under § 2044 (Qualified Terminable Interest Property) should be aggre-
gated with an undivided interest included under § 2033 for valuation
purposes.
3 34
The estate tax aggregation rule also applies regardless of the number
of beneficiaries of property included in the decedent's gross estate.
335
The estate tax "is a tax imposed' upon the transfer of the entire taxable
estate and not upon any particular legacy, devise, or distributive share."
336
The Ninth Circuit has held that nothing in the Code or case law suggests
that valuation of the gross estate should take into account the fact "that
329. Rev. Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294.
330. Id. at 295.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-30-004 (Mar. 16, 1983).
334. Tech. Adv.'Mem. 91-40-002 (June 18, 1991) ("Because the Decedent is treated as
owning outright the real property in the QTIP trust and because he actually owned the other
undivided interests in the real property outright, the undivided interests in the real property
are aggregated for valuation purposes."); but see Kenneth T. Eichel and Ellen J. Abrams, Fam-
ily Ownership May Jeopardize Minority Discounts on Closely Held Stock, 60 TAXES 378 (1982). The
authors suggest that whether stock included in a decedent's gross estate under different code
sections should be valued as a block might depend on the degree of control the decedent
possessed over the stock and the code section that required inclusion. Id. at 387-88. They
suggest that "under Section 2044, the decedent would not 'own' the stock at the moment of
his death for purposes of disposing of it as part of a control block." Determination of whether
property included under different code sections is to be aggregated on the basis of a dece-
dent's control, however, would be inconsistent with the nature of the estate tax and the
notion of fair market value. It would also permit taxpayers to arrange ownership in several
forms to reduce estate taxes; control premiums could be eliminated and minority discounts
could be obtained.
335. See Watts, supra note 33, at 71.
336. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2 (as amended in 1992).
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the assets will come to rest in several hands rather than one."3 37 It noted
that a contrary rule would open the door to tax avoidance.33 8
A no-aggregation rule would be inconsistent with the nature of the
estate tax as a tax on the transfer of property at death and determination
of value by reference to a hypothetical sale. It would also open the door to
tax avoidance through planning. An owner of a control block of stock
could eliminate the control premium and position his estate to secure mi-
nority discounts in two ways. First, he could arrange ownership in a man-
ner permitting him to retain its benefit during life, while including it in
his gross estate under different Code sections at death. Second, he could
dispose of the stock to multiple beneficiaries. The estate tax aggregation
rule closes both these avenues.
a. Effect of Alternate Valuation Election
Section 2032 permits executors to elect to value all property in a dece-
dent's gross estate in accordance with the rules set forth in that section
rather than at their date of death value under § 2031.339 Congress en-
acted alternate valuation in 1935.340 The legislation was intended to pro-
vide relief for estates whose assets had declined in value shortly after
death.3 4 1 The election may only be made if it decreases both the value of
the gross estate and taxes otherwise payable.
3 42
Under the alternate valuation rules, property that is "distributed, sold,
exchanged or otherwise disposed of," within six months of decedent's
death is valued as of the date of such disposition under § 2032 (a) (1).
343
All other property is valued as of the date six months after decedent's
death under § 2032(a) (2).
34 4
Extension of the earlier example will demonstrate the issues that may
arise when alternate valuation is elected. Assume that the decedent died
owning 60,000 shares of X Company stock on January 1 st and that a block-
age discount would not be warranted unless the block consisted of 52,000
shares. If an alternate valuation election is not made, blockage will be
considered in the valuation of decedent's stock. Will an alternate valua-
tion election change that result?
337. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Estate
of Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577, 1582 (1987) ("Since the [estate] tax is laid
upon the decedent's estate as a whole, and not upon the property which is received by the
various legatees, the valuation of decedent's assets, at least for purposes of computing his gross
taxable estate under section 2031, can usually be made without reference to the destination of
those assets.").
338. Ahmanson Found., 674 F.2d at 768; accord Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d
1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1983).
339. I.R.C. § 2032 (1986).
340. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, § 202, 49 Stat. 1014, 1022-23.
341. S. Rep. Nos. 1240,1240 Part 2, 74th Cong., 1stSess. (1935), reprinted in 101 INTERNAL
REVENuE LAws OF THE UrNrrITE STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
342. I.R.C. § 2032(c) (1986).
343. I.R-C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986).
344. I.R.C. § 2032(a) (2) (1986).
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The correct result (consideration of blockage) under alternate valua-
tion is achieved in two situations. First, if the estate sells the entire block
in a single transaction during the six-month period and elects alternate
valuation, the value as of the date of sale will be the block's value for estate
tax purposes.345 Although § 2032 (a) (1) does not provide that the sale
price establishes value, an arms' length, bona fide sale for value should be
accepted as the date of sale value.3 4 6 Disputes over blockage, conse-
quently, can be avoided if the entire block is sold during the alternate
valuation period and the election is made.3 47 The adverse effect of selling
the block within the six-month period, if any, will be reflected in the sale
price. Second, if the block is not disposed of for value, but entirely distrib-
uted on one day to a single beneficiary during the alternate valuation pe-
riod, the entire block would be valued en bloc on the date of
distribution.
3 48
But disposition of only part of the block raises substantial problems in
valuing the shares under blockage. What if the executor sells 30,000
shares at the end of the third month and has 30,000 shares on hand at the
six month date? Is decedent's estate entitled to value either block as part
of the original block? Or will the two blocks be valued independently? If
valued separately, neither meets the 52,000 share blockage threshold.
Under Estate of Van Home v. Commissione, 349 the shares would be val-
ued as two separate blocks and no blockage adjustment would be allowed.
Ada Van Home died owning 56,454 shares of Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.
stock.350 The executors of her estate determined that it was necessary to
sell a portion of the stock to generate cash to pay expenses and taxes.3 5 1
They sold 42,416 shares during the alternate valuation period at a dis-
count from market prices. 352 The estate owned 14,038 shares on the six
month alternate valuation date.35 3 It claimed a blockage discount in the
valuation of the unsold shares, 35 4 asserting that the shares should be val-
ued as part of the original, larger block.
3 55
The Tax Court held that the value of the shares that had been sold
was "fixed as of the date of sale" under § 2032(a)(1).356 The opinion,
however, does not reveal whether the value of those shares was the dis-
counted price at which the shares had been sold or the mean market
price. As to the unsold shares, the court declared that a "simple examina-
345. See I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986); Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114
(9th Cir. 1983), cet. denied 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 225 (1984).
346. See supra part I.B.
347. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-17.
348. I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986).
349. 78 T.C. 728 (1982), afd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980
(1984).
350. Id. at 730.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 730-31.
353. Id. at 731.
354. Id.




tion" of § 2032(a) revealed the weakness of the estate's argument as to the
identity of the relevant block.3 5 7 The court held that § 2032 (a) (2), by ad-
dressing property not disposed of during the alternate valuation period,
"by definition applies only to property remaining in the estate at the alter-
nate valuation date."35 8 The relevant block for consideration of blockage,
therefore, consisted of only the unsold shares.3 59 When the court valued
the unsold block independently, it held that the block was of insufficient
size to warrant a blockage discount.3s t The Ninth Circuit affirmed on
appeal.
3 6 1
Consideration of whether Van Home was correctly decided must begin
with the language of the Code. Section 2032(a) (1) provides that property
disposed of within six months after death shall be valued as of the date of
disposition. Section 2032(a)(2) provides that property, not disposed of
during the six months following death, is to be valued as of the alternate
valuation date. These provisions merely establish the time at which to
value the property. They do not provide how to value the property, nor
indicate whether property that was part of a larger block at date of death
should be valued as if it were still part of the larger block.
Section 2032 was enacted in 1935362 at a time when Treasury Regula-
tions precluded consideration of blockage.3 63 The legislative history, not
surprisingly, is silent on the question of whether sale of part of a block
would cause the unsold property to be valued as a separate, smaller
block.
3 6 4
The rationale for enacting § 2032 provides insight into resolving this
issue. Section 2032 was intended to provide tax relief to estates whose
assets had declined in value.3 65 This section should not result in the de-
nial of an otherwise available blockage discount. Likewise, § 2032 should
not result in changing the identity of the relevant block where the entire
block is not sold during the alternate valuation period. Estates may, as did
the estate in Van Home,3 66 need to sell part of a block during the alternate
valuation period in order to raise cash to pay estate taxes, administration
expenses, or debts. If Van Home was correctly decided, executors who
elect alternate valuation may lose a blockage discount when they sell only
part of the block during the alternate valuation period.
Assuming that shares disposed of for value during the six-month pe-
riod should be valued under § 2032 (a) (1) at their sale price (date of sale
value of a small lot), rather than at their hypothetical value as part of the
357. Id. at 739-40.
358. Id. at 740.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 741-42.
361. Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
362. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, § 202, 49 Stat. 1014, 1022-23.
363. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
364. See H.R. Rep. Nos. 1681, 1885, S. Rep. Nos. 1240, 1240 Part 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935), reprinted in, 101 INrERNAL REVENuE LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard
D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
365. Id.
366. Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 730 (1982).
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larger block, how should unsold shares be valued? Valuing unsold shares
as if they were still part of the larger block would be consistent with the
economic reasons that justify consideration of blockage. In the example,
it is assumed that a block of 60,000 shares is sufficiently large on date of
death to warrant consideration of blockage. That determination will ordi-
narily mean that the block could not be disposed of during a period as
short as six months (the alternate valuation period) without adversely af-
fecting price.3 67 If that is correct, how can the sale of part of the block
eliminate the blockage effect as to the unsold shares?
If the estate in the example were to sell 51,999 of its 60,000 shares, the
facts assume the sale would not adversely affect the per share price and
that a market price would be received. The facts assume, however, that
the market could not absorb the remaining 8,001 shares at market prices.
Van Home, nonetheless, would value the 8,001 shares as a separate block,
isolated from the impact the earlier sales had on the market.3 68 Such an
approach ignores a fact (the earlier sale of a portion of the original block)
relevant to the valuation Of the unsold shares.
The unsold shares should be valued in a two-step process. First, the
value of 60,000 shares (the original block) on the alternate valuation date
should be determined. A blockage adjustment should be allowed if the
estate establishes that the block was so large that it could not be liquidated
within a reasonable time without; depressing prices. Second, a pro rata
portion of that value should be allocated to the 8,001 unsold shares.
Valuation under the suggested method would be consistent with the
fact that the estate tax is a one-taxable-event tax. The estate tax is imposed
on "the transfer" of the taxable estate.3 69 Alternate valuation merely al-
lows valuation of the assets at other than date of death values. It does not
cause the estate tax to become a multiple-taxable-event tax; it should not
change the character of property in the taxable estate. Van Home taxes
estates as if the decedent made two separate taxable transfers to be valued
independently of each other. The decedent, however, should be taxed on
the single taxable transfer that occurs at death-on the transfer of the
original block. If the estate elects alternate valuation, the shares should be
valued as part of the date of death block.
The language of § 2032, however, makes it difficult to reach the cor-
rect result. In order to value unsold shares under § 2032 (a) (2) in the
manner suggested, it would have to be read as if it provided "such prop-
erty shall be valued as a pro rata share of the value of the date of death block as of
the date 6 months after the decedent's death." If § 2032(a) (2) were read
in that manner, it would seem to follow that § 2032(a) (1) should be read
as if it provided "such property shall be valued as a pro rata share of the value
of the date of death block as of the date of' disposition. Such a reading, how-
ever, seems contrary to the direction in § 2032(a) (1) to value property at
date of sale values, presumably using bona fide sale prices.
367. See infra part II.D.2.
368. Van Home, 78 T.C. at 740.
369. I.RC. § 2001 (1986).
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Van Home, consequently, was correctly decided under existing law.
The effect that an alternate valuation election might have on valuation
when blockage is relevant simply was not considered when § 2032 was
enacted.
Current law, however, is inconsistent with the nature of the estate tax
as a single-taxable-event tax. The character of a decedent's property
should not change as a result of any action taken during the alternate
valuation period. An estate that owns all of the stock of a closely held
corporation should not be able to distribute the shares on different dates
to different beneficiaries during the alternate valuation period and value
the shares as minority interests. That, however, seems to be permitted
under current law. An estate, similarly, should not lose the benefit of
blockage as a result of actions taken during the alternate valuation period.
2. Gift Tax
In Helvering v. Kimberly,370 the taxpayer made gifts of 10,000 shares of
stock to each of his three children.3 7 1 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Board of Tax Appeals' consideration of blockage in valuing the shares by
reference to the total gift of 30,000 shares.3 72 The Board followed the
Commissioner's approach in valuating the gifts as a unit.37 3 On appeal,
however, the Commissioner argued (apparently for the first time) that the
gifts should be valued as three separate gifts of 10,000 shares, rather than
as one gift of 30,000 shares.3 74 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument, stating:
It is difficult to believe that the sale of three blocks of 10,000
shares each would have had a different effect from a sale of one
block of 30,000 shares, and there is no reason to believe that the
estimates of the experts would have been different if their atten-
tion had been specifically called to the point.
3 75
The court recognized the impact a sale of all the shares would have had in
the marketplace.
However, the Board of Tax Appeals and Tax Court in later cases re-
fused to aggregate gifts and valued gifts to different donees as separate
blocks. 3 76 Some appellate courts agreed that separate gifts were not to be
aggregated, 377 while one court sidestepped the issue because it found
identical outcomes under either approach.
3 78
370. 97 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1938).
371. Id. at 434.
372. Id. at 434-35.
373. Id. at 435.
374. Id. at 434-35.
375. Id. at 435.
376. E.g., Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1209 (1947); Clause v. Commissioner, 5
T.C. 647, 650 (1945), afd, 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946); Avery v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 963,
971 (1944); Phipps v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1010, 1022 (1941).
377. See, e.g, Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1951); Clause v. Com-
missioner, 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946) (affirming decision without discussion).
378. Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645
(1942).
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In 1951, the Tenth Circuit rejected aggregation of gifts in identifying
the block for gift tax purposes in Maytag v. Commissioner.379 Separate valu-
ation was necessary to determine a taxpayer's net gifts, allowance of the
annual exclusion, and transferee liability under the Code.380 But, while
requiring separate valuation, the court found that the making of multiple
gifts was a factor deserving consideration. 3 8 1 Separate valuation of gifts was
required, but roundabout aggregation was permitted. The same value, ob-
viously, can be determined by roundabout or by actual aggregation.
3 8 2
In 1958, the Treasury, when it acknowledged that blockage could be a
factor in determining value, provided that each gift was to be valued as a
separate block:
If the donor can show that the block of stock to be valued, with
reference to each separate gift, is so large in relation to the actual
sales on the existing market that it could not be liquidated in a
reasonable time without depressing the market, the price at
which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market,
as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of
value than market quotations.
3 83
The regulation was consistent with the case law. It did not, however, ad-
dress the roundabout aggregation permitted by the Tenth Circuit in
Maytag.
The Fifth Circuit considered the validity of the gift tax regulation in
1974. In Rushton v. Commissioner,3 84 the court upheld the regulation as a
"legitimate exercise of discretion under the statute."3 85 It rejected the
roundabout aggregation permitted by Maytag as "very strongly against the
thrust of the regulation."3 86 The court found blockage was triggered by
the size of each particular gift without consideration of other gifts. 387 The
regulation required each gift be valued separately in the actual market
existing at the time of the gift, not a fictitious market flooded by other
gifts.
3 8 8
The reason Rushton was correctly decided and that the no aggregation
of gifts regulation is a reasonable interpretation 38 9 of the Code is found in
the nature of the gift tax as a multiple-taxable-event transfer tax, and from
379. 187 F.2d at 965.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 151.
383. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 652) (empha-
sis added).
384. 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974).
385. Id. at 92. The court also held that the regulation must stand, even if a court con-
cluded aggregation was a better rule, because it was reasonable and court review of regula-
tions is limited. Id. at 94.
386. Id. at 92.
387. Id. at 92-93.
388. Id. at 93.
389. Contra Michael H. Simpson, Note, Federal Gift Tax Regulation 25.2512-2(e)-The Use of
the Blockage Principl, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 612, 626 (1974) (suggesting that courts should not
give effect to the Regulation because it excludes consideration of other gifts which are rele-
vant to the determination of value).
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determination of value under the hypothetical sale posited by fair market
value upon the occurrence of each separate taxable event.
Section 2501 imposes a gift tax on "the transfer of property by gift."
Each transfer constitutes a separate taxable event. If the gift is made in
property, § 2512(a) provides the amount of the gift is the value of the
property. The property transferred in each taxable event is to be valued
independently.3 90 Gifts are aggregated for purposes of determining allow-
ance of the annual exclusion3 9 1 and for purposes of determining taxable
gifts,3 92 but not for valuation.
Fair market value hypothesizes a sale of the property transferred in
the taxable event to a willing buyer possessing reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. Are the other gifts made by the donor on the same day
relevant? If all transfers during a day constituted a single taxable event,
such gifts would be relevant. But under the multiple-taxable-event gift tax,
such other gifts are irrelevant in determining the value of the property
transferred in a single taxable event. Value is the price the property trans-
ferred in the separate taxable event would sell for in the hypothetical sale.
Evidence of other gifts made by the donor is no more relevant than is
evidence of gifts made by other donors3 93 or of property included in es-
tates of decedents who died on that date.3 9 4 In determining value for
purposes of the gift tax, only the property transferred in the taxable event
is relevant.
3. Reconciliation of Estate and Gift Tax Rules
The estate tax is imposed on one taxable event (transfer of the taxa-
ble estate at death).3 95 The gift tax is imposed on multiple taxable events
(transfers of property by gift).3 9 6 Valuation of the property transferred is
to be made upon occurrence of the taxable event-the moment of trans-
fer.3 97 Value is the price at which the property transferred would have
390. Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Conn. 1954) (In discussing the
predecessor of § 2512(a), the court held that the statute's "language plainly imports each gift
made in property is to be valued separately. Not here or elsewhere does the [gift tax] statute
provide or even suggest that, for purpes of valuation, gifts made to separate persons must be
aggregated for purposes of valuation."). See Watts, supra note 33, at 71 (suggesting that refer-
ence to "the gift" in § 2512 does not support the conclusion that the value of property trans-
ferred on a single day is affected by the number of donees); but see Simpson, supra note 389,
at 619 (contending that none of the pertinent sections of the gift tax statute requires that the
value of each gift be derived in isolation from all other gifts).
391. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1986) (excluding the first $10,000 of gifts of present interests
per donee per year).
392. I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1986).
393. But see Simpson, supra note 389, at 625 (noting that, if aggregation of gifts were
permitted, an argument could be made that all gifts made by other donors should also be
considered).
394. See Gordon, supra note 72, at 57 (recognizing that if aggregation of gifts were al-
lowed "parties should be able to adduce evidence of all other gifts, deaths, and exchanges").
395. I.R.C. § 2001 (1986).
396. I.R.C. § 2501 (1986).
397. See Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1953) ("Both the gift tax
statute and the excise tax statute deal with taxable events .... One must look to the value of
the property at the time of the happening of the taxable event and determine the amount of
the tax, whether gift or estate."), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
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sold in fair market value's hypothetical sale at the moment of the taxable
event.
Identification of the taxable event necessarily results in identification
of the relevant block to be valued and plays a major role in deciding
whether a minority or blockage discount will be allowed. It is the single
(estate) versus multiple (gift) taxable-event nature of the taxes whichjusti-
fies different valuation results in seemingly similar situations.
3 98
A taxpayer who owns all 300 shares of a closely held corporation will
pay less transfer tax if he transfers the stock in equal shares to his three
children by gift, than if he transfers the shares to the children at death. If
he gives 100 shares to each of his children, the three gifts will be valued
separately as minority interests and discounts will be allowed. The no ag-
gregation of gifts rule results in separate valuation. But if he transfers 100
shares to each of his children at death, the estate tax aggregation rule will
result in valuation of the 300 shares as a block. No minority discount will
be allowed even though the shares pass to three devisees.
A taxpayer who owns 60,000 shares of publicly traded stock, a quantity
assumed to be sufficient to trigger blockage, will pay less transfer tax if he
transfers the shares in equal shares to his three children at death, than if
he transfers the shares to the children by gift. The estate tax aggregation
rule results in valuation of the shares as a block and a blockage discount
will be allowed even though the shares are devised to multiple benefi-
ciaries. But if he transfers 20,000' to each of his children by gift, the gift
tax no aggregation rule will result in separate valuation of each block. As-
suming 20,000 share blocks are insufficient to warrant consideration of
blockage, no blockage discounts will be allowed.
A remarkable consistency, therefore, exists in the estate and gift tax
laws which can be understood by focusing on valuation of the property
transferred in the taxable events under the two taxes. Fair market value is
determined for the property transferred in the taxable event under the re-
spective taxes.
C. Transferee's Intended Use of the Property
What if a block of property, sufficiently large to warrant consideration
of blockage, is transferred to a person who intends to retain the property
indefinitely? If the property is not brought to market, it will not depress
prices. Should a blockage discount, which assumes the property will be
sold, be allowed in such circumstances? Should consideration of blockage
depend on the transferee's intended use of the property?
This question is similar to the question of whether the identity of the
transferor and transferee is relevant in determining value.3 9 9 The answer
to both questions is no. Neither the transferee's intended use of the prop-
398. But see Simpson, supra note 389, at 624-25 (suggesting that, unless specifically prohib-
ited by the gift tax statute, the value of property transferred on one date should be the same
whether subject to the gift or the estate tax).
399. See supra part I.B.2.a.i.
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erty, nor the transferor or transferee's identity is relevant in the determi-
nation of fair market value.
Fair market value posits a willing buyer and a willing seller who par-
ticipate in a hypothetical sale. In Estate of Bright,400 the court held that "[i]t
would be strange indeed if the estate tax value of stock would vary depend-
ing upon the legatee to whom it was devised." 401 In Seas Shipping Co. v.
Commissioner,40 2 the Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's refusal to
consider blockage where the taxpayer did not intend to sell the block,
noting that "[t] he court's underlying assumption-that fair market value is
a subjective quality varying with the particular owner of the property-is
incorrect."403 Fair market value is the value of the property at the mo-
ment of transfer (the taxable event). It is not determined by the prop-
erty's value in the hands of the transferror or transferee. It necessarily
follows that the transferee's intended use of the property is not relevant in
determining value. This conclusion eliminates consideration of difficult
to prove subjective factors in the determination of value. 404 How could a
transferee's intent to sell (and suffer the consequences of blockage) or
retain the property be confirmed? Tax results should not depend on such
subjective factors.
Courts have correctly rejected the, transferee's intended use of the
property as a factor in blockage. In 1942, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's allowance of a blockage discount where the IRS had argued
there was "no evidence that the blocks of stock to be valued were added or
expected to be added to the supply in the market."40 5 In 1967, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that a taxpayer's intention to sell was irrelevant in
the application of blockage. 40 6 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit noted that
blockage discounts are allowed regardless of whether the property is sub-
sequently sold.
40 7
The Tax Court recently addressed this issue in Estate of O'Keeffe v. Com-
missioner.40 8 The IRS took the position that blockage did not apply in the
valuation of art works bequeathed to museums, because such works would
not be available for sale and would not affect the marketprice. 4°9 The
court, citing Bright, rejected that argument and stated:
Respondent's expert's opinion is erroneous as a matter of
law. There is no justification for his exclusion of the bequeathed
art from the total subject to discount. Determination of fair mar-
400. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
401. Id. at 1006.
402. 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
403. Id. at 530 n.3.
404. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982); Minahan v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 492, 499 (1987) (noting that if valuation were not based on an objective
standard "the subjective inquiry into feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior might well
be boundless") (citation omitted).
405. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 62-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
406. 371 F.2d at 530 n.3.
407. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974).
408. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
409. Id. at 2703.
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ket value assumes that works are in the market and precludes
consideration that works are "unavailable for sale." He was not
entitled to consider the actual disposition of the works of art of
the estate any more than fair market value may be determined by
assuming that particular purchasers will purchase works of art
from the estate.
410
The transferee's intended use of the property is simply not relevant in
determining value.
D. Blockage Factors
Valuation, as a question of fact, must be supported by evidence.
"'Blockage' is not a law of economics, a principle of law, or a rule of evi-
dence."4 11 Whether the value of a block of property is affected by the size
of the block is a matter of evidence. 4 12 It will not be assumed that shares
in a large block will sell for less per share than shares in a small block.
4 13
The taxpayer, having the burden of proof, must demonstrate that a block-
age adjustment is warranted 4 14 as well as the extent of any discount.
4 15
The basic condition for consideration of blockage in the valuation of
stocks is "a small turnover of shares on the valuation date and for a reason-
able period of time thereafter, compared to the size of block to be val-
ued."4 16 While the blockage concept is relatively simple to state, its
application in different situations may be difficult.4 17 Courts have relied
on many factors in determining whether the facts warranted a blockage
adjustment. Fourteen factors, cited frequently in cases decided from 1924
to 1979, have been identified.
4 18
410. Id.
411. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 259, 263 (1937), affd 95 F.2d
806 (4th Cir. 1938).
412. E.g., Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 225 (1984), affd, 795
F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1986); Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 476, 478
(1974); Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 35 B.TA at 263.
413. See, e.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 796 (1946); DuPont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246, 256 (1943).
414. Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225; Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728,
741 (1982), afftld, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976).
415. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974).
416. Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 139.
417. Barrett, supra note 280, at 466.
418. Kramer, supra note 224, at 73-75. The fourteen factors were:
1. The size of the block of stock compared to the number
of shares of stock outstanding.
2. The size of the block of stock compared to its daily trading volume.
3. Whether the block represents control.
4. The trend of general market prices.
5. The trend of market prices for this stock.
6. The existence of large block trades or secondary offerings of the stock.
7. The existence of restrictions on resale of the stock.
8. The mention of expert witness testimony for the taxpayer only.
9. Whether the stock trades on a national stock exchange.
10. The earnings trend of the company.
11. The dividend-paying history of the company.
12. The book value per share of stock on the valuation date.
13. The type of tax involved in the case (estate, gift, or income).
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Since the question of whether a blockage adjustment is warranted is
one of fact, each case must be decided upon its own merits. An analysis of
the facts relied upon by courts in blockage cases involving the valuation of
stock is beyond the scope of this article. Taxpayers confronted with a
blockage issue involving stock may profit from such a study, however, as it
has been suggested that courts have relied primarily upon precedent in
deciding blockage valuation questions.
4 19
Two critical factors appear in every blockage case: the size of the
block and the length of time that would be required to liquidate the block
without adversely affecting price.
1. Size of the Block
Consideration of blockage is warranted where the size of the block is
so large that it cannot be liquidated within a reasonable time without de-
pressing the per unit price of all items. At what point does a block reach
the critical mass sufficient to trigger blockage? This question is answer-
able only in relative, not absolute terms. A block of property, although
large in dollar value, may simply lack the requisite size in relation to the
market. Since blockage is always a matter of proof, no rule regarding size
which will be deemed sufficient exists.
The question of whether a block is sufficiently large to invoke block-
age cannot be answered in isolation. It can only be answered in the con-
text of the market in which the property is sold. In deciding whether
blockage applies, courts determine whether the block could have been
sold on the valuation date or within a reasonable period of time thereafter
without adversely impacting price.420 Courts have reached varying results
depending on the size of the block and the volume of trading in the
market.
42 1
2. Time Required to Liquidate Without Adverse Impact on Price
The Internal Revenue Code generally provides that property is to be
valued for estate and gift tax purposes as of the date of the taxable event
14. The size of the block of stock compared to the number of shares actively traded.
Id. at 75 tbl. 1.
419. Id. at 84.
420. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
796 (1946); Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
421. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1210, 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(blockage discount denied where the court found the number of shares to be valued was
smaller than the number of shares traded during the month preceding the valuation date),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1943)
(blockage discount denied for 100,000 shares of General Motors stock where 375,000 shares
were sold during the two month period following the valuation date); Bull, 119 F.2d at 491
(blockage discount denied where the number of shares was approximately equal to the
number sold during the week prior to the valuation date); Estate of Kopperman v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 27 (1978) (blockage discount allowed for 27,050 shares where
691,000 shares were traded during the entire year). See also Todd & King, supra note 280, at
B-1 102 to B-1 113 (analyzing 63 blockage cases and listing the number of shares valued, the
percentage of all outstanding stock represented by the shares, and the time needed for sale).
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- the date of death4 22 ,or the date of gift.423 Taxpayers, consequently,
have often claimed that the value of a block of property was the price at
which it would have sold if the entire block were offered for sale at the
moment of transfer.4 24 The price for which a block would have sold on
the valuation date, however, is not the measure of value for tax
purposes.
425
In Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,426 the first appellate court deci-
sion to recognize blockage, the court held that value was not determined
by the price obtainable by dumping the entire block on the market at one
time.4 27 This type of procedure would have resulted in valuing the prop-
erty in a hypothetical forced sale.
Three years later, the Second Circuit endorsed a skilled broker-rea-
sonable time test in Bull v. Smith:
428
The trial court held as follows: "The fair market value as of a
given date of a large block of stock, within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue laws, is the highest value at which it could be
sold if the owner on the critical date were to instruct a broker,
reasonably skilled in dealing with such stock, to liquidate the
block on the best terms available within the period of time rea-
sonably required for liquidation in view of the situation as it then
existed and should develop during the progress of
liquidation.-
4 29
Other circuits quickly adopted this approach. 430 If a block of stock could
be sold by a skilled broker within a reasonable time without depressing
market prices, no blockage discount is warranted.
43 '
What constitutes "a reasonable period of time depends on all the facts
and circumstances." 43 2 In determining that period "[fiactors such as the
number of shares in the block, the amount of trading activity in the ex-
change before and after the valuation date, the total number of outstand-
ing shares, and the general market conditions will be important."
43 3
422. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1986).
423. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1986).
424. See, e.g., Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 1938);
Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 598, 599 (3d Cir. 1935); Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner,
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 224 (1984); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 657 (1972),
afTd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
425. E.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 796 (1946); Safe Deposi4 95 F.2d at 812; Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225-26; Estate of Van
Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 742 (1982), af'd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984).
426. 95 F.2d at 806.
427. Id. at 812.
428. 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
429. Id.
430. E.g., Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Maytag,
125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
431. E.g, Mott, 139 F.2d at 317; Bu/, 119 F.2d at 492.
432. Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 226 (1984), affd, 795 F.2d
45 (8th Cir. 1986).
433. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-9.
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While some courts have used a..one-year trading v'olume test,43 4 no rule
exists and the length of the period depends on the facts in the particular
case. 435 Because market volatility and time limitations on sales may ad-
versely affect price, the length of the reasonable period could be relatively
short.43 6 Commentators have generally suggested using a short period in
determining blockage.
43 7
E. Effect of Blockage on Value
Blockage is triggered by a determination that an item's value in the
marketplace does not accurately reflect its fair market value because it is
part of a block which cannot be sold within a reasonable time without
adversely affecting price. If value is determined by reference to market
prices on the basis that the taxpayer in fact could have sold the property at
the market price, support for such an approach disappears when the
quantity available for sale greatly exceeds the market's usual volume. 438
Judicial consideration of blockage resulted from recognition that per unit
market prices did not always accurately reflect the fair market value of
units held as part of a large block.
4 39
Taxpayers, bearing the burden of proof, must demonstrate the extent
of any blockage discount.44 0 They cannot satisfy their burden by merely
relying upon an arithmetical average of blockage discounts allowed in
prior cases. 44 1 The trier of fact, in turn, must determine value considering
all the relevant evidence.
Treasury Regulations provide both general as well as specific gui-
dance in determining value when blockage is a factor. The general provi-
sion, which does not mention blockage, applies when market prices do
not reflect fair market value, and it states:
434. Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 226; Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1210,
1221-22 (Ct. Cl. 1975). But see Robinson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, 94 n.15
(1985) (discussing but declining to use the one-year trading volume test), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 F.2d 38 (lst Cir. 1986).
435. See, e.g., Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 27 (1978)
(blockage discount allowed where it would take three months to sell all the shares); Estate of
Larson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 481, 483-84 (1944) (blockage discount denied
where stock could have been disposed of without adverse impact on price within six months);
DuPont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246, 257 (1943) (blockage discount allowed where stock
could not have been disposed of at market prices within 90 days); see also Todd & King, supra
note 280, at B-1102 to B-1i113 (analyzing 63 blockage cases and listing the number of shares
valued and the time needed for sale).
436. Watts, supra note 33, at 73.
437. See, e.g.,John H. Butala,Jr., Fair Market Value Concept-Valuation of Securities Generally,
14 W. Ras. L. REv. 179, 185 (1963) (suggesting the reasonable period for stocks should not
extend beyond several weeks due to market risk); Watts, supra note 33, at 74 (suggesting the
reasonable period for stocks should be around three months); Wiley, supra note 280, at 8-5
(suggesting the reasonable period for stocks would ordinarily be considerably less than 90
days and possibly as short as two or three weeks).
438. See Gordon, supra note 72, at 56.
439. Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214, 216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645
(1942); Mitchell v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R. 2d 6141, 6142 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
440. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974).
441. Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 476, 479 (1974).
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If it is establishe d that the value of a bond or share of stock deter-
mined on the basis of selling or bid and asked prices as provided
[in] ... this section does not reflect the fair market value thereof,
then some reasonable modification of that basis or other relevant facts and
elements of value are considered in determining fair market value.
Where sales at or near the date of death are few or of a sporadic
nature, such sales alone may not indicate fair market value.
44 2
A second provision specifically applies when blockage is a factor:
If the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so
large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it
could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing
the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such outside the
usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indica-
tion of value than market quotations.
443
The regulations do not address the impact of blockage in the valuation of
property other than securities.
Generally, the regulations reflect the two ways in which courts have
determined value when blockage has been found relevant. Some courts
have allowed a discount (a "reasonable modification") from market prices
and considered blockage as an additional factor (another relevant fact or
element of value) along with all other factors in determining value. 444
Other courts have valued the block by reference to its value in an alterna-
tive market ("outside the usual market"); i.e. in a secondary offering ("as
through an underwriter"). 445 Courts need not, however, follow one ap-
proach to the exclusion of the other.
446
1. All Relevant Factors Valuation
In the first appellate decision upholding consideration of blockage,
the Fourth Circuit observed that the Board of Tax Appeals had considered
blockage as well as other relevant evidence in determining value. 4 4 7 The
442. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); accord Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (asamended in 1976) (containing similar provisions in connection with
the gift tax).
443. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); see Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976) (containing similar provisions in connection with the
gift tax).
444. See infra part II.E.1.
445. See infra part II.E.2.
446. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
noted that:
The specific amount of the adjustment of value is normally computed by referring
to a variety of evidentiary indices, including, for example, the book value of the
stock, its corporate earnings, the value of any outstanding preferred stock and the
amount of dividends payable thereon, and the volume of trading in the stock in
question.
... Nor is there any requirement that the amount of "blockage" be calculated
by reference to such [secondary offering] figures rather than by a consideration of
earnings (past and projected), book value, or any other criteria that accurately re-
flect the true value of the stock.
Id.; see generally Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12, at 368-69 (suggesting eight methods
for valuing blocks of securities).
447. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938).
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court recognized blockage as an additional factor requiring consideration
with all other relevant evidence in the determination of value." 8
In Bull v. Smith,44 9 the Second Circuit adopted the skilled broker-rea-
sonable time approach not only as a way to determine whether blockage
should be considered, but also as a method of determining value when
blockage was relevant.450 Under the skilled broker method "the blockage
discount would take into account the depression in price, if any, upon the
announcement of the contemplated sale, the broker's charge for handling
the market arrangement, and registration and other costs when applica-
ble."4 5 1 This approach permits consideration of all marketing techniques
that would be available under the circumstances.
452
Determination of fair market value when blockage is a factor depends
on all the evidence:
Each case must be decided on its own merits, by reference to the
amount of stock to be disposed of, the number of shares out-
standing, the activity of the market for the stock and such other
factors as may be relevant in the particular case. A method of
valuation which neglects these highly individual factors is obvi-
ously unsuited to the task.
453
Since valuation depends on the evidence in each case, no formula exists
which is applicable in every blockage case. Courts usually recite the evi-
dence which formed the basis for the determination of value, 454 but do
not often reveal the manner in which value was determined or the weight
given to the various factors.
4 55
2. Alternative Market Valuation
A large block of stock may be reducible to cash only through special
marketing devices. 456 Alternative techniques for selling large blocks of
stock include private placements and secondary, special, and exchange
distributions.457 Secondary, special, and exchange distributions require
approval of an exchange which is granted only if it is shown that the regu-
lar market could not absorb the securities within a reasonable time. 458
448. Id.
449. Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1941).
450. Id. at 492; STANLEY S. SuRREY ET AL., FEDERAL W.ALTH TRANSFER TAXATION at 954
(1987); Kramer, supra note 224, at 72.
451. SuRRav ET AJ.., supra note 450, at 954-55.
452. Wiley, supra note 280, at 8-13.
453. Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 476, 479 (1974); see also Estate ofJos-
lyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that value is normally com-
puted by referring to a variety of evidentiary indices).
454. See supra note 418 (listing fourteen factors cited by courts in deciding blockage valu-
ation cases).
455. See, e.g., Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 33 (1978);
Estate of Chistie, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 479; Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 658-
59 (1972), afitd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
456. Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 137-38.
457. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-13.
458. Id. at A-13 to A-14.
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Approval, consequently, depends on proof similar to that required to in-
voke blockage for valuation purposes.
The Board of Tax Appeals, in the first case which recognized block-
age in the valuation of property for gift tax purposes, recognized that the
value of a large block of property might have to be determined outside the
usual market in which the property was sold. In Shattuck v. Commis-
sioner45 9 the Board, discussing the evidence presented by the taxpayer,
observed:
[I]t is quite evident that... disposal could not have been effected
except at so-called wholesale prices, by an arrangement for the
underwriting of the disposal of the sale of stock which would
have entailed an expense netting a price below that possible to
have been secured for small blocks of stock through market sales
at retail.
4 60
The Board's determination of value, nonetheless, was based upon all the
evidence.4 6 1 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the market
for a large block of stock was different from the market for small lots. 4 6 2 It
agreed with the Board's statement, quoted above.
463
In 1943, however, the Tax Court refused to accept the argument that
the value of a large block of stock should always be determined by the
wholesale price in a secondary offering. 464 While recognizing that such a
price could be a factor in valuation, the Tax Court held that the facts
relating to the property control valuation and that it was "not at liberty to
say that wholesale prices and not retail prices are controlling factors."
46 5
In 1944, the Tax Court allowed a blockage discount where it concluded
the stock would have been sold either through a secondary offering or in
small lots over time. 466 The court recognized that a sale through a secon-
dary distribution was "practically equivalent to a sale by wholesale" since
adequate compensation must be paid to the seller.
467
The net amount receivable for stocks in secondary or special distribu-
tions was also considered in other cases in which blockage was a factor.
468
In 1951, one commentator suggested that determination of value by refer-
ence to secondary distributions provided valuations generally acceptable
to the IRS and eliminated much of the guesswork previously involved in
the valuation of large blocks.
469
459. 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 133 (1937).
460. Id. at 135.
461. Id.
462. Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938).
463. Id.
464. Mott v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 356, 357 (1943).
465. Id.
466. Avery v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 963, 971 (1944).
467. Id. at 969.
468. See St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R. 1561, 1564 (N.D. Ind.
1953); Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1212 (1947).




Indeed, in 1974, the Ninth Circuit noted in Estate ofJoslyn v. Commis-
sioner470 that a block of stock, as a result of an IRS proposal, had been
valued at the actual net amount received by the estate in a secondary offer-
ing.47 1 The Tax Court, in its decision in Joslyn, observed that large blocks
of stock could be valued by reference to the amount they could be sold to
an underwriter, even though property generally must be valued at its retail
or replacement cost value. 472 The estate inJoslyn was allowed to deduct all
costs, including underwriting fees, incurred in connection with the sale in
determining value.
4 73
Valuation of large blocks of stock by reference to the net amount that
would be received in a secondary distribution, consequently, was long-rec-
ognized by the courts and, indeed, by the IRS. Recognition continued
after amendment of the regulations in 1965 and adoption of a retail (re-
placement cost) measure of value for most property. Determining the
value of blocks of property in an alternative market (i.e., secondary distri-
butions) resulted in a valuation at wholesale prices; the stock's market
price was generally reduced by the estimated expenses of the distribution,
including brokerage commissions.
474
Valuation was not an issue in Joslyn.475 Resolution of the issues in
Joslyn, however, resulted in the IRS changing its position regarding block-
age valuation and created the uncertainty which remains unresolved. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine Joslyn in more detail.
In Joslyn, the IRS valued a large block of listed stock by allowing a
blockage discount in the exact amount of actual expenses, including un-
derwriter fees, incurred in connection with a secondary offering.4 76 The
estate not only accepted that valuation, but claimed the expenses paid in
the secondary offering as administration expense deductions under
§ 2053. 477 The Tax Court denied the selling expense deduction and
viewed the claim as an attempt to secure an unjustified double deduction
(once in determining value under § 2031 and then as a deduction under
§ 2053).478
470. 500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974).
471. Id. at 383.
472. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 500
F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974).
473. Joslyn, 500 F.2d at 383 n.2.
474. Id. at 383; St.Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R. 1561, 1564 (N.D.
Ind. 1953); Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1212 (1947); see Kramer, supra note 224,
at 72.
475. 500 F.2d at 383.
476. Id. at 383 n.2.
477. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'4 500 F.2d 382 (9th
Cir. 1977).
478. Id. at 726. ("We perceive no rational basis for allowing both the reduction in value
and the deduction for the same expenses. There is no judicial authority supporting the
allowance of both tax benefits, nor is there any indication that Congress intended to allow
both tax benefits.").
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The Ninth Circuit reversed 4 79 and rejected the Tax Court's double
deduction analysis. 480 The court held that the case involved separate, un-
related issues of valuation and deduction.48 1 Blockage was a matter of
valuation, not of deduction. 48 2 The court supported its conclusion by the
fact that blockage adjustments are allowed in determining value regardless
of whether the stock is sold.48 3 The court noted that the blockage adjust-
ment normally was determined by reference to a variety of factors. 484 In-
deed, in many cases the actual costs of a secondary offering would not be
available and other factors would be considered in determining value.
48 5
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether the
expenses should be allowed as deductions under § 2053. 486
On remand, the Tax Court found that the underwriter had sold the
stock at $19.25 per share and paid the estate $18.095 per share. 48 7 The
estate claimed deductions for incidental expenses of the underwriting
which it had paid and the underwriting discount (the difference between
$19.25 and $18.095).488 The court held that the incidental expenses were
clearly deductible selling expenses. 48 9 Deduction of the underwriting dis-
count, however, depended on the nature of the transaction. 490 The court
held that the transaction, both in substance and in form, was a sale by the
estate to the underwriters. 49 1 The controlling factor was the fact that the
underwriters' obligations were not conditional upon their ability to sell
the stock.492 Having determined that the transaction was a sale by the
estate at $18.095 per share, the court held that the underwriter's subse-
quent profit (the difference between $19.25 and $18.095) was not a de-
ductible administration expense.
493
The Ninth Circuit, once again, reversed on appeal. 494 The court held
it irrelevant that the amount withheld by the underwriters was considered
a profit; it represented the amount paid by the estate for the underwriters'
services. 495 The court responded to the underlying double benefit issue
by noting that had the stock "been valued in the estate at a different fig-
ure, because the blockage had been estimated differently, there would not
have been the appearance of duplication." 496 Yet, in either case, the sell-
479. Joslyn, 500 F.2d at 382.
480. Id. at 384, 386-87.
481. Id. at 386.
482. Id. at 384, 386.
483. Id. at 384.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 386.
486. Id. at 387.
487. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 478, 481 (1975), rev'd, 566 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1977).
488. Id.
489. Id. at 483.
490. Id. at 485.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 483 n.5.
493. Id. at 485.
494. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).




ing expense issue would have been the same. 49 7 The amount withheld by
the underwriters was a deductible selling expense and was found to be "no
different than the charge which a real estate broker might make for selling
a house."
4 98
In the year following the Ninth Circuit's second decision inJoslyn, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the same issue in Estate of Jenner v. Commis-
sioner.499 The estate in Jenner also sold stock in a secondary distribution
after death.50 0 The Tax Court, relying on its second decision in Joslyn,
50 1
denied a selling expense deduction for the underwriting discount.50 2 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach and al-
lowed the selling expense deduction.503 Since the estate bore the entire
cost (including the underwriting discount) of the secondary offering, it
should receive a deduction for all the expenses.5 0 4 The court rejected
characterization of the secondary offering as a sale to the underwriters,
noting that SEC regulations prohibited underwriters from purchasing
stock for their own accounts. 50 5 In a footnote, the court noted the ab-
sence of even an appearance of a double deduction (as existed in Joslyn)
because blockage was only one factor considered in the determination of
value (actual expenses had not been used).
50 6
The IRS responded to Joslyn and Jenner by issuing Revenue Ruling 83-
30.507 The Service viewed Joslyn and Jenner as permitting an unwarranted
double benefit by allowing administration expense deductions for under-
writing fees already reflected in the valuation of the estate.50 8 Having lost
the double benefit argument on the administration expense side, the Ser-
vice came at the problem from the valuation side. It ruled that underwrit-
ing fees, necessarily incurred in the sale of a large block of stock through
an underwriter, are deductible as administration expenses, but are not to
be considered in the valuation of the stock.
50 9
In justification, the Service relied upon the regulations. It assumed
that the requirements had been met in order to value a large block of
stock "through an alternative method of disposal."5 1 0 The IRS then inter-
497. Id.
498. Id. at 679.
499. 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978). The estate inJenner sold stock in a secondary offering
to underwriters at $38.85 per share. Id. at 1102. The underwriters, in turn, sold the stock to
the public at $42.00 per share. Id. The registration statement reported an "underwriting
discount" of $3.15 per share ($42.00 - $38.85). Id. The underwriter paid the estate $42.00 per
share and the estate paid the underwriters $3.15 per share for the underwriting discounL
Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 250 (1977). The estate also paid
certain incidental costs of the secondary offering. Id.
500. 577 F.2d at 1102.
501. Jenner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 249.
502. Id. at 250.
503. Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1107.
504. Id. at 1104.
505. Id. at 1105.
506. Id. at 1104 n.7.
507. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 198-1 C.B. 224.
508. Id. at 225.
509. Id.
510. Id. (emphasis added).
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preted the regulation to. preclude consideration of underwriting fees in
valuation:
Note that, in such a situation where a blockage discount is
allowable, section 20.2031-2(e) of the regulations provides that
the price at which the stock could be sold through, rather than to,
an underwriter may be a more accurate indication of value than
market quotations. This indicates that the relevant figure is the
price that the public would pay to the underwriter for the stock,
and not the price the underwriter would pay to the estate. Ac-
cordingly, underwriting fees should not be considered in deter-
mining the blockage discount.511
The Service sought to overturn law that had existed for forty-six years.
512
Two trial decisions have discussed the double benefit issue since issuance
of Revenue Ruling 83-30.513 Neither court, however, has decided the
question.
5 14
The potential double benefit in this situation must be recognized.
The facts of Jenner illustrate this potential. In Jenner, stock was sold in a
secondary offering by underwriters at $42.00 per share.51 5 The estate paid
the underwriters $3.15 per share for their services (the underwriting dis-
count) and netted $38.85 per share. 5 16 If the stock had been valued in
decedent's gross estate at $38.85 per share because actual expenses were
considered 51 7 and the estate was allowed an administration expense de-
duction of $3.15 per share for the underwriting discount, the net effect
would be that the estate would pay estate tax on $35.70 per share. The
511. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224, 225 (emphasis added). The ruling adopted a posi-
tion similar to one advocated fifteen years earlier. Chisum, supra note 280, at 343. Chisum
suggested the regulations do not require use of net sales figures:
The Regulations refer to the price for which the block could be "sold as such outside
the usual market, as through an underniter." "Through" does not speak with the clar-
ity that "to" might have. "To" would ordinarily mean the net value to the seller;
"through" can just as well mean the price the underwriter receives from the public.
Id. (footnote omitted).
512. See supra notes 459-63 and accompanying text.
513. Robinson v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) 1227 (1985), rev'd on other grounds,
805 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986); Rifkind v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R 2d (P-H) 6453 (Cl. Ct. 1984).
In Robinson, the Tax Court recognized the double deduction issue had not yet been resolved.
1985 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1233 n.16 ("The ordinary costs of selling securities are not subtracted
from trading prices in fixing fair market value, but it is not entirely clear whether the extra
costs of a hypothetical secondary distribution should be deducted."). In RiJkind. the IRS
made the double benefit argument. 54 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) at 6463. Consistent with the posi-
tion announced in Revenue Ruling 83-30, it did not challenge the § 2053 administration
expense deduction, but contended that it was improper to consider anticipated costs of a
secondary offering in determining value under § 2031. Id. The court stated that "[t]he right
to take such a 'double deduction' has never been squarely presented before any court,
although its potential existence has been recognized and criticized." Id. (citation omitted).
514. Robinson, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1233 n.16 (the court determined stock was to be
valued as if sold in a private sale where underwriting costs would not be incurred); R/fjkind, 54
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) at 6464 (the IRS offered no evidence that the discount allowed in valuation
was "intended to cover the anticipated costs of sale...").
515. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1978).
516. Id.
517. The stock in Jenner was not valued by reducing market price by the exact amount of
expenses incurred in the secondary offering. Value was determined on the basis of many
factors including blockage. Id. at 1104 n.7.
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cash in the estate available for distribution, however, would be $38.85 per
share.
The value of large blocks of property, nonetheless, should be deter-
mined by considering the price that the seller could receive in an en bloc
sale of the property in an alternative market. In the stock context, this
would include consideration of the underwriting discount. Several consid-
erations justify this conclusion.
First, the courts in Joslyn and Jenner were correct in viewing valuation
under § 2031 and deductions under § 2053(a) as "separate and dis-
tinct."5 18 Nothing in the code suggests that administration expense de-
ductions play any part in determining value, or that administration
expense deductions are limited by the manner in which value is deter-
mined.5 19 Section 64 2(g), which precludes an income tax deduction for
administration expenses allowed under § 2053 in the computation of the
estate tax, does not apply.
520
Second, Revenue Ruling 83-30 is inconsistent with case law and disre-
gards the regulation which it purports to enforce. The ruling requires
valuation of property that would be disposed of in an alternative market as
if it were sold in the usual retail market to ultimate consumers.
Treasury Regulations generally require that the value of property be
determined in the market "in which such item is most commonly sold to
the public." 521 Items generally obtained by the public in the retail market
are to be valued at retail prices (replacement cost). 522 These provisions
are, however, subject to two important qualifications. First, "public" does
not always refer to the ultimate, individual consumer; it may refer to a
middleman who sells to the ultimate- consumer.523 Second, the regula-
tions expressly permit valuation outside the usual (retail) market where
blockage is relevant. The value of a large block of stock may be "the price
at which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market, as through
an underwriter."
52 4
In Revenue Ruling 83-30, the IRS mischaracterized the regulation as
permitting valuation by an alternative "method," rather than in an alterna-
518. Id. at 1103.
519. See Mark D. Maloney, Recent Development, Estate Tax Deductibility of Undenuriters'
Expenses After an Executor's Sale of Stock: A Loophole in Section 2053, 32 VAND. L. Ray. 1003, 1013
(1979) (concluding that no provision of the code "limits the use of one item both to reduce
gross estate value and as a deduction for estate tax purposes").
520. Id.
521. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
522. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1.
523. Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1985). The court held:
The major flaw in [taxpayer's] argument... is that the "public" refers to the custom-
ary purchasers of an item. The most appropriate purchaser of an item is not invari-
ably the individual consumer. For example, the general buying public for live cattle
would be comprised primarily of slaughterhouses rather than individual consumers.
The fair market value of live cattle accordingly would be measured by the price paid
at the livestock auction rather than at the supermarket.
Id.
524. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976) (emphasis added).
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tive "market." It focused on the phrase "as through an underwriter" as if
that were the controlling provision, without acknowledging that those
words merely illustrate how a sale outside the usual market could be made.
The phrase relied upon by the Service is of secondary importance. The
regulation's primary provision is that value may be established by the price
at which "the block could be sold as such outside the usual market." Cor-
rectly understood, the regulation confirmed case law which recognized
that the value of a block of stock could be determined by reference to its
sale price in a secondary offering at wholesale, rather than retail prices.5 25
The regulation focuses on what "the block," "as such," could be sold
for in the alternative market. It contemplates a bulk sale at wholesale
prices to one who would resell at retail.5 2 6 Who are the potential buyers
of "the block" "as such" in the alternative market? The answer will depend
on the property that constitutes the block.
In the stock context, the decisions in Joslyn and Jenner, unfortunately,
confuse rather than enlighten. Both in essence treated the underwriters
as agents for the seller, rather than as buyers purchasing stock for their
own account.52 7 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Jenner observed that Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission regulations prohibited underwriters from
purchasing for their own account.5 28 This might suggest that the buyer
was the group consisting of the individual purchasers in the secondary
offering. That group, however, paid a price higher than received by the
estates. The ultimate purchasers of the stock in the secondary offering
should not be viewed as the purchaser of "the block." They did not
purchase the stock en bloc and the estates did not have access to them in a
secondary offering without the services of the underwriters. Notwithstand-
ing the difficulties that exist in identifying the buyer, the value of a large
525. See supra notes 459-74 and accompanying text. But see SuRREY Er AL., supra note 450,
at 955:
The general valuation principle that retail sales price is the determinant of
value is violated to the extent that the broker's cost is recognized as an element of
the blockage discount. Recognition of this element also appears to ignore the state-
ment in Regulations, section 20.2031-2(e), giving evidentiary weight to 'the price at
which the block could be sold as such.' That statement should be interpreted to
mean that the price paid to the broker should determine the value of the stock
rather than the net amount the holder of the block receives. Otherwise, an estate
may receive the substantive equivalent of a double deduction for broker's fees and
other selling expenses if the stock is actually sold and the same broker's fees are
allowed as deductions under section 2053.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
526. Several commentators, before Joslyn, Jenner, and Revenue Ruling 83-30, recognized
that blockage may result in valuing property at liquidation prices rather than at retail prices.
See Wiley, supra note 280, at § 74.801, 8-4 ("[A]s approved by many courts (and possibly by the
Treasury's Regulations), blockage valuation appears to permit discounts for hypothetical
costs of the liquidation, and to this extent there may be a departure from what is permitted
in other contexts."); Chisum, supra note 280, at 340 ("[C]ourts have extended this economic
contention about the 'realities' of the marketplace to assume that value.., means value in
liquidation-the price that would be received if the property were actually sold at once.");
Note, supra note 189, at 254 (suggesting that blockage represented the only departure from
the trend in the law toward replacement cost valuation).
527. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1978); Estate of
Joslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1977).
528. Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1105 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b6 (1978)).
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block of stock, "as such," valued outside the usual market by reference to a
secondary offering, should reflect the net amount receivable by the
seller.
529
Third, property would be taxed at values in excess of the amounts
that could be realized upon a sale en bloc, unless costs incurred in the
disposition of the block are considered in valuation. While selling ex-
penses are not deductible in the valuation of most property for transfer
tax purposes, large blocks of property justify different treatment. The
owner of a small holding of stock has several alternatives if he desires to
sell. He can sell the stock through a broker, in which case he will incur a
sales commission. Alternatively, he can negotiate a private sale and avoid
payment of a commission. The owner of a large block of stock does not
have that option. The market for "the block", "as such," is limited to dispo-
sition through special marketing devices which utilize the services of un-
derwriters. The owners of large blocks have access to the usual market
only through a sale outside the usual market.
Fourth, adoption of a replacement cost approach in the valuation of
large blocks of property could result in their valuation at a premium
rather than at a discount, as was recognized in 1951:
Buying a large block of stock would raise the price to a premium;
"blockage," however, recognizes that a large block of stock can-
not be converted into cash as readily as a few shares and allows
the donor to value his stock at a lower price than the sum of the
stocks multiplied by the current exchange rate on the market.
Thus, value is measured by the money for which the donor could
sell the stock.
5 30
Supply and demand work both ways. If a buy order for a substantial block
of stock were entered, the price of the stock would rise to reflect the in-
creased demand. Such a valuation would result in taxation at a value
which the estate could never receive. These considerations justify valua-
tion of a block of property by reference to the amount receivable in an en
bloc sale.
Resolution of this valuation issue will not merely decide whether cer-
tain amounts (i.e. the underwriting discount) will effectively be allowed
once or twice in the computation of federal estate taxes. In certain cases,
it will decide whether the amounts will be allowed at all in that calculation.
If the IRS' position in Revenue Ruling 83-30 is sustained, these
amounts might never be deductible for estate tax purposes for two rea-
sons. First, administration expenses are deductible only if paid. If the
property is not sold, there will be no selling expenses to deduct. Second,
even if the property is sold and selling expenses are paid, they might not
be deductible as administration expenses under § 2053. Section
2053(a) (2), by its terms, allows a deduction for administration expenses
529. See Watts, supra note 33, at 77.
530. Recent Case, supra note 173, at 294-95 (footnote omitted); see also HAmuss, supra
note 284, at 83 (suggesting that the unit value of a large block of stock would exceed market
prices for smaller blocks if value were interpreted as cost of acquisition).
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"allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction" under which the estate is being
administered. It is the Treasury's position, however, that not all adminis-
tration expenses are deductible. The regulations provide that only selling
expenses incurred in sales necessary to pay decedent's debts, expenses of
administration, taxes, or to preserve the estate or effect distribution are
deductible. 53 ' The circuit courts have reached different conclusions as to
whether deductibility is solely a matter of state law.5 32 Consideration of
that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 533 Deductibility of adminis-
tration expenses, however, is never an issue in connection with the gift tax
because no estate is being administered.
53 4
Concluding that the value of large blocks of property may be deter-
mined by reference to sales in alternative markets at wholesale, rather
than retail prices, does not mean that estates must also be allowed a selling
expense deduction for items considered in valuation. WhileJoslyn andJen-
ner correctly allowed deductions for underwriting expenses under current
law, 53 5 Congress could conclude that the double benefit should be pre-
531. Treas. Regs. § 20.2053-3(a), 3(d)(2) (as amended in 1979). These regulations are
substantially unchanged since their promulgation in 1919. Estate of Park v. Commissioner,
475 F.2d 673, 676 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 660
(1972), afyd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
532. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that state law alone determines deductibil-
ity. Park, 475 F.2d at 676 ("Congress has committed to the considered judgment of the states
whether a particular expense is allowable as a proper or necessary charge against estate as-
sets."); Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1106 ("As a general rule the decree of a probate court approving
expenditures as proper administrative expenses under state law will control."). The Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that state law alone does not
control. Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83 ("[T]he federal courts cannot be precluded from reexam-
ining a lower state court's allowance of administration expenses to determine whether they
were in fact necessary to carry out the administration of the estate or merely prudent or
advisable in preserving the interests of the beneficiaries.") (footnote omitted); Estate of Love
v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Given this regulation, it is clear that this
is a question of federal law and federal taxation policy which would not be properly ad-
dressed under a state statute."); Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651,659 (5th Cir. 1967) ("In
the determination of deductibility under section 2053(a) (2), it is not enough that the deduc-
tion be allowable under state law."); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 744 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("We agree with the district judge that allowability under state law is not the sole
criterion for determining the deductibility of a particular expenditure under section
2053(a) (2)."); Marcus v. DeWitt, 704 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("[T]he law is estab-
lished for this circuit that the state probate court determination is not conclusive.") (citation
omitted).
533. Several recent articles have considered this issue. For additional discussion, see
Sharon C. Nantell & Marjorie A. Rogers, Deductibility of Administration Expenses Is Not Always
Black and White, 16 HI-MLuE L. Rxv. 105 (1992); Michael H. Tow, Note, Estate of Love and
§ 2053(a)(2): Why State Law Should Control the Determination of Deductible Administration Expenses,
12 VA. TAx REv. 283 (1992); Paul L. Caron, Must an Administration Expense Allowed by State Law
also Meet a Federal Necessity Test?, 70J. TAx'N 352 (1989).
534. No deduction is allowed for selling expenses in the determination of gift taxes. Tax-
payers, however, can decide whether to make gifts of property or of cash. A donor may de-
cide to sell property and make a gift of the net sale proceeds, effectively obtaining a full
deduction for selling expenses incurred.
The valuation issue, however, can arise in connection with the gift as well as the estate
tax. If the owner of a large block of stock transfers the entire block to one donee in a single
transfer, the same question arises regarding valuation. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as
amended in 1976). With no possible administration expense deduction, the only way the
donor can benefit from consideration of items such as underwriting discounts is if they are
considered in valuation of the block gifted.
535. Maloney, supra note 519, at 1019.
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cluded and amend the Code.53 6 Alternatively, it has been suggested that
the double benefit problem could be solved by amendment of the regula-
tions under § 2053.537
The difficulty with either approach, however, would lie in identifying
how much of the blockage discount was attributable to selling expenses
that would be incurred in the hypothetical sale in the alternative market
(i.e., in a secondary distribution). While those amounts could be deter-
mined in Joslyn because actual expenses were used in determining value,
the amounts could not be determined in Jenner where the Tax Court con-
sidered blockage as only one of many valuation factors. Valuation of a
block of property in an alternative market will usually reflect consideration
of many factors, making it difficult to isolate the expenses which would not
be deductible under an amended § 2053.
III. VALUATION OF ART
Art, unlike most property, has no intrinsic value. 538 The value of art
largely depends on the reputation of the artist at the time of sale.53 9
Changing tastes and artists falling in and out of favor both affect the value
of art.5 40 It has been suggested that art "prices float more or less aim-
lessly"54 1 and that only critics who succeed in redirecting general tastes are
able to profit from their judgment.
5 42
Recent history demonstrates the dramatic price fluctuations that can
occur in the art market. Art prices boomed in the 1980s, peaked in 1989,
but, by late 1992, had declined to 1987 levels. 543 It is unclear whether the
536. See id. at 1020 (proposing amendment of § 2053(a) (2) to allow deductions for ad-
ministration expenses only "when the value of the gross estate is undiminished by such ad-
ministration expenses or estimates thereof").
537. Watts, supra note 33, at 79 (suggesting amendment of the regulations under § 2053
"to exclude any deduction for selling expenses thereunder to the extent that the particular
expenses have already been reflected in the relevant estate tax valuation").
538. See Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M (CCH) 2699, 2702 (1992) ("A
work of art usually does not have intrinsic financial value beyond its desirability as art and
lacks external indicia of return prior to resale, such as earnings or dividends.").
539. LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 49.
540. Id.; see also William J. Baumol, Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap
Game, 15J. ARTS MGM-r. & L. 47, 53, 58 (1985) (concluding, after studying 640 art transac-
tions from 1652 to 1961, that history "tells us that the main lesson imparted by the test of
time is the fickleness of taste whose meanderings defy prediction"); McCarthy, supra note 4,
at 8 (noting that factors relating to art valuation change, rendering the art market artificial
and subject to manipulation).
541. Baumol, supra note 540, at 47.
542. Id. at 58.
543. See Ralph E. Lerner, Big Picture: Dealing with the Business Side of Art, 79 A.B.A. J. 84
(March 1993). Lerner noted that:
The art world has been on a roller coaster in recent years.
The art market peaked in May 1990, when Van Gogh's "Portrait of Dr. Gachet"
sold for a staggering $82.5 million at a Christie's auction. Forty-eight hours later,
"Au Moulin de la Galette" by Renoir sold for $78.1 million at Sotheby's.
But the plunge has been as sharp as the climb. Battered by the recession, art-
ists, dealers, collectors and auction houses have sought to encourage sales by reduc-
ing prices.
Id; Alexandra Peers, Art Prices Begin Emerging From 2-Year Slump, But Remain Far Below the
Height of '80s Boom, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1992, at Cl ("Sales of paintings back on the [Nov.
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art market has recovered.5 44 In valuing art, the Tax Court has noted and
apparently considered the boom and subsequent bust of art prices.
545
The value of art, as with other property, is a question of fact to be
determined on the basis of all relevant facts.5 46 Art, however, is particu-
larly difficult to value because of the multitude of factors that may affect its
value. 54 7 In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,5 48 for example, the Tax Court
listed the following factors in determining the value of a large block of art:
the artist's reputation at time of death; the market's acceptance of the
works; the distribution of works according to size, period during which
they were created, and their expression of the quality of the artist's work;
the tendency of the artist in working in series and whether an item was
part of a complete series to be valued; sales before and after death; and
the location of the items.
5 49
Although the taxpayer has the burden of proof, commentators have
suggested that the Commissioner rarely challenges art valuations.550 One
1992] auction block after only a brief time in private hands illustrate the erosion in art prices
since 1989. Frank Stella's 'Sketch Red Lead' sold for $198,000, a pale 45% of the price it
fetched at auction in May 1990. Andy Warhol's 'Race Riot' fetched $627,000, down 65%
from its November 1989 price. Kenneth Noland's 'Blue Horizon' brought $93,500, off 30%
from its auction-block price two years ago this month.").
544. Ann E. Berman, SpringArt Auctions: The Apples of Canne's, WALL ST.J., May 18, 1993,
at A14 (suggesting the art market was still confusing and that "to anyone taking a global
perspective, art still must seem like an unsafe vehicle for investment or pleasure"); Alexandra
Peers, At 227 Years Old, Christie's Is Undergoing a Face Lift WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993, at B6
(noting, despite encouraging results at recent Impressionist auctions, that the CEO of Chris-
tie's could not answer the question of whether the art market was back); Peers, supra note
543, at CI (noting art prices were still far below 1989 levels).
545. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701-2702 (1992).
546. See, e.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985).
547. See Karlen, supra note 5, at 187-88. Karlen listed the following factors:
The primary physical and temporal considerations for evaluating a painting,
sculpture, or other art object include the identity of the artist; date or period of
creation; physical condition; quantum of restoration; subject matter; medium; phys-
ical dimensions; authenticity; rarity; artistic value; aesthetic value; and other factors
peculiar to the physical creation and physical existence of the art object. Also, be-
cause value is based upon a "market," the physical aspects of the work are then
related to past and present market considerations such as past sales prices for the
same or similar works; provenance; offers to purchase; other earlier appraisals; state
of the economy and market in general; size and extent of local, national and/or
international markets for the type of work in question; and changes in fashion and
taste which affect the demand for the work or works like it. Other considerations
affecting value are impediments and restrictions such as those imposed by joint
ownership; import and export laws; claims made on the art object; and artists' rights
in the work of art.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Speiller, supra note 14, at 227-29 (discussing the difficulties that exist
in the valuation of art and identifying relevant factors).
548. 57 T.C. 650 (1972), afd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
549. Id. at 658-59. The court noted that in listing these factors it did "not mean to imply
that we have set forth every consideration which has influenced our decision herein." Id. at
658 n.7.
550. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 13; see also Lawrence Malkin, How the IRS Looks at Art,
CONNOISSEUR, May 1989 at 170, 172 ("The IRS does not quibble with differences in valuation
of less than about 15 percent and is also loath to fine-tune larger but still moderate disagree-
ments in valuation that might represent honest differences of opinion."); see also Calder v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 714 (1985) (the IRS determined the amount reported by the
taxpayer for estate tax purposes ($949,750) "was within an acceptable range and no change
was recommended" where the IRS's appraiser valued the art as having a value of $1,164,600
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reason suggested for the Service's avoidance of litigation in art valuation
disputes is the difficulty it has in obtaining witnesses. 55 ' Indeed, in the
three cases in which blockage was considered in the valuation of art, the
IRS agreed with the taxpayer prior to trial as to the per-item value of art
valued at $4,284,000,552 $2,911,750,553 and approximately $73,000,000.
5 5 4
A. Relevant Market
Treasury Regulations require the value of property be determined in
the market in which it is most commonly sold to the public: the retail
market for items generally obtained by the public at retail.555 The value of
an individual work of art, as a result, will generally be determined by the
price at which it could be purchased in the retail market by the ultimate
consumer of the property.
5 5 6
Art is sold and purchased through private sales, gallery sales, and auc-
tion sales. Which of these is the retail market in which art is most com-
monly sold to the public? 557 Do these represent different markets or
merely different sale methods within the same (retail) market? The IRS
has ruled558 that, absent evidence to the contrary, the retail market for art
includes dispositions by private sales, gallery sales, or through auctions be-
cause a buyer would pay a comparable price regardless of how the art was
acquired.55 9 The answer to the question, however, will depend on the
facts in each case 56° and may hinge on the nature and price of the item
being valued.
561
to $1,293,800). Cf Speiller, supra note 14, at 238 (suggesting that, while the IRS is in "con-
stant disagreement" with taxpayers in art valuation cases, litigation rarely results).
551. Speiller, supra note 14, at 238.
552. Smith, 57 T.C. at 655.
553. Calder, 85 T.C. at 717.
554. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2703 (1992) (the par-
ties agreed that the value exceeded $72,759,000).
555. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
556. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 2115, 2120 (1986).
557. SeeJessica L. Furey, Note, Painting a Dark Picture: The Need for Reform of IRS Practices
and Procedures Relating to Fine Art Appraisals, 9 CAROozo ARTs & ENrr. 177, 178 (1990) (sug-
gesting that the regulations are ambiguous because they fail to specify whether auction value,
retail (dealer) value, or private sales figures are to be used in determining value).
558. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992).
559. Id. ("[Tihe estate could have sold the artwork directly to a purchaser or through a
private art dealer. The buyer would pay an amount that would be comparable to the total
amount paid by the buyer at a public auction.").
560. See Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2121 (holding that auction sales of pre-Columbian
art did not reflect prices in the retail market because they were composed of wholesale, as
well as retail transactions).
561. See Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 2419, 2426 (1992) (the court
found a limited market existed for a five-panel, 110.5 foot-long frieze because of its large size
and uniqueness); Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2706 (1992)
(the court found different works of art in the estate would appeal to different segments of
the art market); LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 668 ("The market for a seven-foot sculp-
ture weighing five tons is smaller than the market for a three-foot-by-two-foot oil painting.
Relative price also enters into the determination, that is, the market for oil paintings selling
for more than $100,000 is probably smaller than the market for those selling for between
$1,000 and $10,000.").
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But what if the price varied depending on whether art were
purchased in a private sale, in a gallery, or at auction?562 Courts have
dealt with that situation in two ways. First, such evidence may mean that
different markets are involved. Auction prices for pre-Columbian art have
been rejected for this reason-purchases by collectors, dealers, and muse-
ums made it a mixed retail and wholesale market.563 Second, courts have
recognized that within a retail market consumers may pay a wide range of
prices for the same item depending on where they choose'to shop.564 In
cases involving income tax charitable contribution deductions, courts have
held that the most appropriate market in which to determine value is "the
most active marketplace for the item."5 65 Estate and gift tax regulations,
similarly, provide that value is determined in the market in which the item
is "most commonly sold to the public." 566
1. Private Sales
It is difficult to use private sales prices to determine fair market value
because sales figures are often confidential, and no publication exists
which details sales information.5 67 The Tax Court, however, has consid-
ered evidence of private sales in determining value where it found the
sales were "adequately verified and documented."
568
2. Gallery Sales
Art sold by dealers in galleries to ultimate consumers may appear to
be most representative of the traditional "retail" sale used to establish fair
market value. As with private art sales, however, gallery sales information
may be difficult to obtain,56 9 a fact recognized by the Tax Court.5 70 De-
spite this difficulty, the Tax Court has considered gallery sales in determin-
ing fair market value.
57 1
Prices in gallery sales, moreover, may not represent fair market value
because sale prices might be too high or too low. Gallery sales prices may
be too high because:
562. See Furey, supra note 557, at 178 (suggesting that "large discrepancies" usually exist
between private, gallery, and auction prices).
563. Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. at 2118, 2121.
564. Lio v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 56, 69-70 (1985), affd sub nom. Orth v. Commissioner,
813 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1987).
565. Id. at 70.
566. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
567. Furey, supa note 557, at 179 n.12.
568. Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 2419, 2426 (1992) (court found the
IRS expert, who relied on auction sales and rejected using private sales, less persuasive than
taxpayer's experts who used both).
569. Furey, supra note 557, at 179 n.12.
570. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701 (1992)
("O'Keeffe's works were also sold through galleries, although exact data concerning such
sales is difficult to obtain or to verify.").
571. E.g., Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 719 (1985); Estate of Smith v. Commis-




Dealers who have well-established reputations can often demand
artificially high prices for the paintings they sell. Private collec-
tors will often pay considerably more for a painting purchased
from a well-known dealer than its current market value as deter-
mined at auction, in order to gain the benefit of the dealer's ex-
perience, guidance, personalized service, and professional
guarantee regarding authenticity.
572
Conversely, gallery sales prices may be too low as evidenced by subsequent
auction sales.
5 73
Artists sometimes sell works of art to dealers for resale. 574 Sales made
to dealers must be distinguished from sales made by dealers. While gallery
sales prices may evidence value in the retail market, sales to galleries will





Auction prices are readily available through several publications.
5 7 7
Because auction prices are easily verified and often reflect current market
developments, 5 7 8 commentators have suggested adoption of auction
prices as the standard to determine the fair market value of art.5 7 9 The
Tax Court has recognized that auction prices may be relevant in the deter-
mination of fair market value.
5 8 0
Auction prices, however, may not always reflect fair market value.
They may be too high due to some items receiving more publicity, than
others, the attendance of an avid collector,58 1 or "auction fever."5 8 2 Addi-
tionally, prices might be inflated because a dealer bought back paintings
in order to drive up prices5 8 3 or to protect the value of works in his inven-
tory.5 8 4 On the other hand, auction prices may be "too low if the auction
572. Furey, supra note 557, at 197-98; accord Speiller, supra note 14, at 229 ("[D]ealers have
been known to obtain extraordinary prices from clients whom they have wined and dined
over the years.").
573. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
574. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 4.
575. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965) (providing that the fair market
value of a used automobile is the price at which a comparable vehicle could be purchased by
the public rather than the price that a dealer would pay); see also Alan Halperin, The IRS Rules
that a Picture is Worth 1,100 Words, 132 TR. & EST., Mar. 1993, at 36, 42.
576. Sotheby's Holdings Inc. and Christie's International PLC handle approximately 98%
of the world auction market for art and antiques. Peers, supra note 544, at B6; see generally
LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 143-45.
577. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 27-28; Furey, supra note 557, at 179 n.13.
578. Furey, supra note 557, at 179.
579. Furey, supra note 557, at 179; see also Halperin, supra note 575, at 38 (suggesting that
the IRS should recognize "the dominant market place is the public auction" for estates con-
taining valuable art).
580. Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994, 999 (1968).
581. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 11.
582. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
583. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 11; accord IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 27-28
("While such [auction price] information may prove helpful, experience discloses that such
publications have reported (without any intent to mislead) prices resulting from rigged
sales.").
584. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
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is not well attended because the items offered are unexciting or even be-
cause the weather is bad."
58 5
The large number of dealer purchases at auctions, moreover, suggests
the auction market may be a mixed retail-wholesale market. One com-
mentator has suggested that:
With respect to the auction market, Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc.
(New York) estimated that sixty percent of its sales are to dealers.
Is then the price obtained at auction a retail price that represents
fair market value or a wholesale price that does not? The ques-
tion is unanswerable because the dealers may be bidding as
agents for clients, thereby paying a retail price, or they may be
bidding for their own account, thus paying what may be regarded
as a wholesale price, which they will presumably mark up for
resale.
58 6
Nonetheless, one commentator has observed that executors overwhelm-
ingly select the auction market as the method of disposing of art.
58 7
a. Buyer's Premium
The purchaser of art at major auction houses must pay not only the
"hammer price," but also a "buyer's premium."5 88 The premium had
been a uniform 10% of the bid price until January 1, 1993, when it was
increased to 15% on the first $50,000 of the price. 58 9
The Service recently ruled590 that the fair market value of art in a
decedent's gross estate which was sold at auction was the auction price
plus the buyer's premium.5 9 1 The IRS relied upon Guggenheim v. Ras-
quin592 and Publicker v. Commissionei59 3 for the proposition that fair market
value is the total amount (purchase price plus excise tax and other
charges) that a purchaser has to pay to acquire property.594 Although Ras-
quin and Publicker involved valuation for gift tax purposes, the Service
noted that fair market value should be the same for gift and estate tax
purposes.
595
585. Id. (footnote omitted).
586. Speiller, supra note 7, at 229 (footnote omitted); see also Furey, supra note 557, at 179
n.15 (suggesting that most dealers buy works of art at auctions and resell them at a considera-
ble markup in order to make a profit).
587. Halperin, supra note 575, at 38.
588. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005, (May 27, 1992); see generaly, LERNER & BRxsLER, supra
note 4, at 153.
589. Ann E. Berman, Good New, Bad News in the Art May*e WALL. ST. J., Nov. 25, 1992, at
A12; Alexandra Peers, Sotheby's Raises Commissions for Buyers by 50% in a Bid To Increase Its
Revenue, WAiL. ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at Cl.
590. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992). An attorney in the firm that represented
the taxpayer has written an article analyzing the ruling. Halperin, supra note 575.
591. Id.
592. 312 U.S. 254 (1941); see supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
593. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 174-82.




The IRS concluded that the estate could have received the hammer
price plus the premium, if it had sold the art other than by auction.
596
The IRS stated that:
The estate was not obligated by statute or otherwise to sell the art
work in any particular manner, and there is no indication that, if
the estate sold the art work directly or through a private dealer,
that the sales price would not have been higher, reflecting the
fact that the buyer would not have had to pay the purchase
premium.
5 97
It held that although known as a "buyer's premium," it was really a seller's
cost of sale, regardless of who paid it.5 98 Finally, the Service noted that the
gross estate includes the value of property unreduced by selling expenses,
which may be deductible as administration expenses under § 2053.59 9
The Service's ruling that actual sale prices established value recog-
nized that post-valuation date sales are relevant in determining value con-
sistent with long-established precedent. 60 0 But, whether the buyer's
premium should be added to the hammer price depends on identification
of the relevant market and on whether the estate had access to buyers in
that market by alternative sale methods.
Since the ruling did not involve the blockage issue, the value of the
artworks was to be determined in the market in which art was most com-
monly sold to the public. 6° 1 Because art is generally obtained by the pub-
lic in the retail market, value is the price at which it would be sold at
retail. 602 The regulations provide that value is determined from the
buyer's perspective. 6°3 If the estate could have obtained an amount equal
to the auction price plus the buyer's premium by negotiating a private
sale, determining value by reference to the willing buyer's total cost would
be appropriate.
In United States v. Cartwright,6° the Supreme Court held that regula-
tions valuing mutual fund shares at the price a buyer would have to pay
(the asked price), rather than at the amount a seller could receive (the bid
price), were invalid.6° 5 The Court noted that private trading of mutual
fund shares was "virtually nonexistent"6° 6 and that the bid price was "the
only price that the estate could hope to obtain if the shares had been





600. See supra part I.B.4.a.
601. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965).
602. See /i.
603. Id.
604. 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
605. Id. at 550.
606. Id. at 549.
607. Id. at 551.
608. Id. at 550.
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The IRS distinguished Cartwright in its recent ruling and held that the
sale of art does not involve a restricted market as did the sale of mutual
fund shares in Cartwright.60 9 The estate, therefore, could have sold the art
directly, or through a dealer, and obtained "an amount that would be
comparable to the total amount paid by the buyer at a public auction."
6 10
If the IRS is correct, valuing the art by the buyer's total cost at auction is
correct.
It has been suggested, however, that estates cannot sell art directly in
the retail market:
[A]n executor of an estate containing paintings cannot function
as a dealer of fine art and dispose of the paintings in that market.
An executor can place an advertisement in a newspaper and sell
a used car, but it would not be prudent for an executor to sell a
valuable painting in that manner. The art market is composed of
highly specialized experts whose dealer-customer relationships
are more analogous to a lawyer-client relationship than to a used-
car dealer-customer relationship. Years of trust, experience,
prestige, and warranties bind a dealer to his or her customers.
6 11
The public auction, therefore, is "the most commonly used marketplace
for an executor" to dispose of art.612 Value determined in that market
should be the amount obtainable by the estate-the hammer price.
6 13
This issue should be resolved on the basis of whether estates can real-
istically and reasonably dispose of art other than through public auctions.
The art market, unlike the market for mutual fund shares in Carturight, is
not a market restricted by law.6 14 But does its unique nature effectively
restrict the market? Can an estate dispose of art directly in the retail mar-
ket? The courts should resolve the buyer's premium issue on the basis of
evidence regarding the realities of the market.
B. Art Appraisers6 15 and Appraisals
Early Treasury Regulations required that the value of artworks be sup-
ported by expert appraisals. 61 6 Value was to be determined by the amount
the art "would bring at a bona fide sale to individual purchasers, to deal-
ers, or upon a well-advertised auction sale."6 17 Current regulations re-
quire appraisals of personal property whose value exceeds $3,000.618
609. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992).
610. Id.
611. LER.NER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 367 (Supp. 1992); see also Halperin, supra note
575, at 38 (noting that a retail market exists in the art field, but that it is generally not
available to or appropriate for most executors).
612. LERNER & BREslER, supra note 4, at 367 (Supp. 1992); Halperin, supra note 575, at
38.
613. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 369 (Supp. 1992); see Halperin, supra note 575, at
40.
614. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992); Halperin, supra note 575, at 37.
615. For detailed treatment of issues involving art appraisers, see Furey, supra note 557;
Homer, supra note 17.
616. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 17, 18, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765 (1919).
617. Id. at 766.
618. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
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Art appraisals can be obtained from many sources, including mem-
bers of appraisal associations, art dealers, auction houses, and art museum
personnel. Two factors are important in assessing the relative merits of
these appraisers: competence and objectivity.6 19 Competence refers to
the training and experience that qualifies one to appraise art.620 Objectiv-
ity refers to the absence of a conflict of interest. 62 ' Lack of an inherent
conflict of interest, however, does not mean that the appraiser will not
assume the role of an advocate for the party that retains him. It means
only that the appraiser does not have any other personal stake in the ap-
praisal result. Competence and objectivity obviously depend on the indi-
vidual appraiser. But membership within a particular group may affect an
appraiser's competence and objectivity.
622
There are a number of associations of art appraisers. 623 Require-
ments for membership in the associations vary greatly.6 24 Failure to en-
sure competence of their members is "[t]he fundamental problem with
appraiser societies." 625 The current system does not require uniform ac-
creditation and, consequently, allows persons with little or no training or
experience to make appraisals. 626 Although questions exist regarding
their competence, professional appraisers may be objective because they
have "no financial incentive to become an advocate."
627
Art dealers also appraise art. Their competence to appraise art, how-
ever, may be questioned.6 28 They may lack knowledge and training in the
appraisal process and have limited exposure to art other than that for sale
in their galleries. 629 Art dealers also have a serious conflict of interest in
valuing art.630 They "have every reason to want to establish high prices,
since high art values are financially beneficial to collectors who, upon do-
nation of artworks, can take maximum charitable deductions."6 3' Dealers
might also overvalue art in order to increase the prices of comparable
works in their galleries.
6 32
Art appraisals may also be obtained from representatives of major auc-
tion houses which have full-time appraisal staffs. 633 Such appraisers are
usually well-trained, experienced, and familiar with the latest market de-
619. Homer, supra note 17, at 463.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 462-80 (discussing these issues in detail).
623. Furey, supra note 557, at 185 n.63.
624. Id.; Homer, supra note 17, at 464-66.
625. Homer, supra note 17, at 465.
626. Furey, supra note 557, at 199; Homer, supra note 17, at 461 (suggesting "formal state
regulation of appraisers via appraiser licensing and accreditation legislation could solve some
of the problems of incompetence in the profession").
627. Homer, supra note 17, at 466.
628. Id. at 472.
629. Id.
630. Id. at 470.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 466.
633. Id. at 473.
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velopments. 63 4 Most staff members possess knowledge of a particular art
market and have a background in the arts and art history. 635 If the possi-
bility of overvaluation to obtain art for auction and the resultant commis-
sions is dismissed, 63 6 auction houses lack a conflict of interest in
appraising art.
63 7
Finally, museum curators and staff sometimes appraise art, although
some may be prohibited from preparing appraisals for outsiders. 63 8 Mu-
seum personnel with credentials and training as art historians would ap-
pear to be competent appraisers.63 9 But valuation of art requires
knowledge of current market conditions that they may not possess.640
Moreover, museum personnel may have a conflict of interest when valuing
art.64 1 A high appraisal may result in the museum's receipt of the piece or
increase the chances that a collection might be donated in the future.642
Treasury Regulations address the competence and objectivity of ap-
praisers.643 Taxpayers are advised to select carefully appraisers that are
'reputable and of recognized competency to appraise the particular class
of property"644 and are required to provide a statement under penalties of
perjury "as to the disinterested character and the qualifications of the ap-
praiser."6 45 Courts have focused on experts' competence and objectivity
in determining whether to accept their testimony and how much weight it
should be given.6 46 Courts have disregarded expert testimony determined
to be exaggerated, biased, or given by one inexperienced in the appraisal
of the item valued.
647
Objective facts must support appraisals. An "appraiser's opinion is
never more valid than the facts on which it is based; without these facts it is
simply a guess." 64 8 An appraiser's failure to support his opinion with facts
may lead the IRS to challenge the appraisal. 649 The IRS has set forth the
634. Furey, supra note 557, at 186.
635. Homer, supra note 17, at 474.
636. Id. (stating that her interviewees "claimed this is unlikely to occur; and stated that it
never had occurred to their knowledge").
637. Id.; see Furey, supra note 557, at 186 n.71.
638. Homer, supra note 17, at 467.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 468.
641. Id. at 467-68.
642. Id. at 467.
643. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b), (d) (1958).
644. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(d) (1958); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 561,
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED PROPERTY 9 (1992) ("The weight given the appraisal
depends on the completeness of the report, the qualifications of the appraiser, and the ap-
praiser's demonstrated knowledge of the donated property."); cf McCarthy, supra note 4, at
20 (suggesting one reason the IRS challenges appraisals is "use of an appraiser unfamiliar
with the type of property being valued").
645. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
646. See, e.g., Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 92,450, at 2419 (1992);
Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992); Biagiotti v. Commis-
sioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115 (1986).
647. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
648. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 561, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED
PROPERTY 9 (1992); see Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258.
649. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 20.
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sort of data to be included in art appraisals for federal income tax pur-
poses. 650 The IRS factors also serve as a useful guide for transfer tax pur-
poses. Seventeen items that would be contained in an "ideal appraisal"
have been identified.
65 1
C. IRS Art Advisory Panel
In 1968, the IRS created the Art Advisory Panel ("Panel") to deter-
mine whether art donated to charity was being realistically appraised.
65 2
The Service maintains the Panel to assist it in reviewing selected cases in-
volving taxpayer valuations of major art objects. 653 An Art Valuation
Group within the Service's Engineering and Valuation Branch provides
staff support for the Panel.
654
The Internal Revenue Manual provides that objects valued by taxpay-
ers at $20,000 or more are to be referred to the National Office for review
by the Panel.655 The large number of cases meeting that threshold, how-
ever, has required the Art Valuation Group to select cases for Panel con-
sideration and handle the rest itself.
656
The Panel's meetings are closed to the public to prevent disclosure of
taxpayer information. 65 7 Several procedures are followed to ensure an ob-
jective review. Panel members are not informed in advance of the meet-
ing of the taxpayer's identity or whether the valuation issue arose in an
estate or income tax context.6 58 The Panel discusses works in alphabetical
order by artist (or by culture in the case of non-western art) to minimize
recognition of a taxpayer's collection.
659
After discussion, the Panel reaches a consensus value. 66° If the Panel
disagrees with the taxpayer's valuation, it usually recommends a specific
valuation. 66 1 Although the Panel's recommendations are merely advisory,
they become the Service's position after review by the National Office Art
Valuation Group staff.6 6 2 The IRS prepares a report of the Panel's deter-
mination and a copy is given to the taxpayer. 663 If the taxpayer provides
additional information or new evidence deemed substantive by the staff, it
650. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1259.
651. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 18-20.
652. Furey, supra note 557, at 182.
653. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
654. Id.
655. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 42(16)4.2 (11-19-82), eprinted in IRS Valuation Guide,
supra note 65, at 18; cf. Speiller, supra note 14, at 234 (noting that items valued at less than
$20,000 are primarily handled in the district offices by appraisers who have no training or
background in art).
656. Speiller, supra note 14, at 235 & n.82.
657. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 25.
658. Id. at 24-25.
659. Internal Revenue Service, Annual Summary Report for 1992 of Closed Meeting Activity of
the Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue [hereinafter 1992 Regular Meeting
Summary].
660. Id.
661. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
662. IrERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 42(16)4.1 (11-6-84), reprinted in IRS Valuation Guide,
supra note 65, at 17; 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659.
663. 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659.
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will be submitted to the Panel for reconsideration at a subsequent
meeting.
66 4
The Panel is composed of nationally prominent art museum direc-
tors, curators, and art dealers6 65 appointed by the Commissioner as "spe-
cial government employees." 666 Members of the Panel receive no
compensation, but are reimbursed for travel expenses at the allowable gov-
ernment rate. 667 The Panel currently has twenty-five members.668 Con-
flicts of interest may arise because the Panel is composed of art dealers
(who may profit from high valuations of works by artists they represent)
and museum directors (who may not risk offending donors by lowering
valuations).669 If a conflict of interest exists, the panelist with the conflict
does not participate in the deliberations and leaves the room.
670
In 1992, the Panel met three times67 1 and reviewed a total of 2,642
items.672 It recommended acceptance of 56% of the appraisals, adjust-
ments as to 42%, and determined that 1% required additional staff devel-
opment 675 (the missing 1% appears to have resulted from rounding).
The Panel's recommendations resulted in a 55% reduction of "overvalued
items" in charitable contribution appraisals and a 56% increase of "under-
valued items" in estate and gift appraisals.
67 4
The Panel reviewed 126 estate and gift tax cases in 1992 and apprais-
als of 1,910 items.67 5 It recommended acceptance of the appraised value
for 71% of the items.676 The Panel recommended adjustments for 27% of
the items (increases - 20%; decreases - 7%).677 The remaining 2% re-
quired further staff development.678 These statistics, however, are mis-
leading because they include two categories: (1) Painting and Sculpture;
and, (2) African, Oceania and the Americas. 6 79 The Panel recommended
acceptance of the appraisals for all 803 items in the second category,6
0
but recommended acceptance of only 50% of the appraised values within
664. Id.
665. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
666. Karen E. Carolan, Documenting Art Appraisals for Federal Tax Purposes, in THE LAW AND
Bus INss OF ART, at 797, 824 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1990).
667. Id.
668. 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659 (a list of the members is provided with
the report).
669. Furey, supra note 557, at 184-85.













the Painting and Sculpture category. 68 1 Increases were recommended for
34% of the items, decreases for 12%.682
IV. BLOCKAGE AND THE VALUATION OF ART
Blockage was initially recognized in cases involving the valuation of
securities for transfer tax purposes, and the Regulations discuss it only in
that context. Blockage, however, has not been limited to transfer tax valu-
ation cases, 68 3 nor to cases involving securities. 68 4 Blockage "is relevant in
the valuation of any commodity."
685
A. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner
686
David Smith died from injuries suffered in an automobile accident in
1965.687 He died owning 425 pieces of sculpture created during various
periods of his life.688 A large majority (291) of the works were located at
Bolton Landing, N.Y. 68 9 Most of Smith's art consisted of abstract metal
sculptures.
690
In determining the value of Smith's art, the estate first valued the
pieces individually. 69 1 The estate determined the art, if sold separately,
had an aggregate value of $4,284,000.692 The estate, however, discounted
the aggregate value by 75% for blockage. 693 It asserted that value had to
be determined by the amount that could be obtained if all the sculptures
had been offered for sale at the moment of death. 694 The only purchaser
under those circumstances would have been a bulk purchaser acquiring
the art for resale. 69 5 Such a purchaser, the estate believed, would have
made a large cash investment which could only be recovered with an ac-
ceptable profit over a long period of time.69 6 As a result, such a buyer
would have only paid 25% of the art's aggregate value. 6 9 7 Finally, the es-
tate reduced the already discounted figure by one-third to take into ac-
count gallery commissions that would be paid under a contract existing at
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.) (income tax),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.)
(income tax), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967); Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887
(5th Cir. 1962) (income tax).
684. See Estate of Folks v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1982) (valuation of
lumberyards).
685. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 90 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974).
686. 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aftd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
687. Id. at 651.
688. Id.
689. Id. Bolton Landing is in upstate New York.
690. Id.
691. Id. at 654.
692. Id.
693. Id.
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Smith's death. 69 8 The artworks, according to the estate, had a value of
$714,000;699 less than 17% of the aggregate value determined on a per-
item basis.
The estate, relying on the blockage discount, valued the sculptures at
the price at which "the block" could be sold "as such" "outside the usual
market."70 0 Who would purchase such a large block of art in the alterna-
tive market? Not individual consumers in the retail market, but a person
who would buy en bloc at wholesale prices with the intent to resell. Such a
buyer would consider recovery of his investment as well as profit in deter-
mining price. The estate's approach was consistent with the manner in
which large blocks of stock had been valued at wholesale prices outside
the usual market.
70 1
The IRS, in its deficiency notice, valued Smith's works at
$5,256,918.702 At trial, however, the IRS conceded that the art's value did
not exceed the $4,284,000 amount determined by the estate.70 3 The IRS
did not allow a blockage discount; it claimed that simultaneous availability
of all works would not adversely affect prices. 70 4 Value, therefore, was de-
termined on an item-by-item basis in accordance with the regulations.
70 5
The Tax Court rejected the estate's argument that sale commissions
should be considered in determining value.70 6 The court relied upon Pub-
licker v. Commissioner° 7 and held the measure of value is what could be
received on a sale, not by what would be retained on a sale.
708
If the court was determining value in the retail market, it was correct
in holding that the value of property is the price that the purchaser would
have paid to acquire the property, not what the seller, after transactional
costs, would have received. But if value is determined outside the usual
market, the proper measure is the amount that the estate would have re-
ceived: a wholesale price. The claimed reduction for commissions, how-
ever, appears to duplicate the 75% blockage discount. If the estate could
only have sold the block to a bulk purchaser for 25% of the art's aggregate
value, that would be its value for estate tax purposes. No additional dis-
count would be warranted.
The Tax Court refused "to make any hard-and-fast choice between
the two approaches urged by the parties."7 ° 9 It did not reject the estate's
698. Id. at 654.
699. Id. In the Tax Court, the estate took the position that the artworks could not be
valued and had no value. Id. at 655. The court summarily rejected that argument; difficulties
in determining value are not a bar to valuation. Id.
700. See id. at 654.
701. See supra part II.E.2.
702. 57 T.C. at 655.
703. Id.
704. Id. at 656-57.
705. Id. at 657.
706. Id. at 659.
707. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
708. 57 T.C. at 659.
709. Id. at 657.
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valuation method although it believed a 75% discount was too large.710
On the other hand, it held that the Commissioner should have given "con-
siderable weight" to the fact that each item would not be offered in
isolation.
711
The court found that the large number of artworks in the estate
would adversely affect prices in the market.712 If the public had known of
the great number of unsold artworks and had all 425 pieces been made
immediately available, the estate could "reasonably have expected to get
substantially less money for them than if the works were slowly dissemi-
nated in the market over a period of years."7 13 The Tax Court thus made
the threshold factual determination required to invoke blockage. It spe-
cifically found that blockage provided a useful analogy in determining the
value of the large block of art.
714
In the most puzzling statement in the opinion, the court concluded
"in this case, the amount which an en bloc purchaser for resale would pay
and the aggregate of the separate 'one-at-a-time' values to be obtained by a
variety of dispositions in the 'retail market' would be the same."7 15 Whole-
sale prices, however, must differ from retail prices. A wholesale purchaser
of Smith's art would have incurred substantial opportunity costs (use of
money) and carrying costs (transportation, maintenance, insurance, etc.).
If such a purchaser could only resell the works at his purchase price, the
purchase would not be made.
The court listed a multitude of factors it professed to have considered
in determining value, 7 16 including pre-death and post-death sales. 7 17 The
court then declared that it had "carefully considered the entire record"
and valued the artworks at $2,700,000.718 It did not discuss its valuation
process or the weight it had given to any of the evidence. The determina-
tion of value was not appealed.
7 19
The Tax Court took an important first step in recognizing and apply-
ing blockage in the valuation of art in Smith. The court, unfortunately,
provided little guidance as to how value is determined when blockage is
involved. The opinion suggests the court used the "all relevant factors
valuation" approach. The court's lengthy recitation of factors and its hold-
710. Id. at 657-58.
711. Id. at 658.
712. Id. at 653.
713. Id.
714. Id. at 658.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 658-59.
717. Id. at 659 n.8 (giving little weight to sales made more than two years after Smith's
death). The court's consideration of post-death sales has been criticized. Martin S. Echter,
Equitable Treatmentfor the Artist's Estate, 114 TR. & EsT. 394, 397 (1975) ("To establish a date-of-
death fair market valuation based on the fortuitous post-death appreciation in the value of
sculptures several years after the artist's death is utterly incompatible with the concept of
taxing an estate based on its value at the date of decedent's death.").
718. 57 T.C. at 660.
719. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 480 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 423 U.S.
827 (1975). The issue on appeal was whether commissions paid by the estate were deductible
as administration expenses under § 2053.
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ing that value is determined by the amount that could be received (rather
than retained) is consistent with that method. The court apparently con-
sidered the amount that a bulk purchaser would have paid as one of many
relevant factors.
The $2,700,000 value and the lack of any discussion of the valuation
process suggest, however, that the court simply "split the baby" by reach-
ing a compromise value close to the average of the parties' positions.
72 0
The court's valuation was 37% less than the agreed upon per-item aggre-
gate value. The 37% figure and the final value strongly suggest that the
court allowed a 37.5% blockage discount (exactly in the middle of the
parties' positions) and rounded the resulting number to the nearest hun-
dred thousand dollar amount.
72 1
B. IRS Valuation Guide
The IRS specifically recognized that blockage applies in the valuation
of art in the IRS Valuation Guide published commercially in October,
1985:
In handling an artwork valuation case, the appeals officer may
also encounter a blockage issue. The concept of blockage is es-
sentially one of timing. A discount may be allowed where a large
quantity of any one type of art is offered on the market at one
time, and would substantially depress its value. The amount of
the discount would be determined, in part, on a reasonable esti-
mate of the time it would take to sell the entire quantity in
smaller lots. Some of the factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether a blockage discount is available are the opportunity
cost of holding the inventory, the carrying costs of the inventory,
and the expected period of time it will take to dispose of the
inventory.
722
The Service correctly identified size of the block and time required to
liquidate as the primary factors in deciding whether consideration of
blockage is justified. The other factors listed (opportunity cost and carry-
ing costs) are more relevant in determining the amount of the discount
than in deciding whether blockage is to be considered at all.
The IRS Valuation Guide gives a curious example based upon Smith:
720. The estate valued the art at $714,000 (ignoring its argument that the art had no
value). 57 T.C. at 654. The IRS valued the art at $4,284,000. The average of those values is
$2,499,000. Others have reached a similar conclusion. Norman E. Donoghue, II, Art Apprais-
als and Valuation for Federal Tax Purposes: Mechanics of New IRS Appraisal Rules, in THE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF ART at 183, 220 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1990) ("In Smith, the Tax Court literally split the differ-
ence between the IRS valuation and one of the executors' valuations."); Echter, supra note
717, at 396 ("The Court valued the sculptures at $2,700,000, approximately mid-way between
the executors' $0 valuation and that of the government.").
721. 75% (estate) + 0% (IRS) = 75% + 2 = 37.5%; $4,284,000 x 37.5% = $1,606,500 block-
age discount; $4,284,000 - $1,606,500 = $2,677,500; $2,677,500 rounded to $2,700,000. See
LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 429 (Supp. 1992) (concluding the court allowed a 37.5%
blockage discount).
722. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 30.
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Example 3 A famous sculptor died, leaving a large inventory of
unsold sculptures. Because the sculptures could not be sold in
one group, a discount may be allowable based upon the time re-
quired to dispose of the inventory in smaller lots. 7 23
By assuming that the sculptures could not be sold in one group, the IRS
seemed to reject determination of value by reference to a bulk sale in an
alternative market as advocated by the taxpayer in Smith. The IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 83-30724 after Smith and before commercial publication of
the valuation guide in 1985. Was this example, as well as the Revenue
Ruling, intended as a rejection of the Regulation which recognizes that
the value of a large block might be "the price at which the block could be
sold as such outside the usual market?"
C. Calder v. Commissioner
725
Alexander Calder died November 11, 1976.726 His estate contained
1,292 gouaches (opaque water color paintings). 72 7 The estate claimed a
60% blockage discount in the valuation of the gouaches 728 and reported
them on the estate tax return at $949,750.729 The Service's appraiser also
determined that a blockage discount of about 60% should be allowed and
valued the gouaches in a range from $1,164,600 to $1,293,800.730 In de-
termining value, the Service assumed that approximately fifty could be
sold per year.73 1 Although its appraiser valued the art at least 22% higher
than did the estate, the IRS concluded that the estate's valuation was
within an acceptable range and did not recommend a change for estate
tax purposes.
732
Louisa Calder, widow of the decedent, received 1,226 of the 1,292
gouaches.733 In the month following her husband's death, Louisa Calder
transferred her 1,226 gouaches to four irrevocable trusts for her children
and grandchildren.73 4 Calder believed that the value of the gouaches had
not changed in the forty days following her husband's death. 735 She
claimed a 60% blockage discount and reported the gifts at the same value
used for estate tax purposes. 73 6 The IRS disagreed with Calder's valuation
and issued a notice of deficiency.
737
In the Tax Court, Calder and the IRS agreed on the fair market value
of the individual gouaches, but disagreed as to the application of block-
723. Id.
724. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224.
725. 85 T.C. 713 (1985).
726. Id. at 714.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 717.
729. Id. at 714.
730. Id.
731. Id. at 719.
732. Id. at 714.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 717.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 713.
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age. 73 8 The disagreement involved three issues: (1) whether blockage ap-
plied for gift tax purposes, (2) identification of the relevant block, and (3)
the manner in which the blockage discount was to be determined. 73 9
The IRS argued that blockage discounts should not be allowed in the
valuation of gifts "because gifts, unlike deaths, are contemplated events
and one can manipulate the circumstances surrounding the transfers."
740
The court summarily rejected that argument as inconsistent with the gift
tax regulations and case law.
74 1
Calder treated her transfers into the four trusts as four separate gifts
(even though there were six beneficiaries under the trusts) 742 and calcu-
lated a blockage discount on the basis that all four gifts should be valued
as part of one large block.743 Calder argued that value should be deter-
mined on the basis of all gifts in order to take into account the time re-
quired to sell the gifts in an orderly manner.744 She contended the
Regulation's "no aggregation of gifts" rule applied only to the valuation of
securities. 74 5 The Commissioner, on the other hand, calculated a block-
age discount on the basis of six separate gifts.
746
The Tax Court determined that Calder had made six, not four, sepa-
rate gifts. 7 4 7 Case law established that gifts in trust are regarded as gifts to
the trust beneficiaries, not gifts to the trust.748 That determination was
also consistent with the duty imposed on the trustees to administer the
funds as separate trusts for the beneficiaries.
749
The court held that the blockage discount must be applied separately
to each gift under the "no aggregation of gifts" rule. 750 Although Calder
attempted to restrict that rule to the valuation of securities, 751 the court
held that the limitation also applied in the valuation of other property,
752
citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rushton.
753
The opinion does not reveal how Calder computed the 60% discount
that she claimed. The Commissioner calculated a blockage discount by
taking the agreed-upon prices of each gouache, estimating the number of
years that would be required to sell each block, and determining the dis-
counted present values of the rights to receive those amounts, using tables
738. Id. at 721.
739. Another issue, unrelated to blockage, involved the gift tax annual exclusion. Id. at
726-30. Consideration of that issue, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
740. Id. at 721. Similar arguments against allowance of blockage discounts for gift tax
purposes had previously been made. See HARmss, supra note 284, at 82.
741. 85 T.C. at 721-22.
742. Id. at 720.
743. Id. at 722.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 718.
747. Id. at 720-21.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 721.
750. Id. at 723.
751. Id. at 722.




provided in the regulations for the valuation of annuities for a term cer-
tain.75 4 He discounted the date of gift per-item values for the time that
receipt of those amounts would be delayed. 755 The six gifts were valued
independently with no consideration of the possible impact one trust's
sales would have on the others.756 The net effect of the Commissioner's
approach was allowance of a 25% discount for gifts which would require
five years to liquidate and an 18% discount for gifts which would require
three years to liquidate.
757
The Tax Court recognized the annuity approach taken by the
Commissioner:
[R]espondent treated the gouaches here as a large number of il-
liquid assets, whose worth could be realized only through liquida-
tion over a period of time at a uniform rate, yielding an assumed
amount of dollars each year over such period. Under this ap-
proach, realization of the value of the artworks can be compared
to the right to receive an annuity of the stated amount over the
given period, and the present worth of such annuity can be deter-
mined from the appropriate valuation tables. Sec. 25.2512-5, Gift
Tax Regs. The appropriate valuation factor reflects a discount
for the amount of time the various installments of the annuity are
deferred. As applied in the instant case, the effect is to grant a
blockage discount in a somewhat more sophisticated manner
than the usual method of applying a single percentage discount
to the retail value of the items at the date of the gift.
758
It did not find the annuity approach unreasonable, but noted that its accu-
racy depended upon the validity of the assumptions regarding the number
of pieces that could be sold each year and the length of the liquidation
process.
759
The problem with the Service's valuation, according to the court, was
that it assumed 330 gouaches could be sold each year.760 The evidence
established, however, that combined average annual sales of all six blocks
from 1977 though 1982 had been sixty.
76 1
The court then engaged in the roundabout aggregation rejected by
the Fifth Circuit in Rushton:
We agree that the discount should be calculated for each gift sep-
arately, but it is not realistic to apply the total sales figure for all
gouaches sold during the year to each gift, separately, in deter-
mining the liquidation period. Rather, it seems more logical to
us to use the actual average annual sales for each of the six gifts to
determine the relative liquidation periods.
762
754. Id. at 724.
755. Id.
756. Id. at 718.
757. Id.




762. Id. at 724-25.
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It attempted to justify its departure from the "no aggregation of gifts" rule
on the grounds that "blockage is a question of fact rather than a rule of
law."7 63 Actual sales, according to the court, provided the best evidence of
the true absorption rate of the market and were to be used to determine
the blockage adjustment through the annuity approach employed by the
Service.
764
The court utilized the Service's annuity approach to determine value
and the blockage discount.765 It concluded that sixty gouaches could be
sold each year and that it would take twenty-two years to liquidate all
1,226.766 The court took the per-item fair market value of the gouaches as
stipulated by the parties and discounted those amounts to present value
using a 10% discount rate over the twenty-two year liquidation period.
7 67
It concluded that the value of the gouaches was $1,210,000, after an appro-
priate discount for blockage. 76a The court thus allowed Calder a discount
of approximately 58%, close to the 60% she had claimed.
769
The court, although professing to uphold the "no aggregation of
gifts" regulation, refused to enforce its requirement that blockage be de-
termined by reference to each separate gift. 7 7 0 The court did indirectly
what it refused to do directly. The Tax Court, moreover, had earlier rec-
ognized the inconsistency of allowing roundabout aggregation. In Rushton
it had held that it was "illogical to determine the value of each gift sepa-
rately and yet take into account the effect of all gifts of shares upon the
market. The two concepts are irreconcilable."77 1 The Fifth Circuit, simi-
larly, had found roundabout aggregation "strongly against the thrust of
the regulation."
772
763. Id. at 725.
764. Id.
765. Id. at 725-26.
766. Id.
767. Id. at 726.
768. Id.
769. Calder stipulated that each gouache had a value of $2,375, resulting in an aggregate
value of $2,911,750 for the 1,226 gouaches. Calder claimed a 60% discount resulting in a net
value of $1,164,700. The Tax Court valued the gouaches at $1,210,000.
Calder Tax Court
Aggregate Value $2,911,750 $2,911,750
Effective Discount -1,747,050 (60%) -1,701,750 (58.444%)
Value $1,164,700 $1,210,000.
770. See Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-12 (recognizing the inconsistency in Calder
and noting that "[iun considering the reality of actual sales by each block, the court's applica-
tion of the blockage theory to each separate gift is somewhat inconsistent. However, that
may be the result of not wishing to invalidate the regulations, but, at the same time, being
unable to ignore reality."). The Tax Court earlier recognized that allowing roundabout ag-
gregation would be equivalent to holding the regulation invalid. Rushton v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 272, 276 (1973) ("Although petitioners do not ask us to hold the above-quoted sec-
tion of the regulations invalid, we would, in effect, be doing so if we adopt petitioners' posi-
tion."), affd, 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974). Two years after deciding Calder, the Tax Court cited
the "no aggregation of gifts" regulation, Calder, and Rushton and suggested, somewhat surpris-
ingly given Calder, that it had consistently valued gifts separately. Adair v. Commissioner, 54
T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 708 (1987).
771. Rushton v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 272, 278 (1973).
772. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The court in Calder confronted a difficult problem. How could it
value a block of art as of Dec. 21, 1976 (date of gift), at a value substan-
tially different from its value on Nov. 11, 1976 (date of death), when the
parties had agreed that the value of the individual gouaches did not vary
between the date of the death and the date of the gift?7 73 The court could
not, and disregarded the Regulation.
774
On this issue the court erred. Notwithstanding the apparent inequi-
ties that may arise as a result of the "no aggregation of gifts" rule, the rule
is required by the multiple-taxable-event nature of the gift tax and the
hypothetical sale posited by fair market value. Enforcement of the rule is
also necessary to maintain consistency in allowing minority and blockage
discounts for estate and gift tax purposes. 775 The court should have val-
ued each gift separately without considering the other gifts.
The Tax Court is to be commended, however, for utilizing the annu-
ity approach. The court's use of that approach may have laid the founda-
tion for future recognition that the value of a block of art may be
determined at what "the block" could be sold for "as such" "outside the
usual market." The court did not discuss its valuation in those terms; how-
ever, several considerations support that conclusion.
First, the court recognized that the property to be valued consisted of
blocks of art and that, for such property, no established retail market ex-
isted. 776 Second, its use of the annuity approach considered factors (op-
portunity cost of money and length of resale period) which the taxpayer in
Estate of Smith suggested would be important to a bulk purchaser for resale.
The annuity approach discounted a stream of payments to current value.
Stated another way, the value determined was the amount an investor (a
bulk purchaser) would have paid to receive the right to future sale pro-
ceeds and a 10% profit on his investment. Third, the court considered the
gift tax regulation that addresses blockage in the securities context as
equally applicable to the valuation of art. That regulation recognizes that
the value of a block of property may be "the price at which the block could
be sold as such outside the usual market."
777
The court's annuity approach, however, probably resulted in overval-
uation of the art for two reasons. First, it did not consider carrying
costs 778 (i.e., storage, maintenance, insurance, etc.) that a purchaser of
1,226 gouaches would incur. A bulk purchaser of art is not purchasing a
financial instrument; he is acquiring tangible personal property. The IRS
Valuation Guide recognizes that "the carrying costs of the inventory" are
773. Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 717 (1985).
774. See id. at 724-25.
775. See supra part II.B.3.
776. Calder, 85 T.C. at 723 ("[T] here is no established market in which to make a disposi-
tion, and both [large blocks of stock or art] involve sales which are privately negotiated be-
tween the buyer and the seller.").
777. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976).
778. Cf LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 503 ("Maintaining a collection [of art] in good
condition is expensive: expenses may include framing, reframing, lighting, air conditioning
and humidity controls, cleaning and other maintenance, security devices, publications, and
insurance.").
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relevant in determining whether blockage applies.779 Such costs are also
relevant in determining the effect of blockage on value.
Second, the market risk associated with art cannot be equated with
the market risk associated with annuities. The purchaser of an annuity
contract from an established insurance company is not assuming much
risk of loss of capital. He can reasonably anticipate full payment under the
contract. A bulk purchaser of art, on the other hand, is purchasing prop-
erty which may be subject to dramatic price fluctuations. The court's valu-
ation in Calder, in effect, assumed that the value of each gouache would
remain unchanged during the twenty-two year liquidation period, an as-
sumption that will undoubtedly prove false. It cannot be known whether
the gouaches will rise or fall in value during that period. The higher mar-
ket risk that exists with art should have been reflected in a higher discount
rate. An investor will not buy a block of art with an anticipated 10% profit
if a 10% annuity is available as an alternative investment. The discount
rate must reflect market risk.
D. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner 780
Georgia O'Keeffe died in 1986 at the age of ninety-eight.78 1 Her
gross estate contained approximately 400 works of art or groups of art that
she had created. 78 2 The total fair market value of the artworks, valued
individually, exceeded $72,759,000,783 as determined by agreement of the
estate and the IRS. 78 4 Although the estate and the IRS agreed on the art's
aggregate per-item fair market value, they disagreed on blockage.
The estate employed Eugene Victor Thaw to appraise O'Keeffe's
art.78 5 Thaw had been a witness for the government in Estate of Smith.78 6
The manner in which Thaw determined value in O'Keeffe (en bloc sale to a
purchaser for resale) 787 and the percentage blockage discount which he
used (75%)788 were identical to those advocated by the taxpayer in Smith.
Thaw was under the impression that determination of the blockage
discount required him to assume a hypothetical buyer who would
purchase all of the works en bloc on date of death.78 9 He assumed that the
block would be sold to a single purchaser who would hold the art for many
years and who would consider interest, selling costs, promotion, mainte-
nance costs, and carrying charges in determining the price he would
pay.790 Such a purchaser, according to Thaw, would also consider possible
price fluctuations from the high level for O'Keeffe's works in 1986,
779. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 30.
780. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
781. Id. at 2700.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 2702.
785. Id.
786. Echter, supra note 717, at 396.






although he believed prices of her works were unlikely to decline on the
average. 79 1 Thaw believed that a 75% blockage discount should be al-
lowed 792 and determined the fair market value of the estate's art was ap-
proximately $18,000,000. 7 9 3 Thaw would not, however, have advised a
hypothetical seller of O'Keeffe's art to sell at a 75% discount.
794
Anthony M. Lamport, a financial analyst and advisor to venture capi-
tal funds, testified in support of Thaw's opinion. 795 He made various as-
sumptions regarding the financial return to a bulk purchaser of the
estate's art and prepared a pro forma income statement.796 Lamport as-
sumed that a bulk purchaser would have sold the art through a new gallery
opened in New York City. 79 7 He made no allowance for increases in
prices and used rates of 10% to 32% to discount projected cash flows after
expenses.798 Under Lamport's model, if anticipated cash flows were dis-
counted to yield a 20% rate of return, the estate's art would have been
valued at $14.4 million (an 80% blockage discount). 799 Lamport's analy-
sis, according to the estate, "was intended only to explain expenses that a
hypothetical buyer would consider in determining a fair purchase
price."80 0 The estate apparently argued, however, that even if expenses
were ignored, a 60% discount would result if annual sales were projected
at $5 million and discounted to present value.
80 1
Warren Adelson prepared the valuation report for the IRS.80 2 He di-
vided the estate's works into two categories: "Bequested Art" and "Remain-
ing Art."80 3 Adelson assumed that blockage applied only to artworks that
were for sale and would impact the marketplace, not to the bequested
works which were unavailable for sale.80 4 He valued the bequested art
without a blockage discount at $32,228,000,805 the aggregate of their indi-
vidual fair market values. He then divided the "Remaining Art" into two
categories. 80 6 The first consisted of the most valuable pieces which Adel-
son believed could be sold within a few years. 80 7 Adelson discounted
these works by a nominal discount of 10%.808 A blockage discount of 37%
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 2703. An art historian also testified on behalf of the estate. Id. She concluded
that a bulk sale of O'Keeffe's art "would have resulted in a two-thirds to three-fourths loss in
value." Id. She would not have recommended a bulk sale of the estate's art at the discounted
value at date of death. Id.
794. Id. at 2702.




799. David Schaengold, Artist's Artworks Valuation: Is "Blockage" the Issue? The Estate of Geor-
gia O'Keeffe and an Alternative Approach, 17 EsT. Givrs & TL J. 167, 169 (1992).
800. O'Keefife 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2704.
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was suggested for the other pieces that Adelson felt would take years, per-
haps a decade, to sell. 8° 9 The IRS believed a tiered approach should be
used to determine the blockage discount because of the unique nature of
works of art.8 10
The court found that if all of O'Keeffe's art had been offered for sale
simultaneously, the size of the block would have depressed the prices for
each of the works.8 1 1 Therefore, the court concluded that the fair market
value of the block of art was substantially less than the simple total of the
fair market values of the individual works.8 12 The court decided not to
apply a single, across-the-board discount to all the works. It held that the
amount of the blockage discount with respect to each work depended on
the market for that work.8 13 It was necessary, therefore, to examine the
history of the market for O'Keeffe's art, the prospects for her works at her
death, the types of works to be valued, and the United States art market to
determine the discount.
8 14
The court recognized the limited market for large blocks of art cre-
ated by one artist, which it attributed to the unique nature of the art mar-
ket.8 15 The court found that a purchaser for investment would consider
the potential involvement of key dealers and collectors identified with spe-
cific markets within the larger art market.8 16 Without their involvement
and a broad appeal to patrons capable of investing at the required level,
the court concluded it would be very difficult to sell a large block of art.8 17
The court found that O'Keeffe's works were classified as early American
Modernism and that the market for such art had few key dealers and col-
lectors to support it.
8 18
The court found each of the experts qualified to express opinions as
to value.8 19 .But it was "frustrated and imposed upon by the lack of relia-
ble expert opinion supporting the discounts claimed by the opposing par-
ties."8 20 Its frustration resulted from what it believed to be erroneous
instructions to the experts regarding blockage8 2 1 and from their tendency
to ignore relevant facts inconsistent with the position of the party employ-
ing them and to exaggerate facts consistent with their own views.8 2 2 The
809. Id.
810. Id. at 2704. The IRS claimed its tiered approach reflected the fact that works of art
are unique and incorporated factors enunciated by the Tax Court in Estate of Smith and Cal-
der. Id.
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821. Id. at 2703.
822. Id. at 2704.
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court found each conclusion as to the appropriate discount suffered from
substantial defects and was patently unreliable.
823
The Tax Court rejected the estate's valuation. It found that Thaw, in
effect, had determined value on the basis of an assumed forced sale to a
single buyer at date of death. 824 The estate argued that fair market value
required property change hands at date of death. 825 The court rejected
the argument as unsupported by authority or reason and because it ig-
nored the concepts of willing buyers and sellers acting without compul-
sion. 8 26 It rejected the estate's $18,000,000 valuation as defying common
sense, noting that the individual values of 44 pieces totaled almost one-
half of the agreed value of all works.
827
The Service's opinion of value was held to be erroneous as a matter of
law.8 28 The court found no justification for exclusion of bequested art
from the total subject to blockage discount.8 29 Fair market value assumes
that the property is in the market.83 0 Actual disposition of the property is
not relevant to the determination of value.
8 31
The court also held that the Service's discounts for the remaining art
were inadequate and inconsistent with statements in the IRS Valuation
Guide.83 2 The small discount Adelson allowed was found to be at odds
with the amount of time he anticipated would be required to sell the
works and apparently did not reflect any opportunity or carrying costs.
833
The Service's tiered approach appealed to the court; the approach
made sense and was supported by the evidence.8 34 The court, however,
rejected the percentages used by the Service.83 5 Its tiered approach was
based entirely on the dollar values of individual artworks.8 36 It allowed no
discount for works valued at $500,000 or more; a 20% discount for works
valued at $200,000 to $499,999; and a 50% discount for works valued at
less than $200,000.83 7 The court found, however, that the most valuable
works, for which no discount was allowed, would not necessarily be sold
first.838 Some works of all types and values would be introduced into the
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experts was that the better works could be sold within seven years, but that
the bulk of the pieces would require more than ten years to sell.
8 40
The Tax Court sidestepped a critical issue in O'Keeffe. The IRS argued
that the estate's valuation improperly took into account expenses that
would be incurred in the sale of the art, in violation of § 2053.841 The
estate's position was that expenses that would be considered by a hypothet-
ical purchaser were relevant in determining value and were not affected by
§ 2053.842 The court refused to decide the issue, stating that it did not
include assumptions about specific expenses or rates of return in its analy-
sis.8 43 It did consider, however, that the "works could not be sold simulta-
neously on the date of death and that carrying costs would be
incurred."
8 44
This essentially is the issue addressed by Revenue Ruling 83-30845
which is central to the correct application of blockage. It is the question
of whether the value of a block of property, consistent with case law and
the regulations, may be determined by reference to "the price at which the
block could be sold as such outside the usual market." Factors potential
purchasers of "the block" "as such" would consider in determining price
are relevant since the price they would pay is the price "at which the block
could be sold."8 46 Fair market value, moreover, assumes the willing buyer
has reasonable knowledge of relevant facts, including expenses he would
incur in disposing of the block over the anticipated liquidation period.
8 47
In 1993, the Tax Court recognized and correctly decided this issue in
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner.
8 48
Petitioner's expert did not reduce the value of decedent's min-
eral interest properties by a fictional seller's cost, but rather took
the relevant costs and various factors that a potential buyer would
have to pay and thus take into account in determining the price
he would be willing to pay. This, of course, is consistent with the
definition of fair market value.
8 49
Similarly, the court in O'Keeffe should have held that a potential buyer's
expenses were relevant in determining the price he would pay for the
block of art.850 The bulk purchaser, after all, would not be the ultimate
consumer; he would purchase for resale.
In OKeeffe, the Tax Court reviewed its earlier decisions in Smith and
Calder. It rejected the parties' reading of Smith as allowing a 37% blockage
discount, noting that "[n ] othing in the opinion, however, explains the con-
840. Id.
841. Id. at 2705-06.
842. Id. at 2706.
843. Id.
844. Id.
845. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224; see supra text accompanying notes 507-37.
846. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 434 (Supp. 1992).
847. Id.
848. 1993 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 93,236, at 1173, 1176 (1993).
849. Id. at 1176 (citation omitted).
850. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 434 (Supp. 1992).
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clusion of value by application of a particular percentage to the total." 5 1
The court highlighted the major shortcoming of Smith: its failure to dis-
close the amount of the blockage discount or the manner in which it had
been determined.
The court discussed Calder as a case in which it had calculated the
blockage discount by reference to actual annual sales and had reduced the
projected income stream to its present value.8 5 2 The court apparently dis-
missed the Calder approach in O'Keeffe for two reasons. First, only a small
percentage of O'Keeffe's works had been sold after death.8 53 Second,
neither party advocated application of that approach.8 54
The Tax Court concluded that the amount that would be paid by a
hypothetical en bloc purchaser of O'Keeffe's art would be different from
the amount that would be paid by individual purchasers.8 55 The court was
correct because retail prices must exceed wholesale prices. This conclu-
sion apparently contributed to the court's refusal to determine value by
reference to the amount that could have been received in a bulk sale.
The court held that each of the experts had failed to consider the
relevant market for O'Keeffe's works.856 The market, according to the
court, included not only a bulk purchaser as suggested by the estate, but
collectors and museums.8 5 7 It found that many factors affected "the prob-
able market for each work."858 The court's focus on the market for each
work evidences its failure to consider the market for "the block" "as such."
When a block of art is to be valued, however, the Regulations recognize
that its value may be the value of "the block" "as such" outside the usual
market. The market and potential buyers of "the block" "as such" should
have been identified and considered by the court.
The Tax Court decided that O'Keeffe's art should be segmented, not
on the basis of value, but by quality, uniqueness, and salability.8 59 It deter-
mined the art should be divided into at least two categories. 860 One would
consist of works that could be sold within a relatively short period at ap-
proximately their individual values.8 6 1 The other would include works
that could be sold only over a long period of years with substantial ef-





856. Id. at 2706.
857. Id.. It has been suggested that the court's view of the appropriate marketplace was
unrealistic:
The executor could conceivably sell some works at auction in an attempt to reach
the collectors market, as indicated in O'Keeffet However, the reality of the art world
is that the executor would substantially hurt any chance of making a bulk sale of the
works of art if some of the works were separately offered on the auction market.
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 435 (Supp. 1992).
858. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2706 (emphasis added).
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fort.862 Lacking a more reliable breakdown, the court allocated one-half
of the agreed upon, per-item aggregate value to each category.
8 63
Having divided O'Keeffe's art into two categories, the court deter-
mined the effect of blockage separately with respect to each. It believed
the Service's valuation approach was valid as to the first category and al-
lowed a 25% discount.8 64 It found the estate's experts' opinion valid as to
the second category and allowed a 75% blockage discount.8 65 The court
made its customary "we considered the entire record" statement and con-
cluded the fair market value of O'Keeffe's art was $36,400,000.866 By us-
ing the approach advocated by each of the parties as to exactly one-half
the value of O'Keeffe's art, the Tax Court, once again, appears to have
"split the baby" and reached a compromise valuation.
The Tax Court confused two important aspects of fair market value by
concluding that valuation of O'Keeffe's art by reference to an en bloc date
of death sale would be at forced sale prices.8 67 The court incorrectly
equated determination of value as of the moment of death with a forced
sale. This led the court to reject the estate's valuation approach.
Fair market value is the price that property (properly identified)
would command if offered for sale in a prudent manner for a reasonable
period of time beginning on the valuation date. Valuation as of the date
of death is not applied literally. Value, nonetheless, is to be determined by
reference to a hypothetical sale; the property must change hands.
868
When blockage is involved, "the price at which the block could be
sold as such outside the usual market" may indicate the property's value.
The property to be valued is "the block" "as such." Identifying the prop-
erty as "the block" determines the potential purchasers and the relevant
market. Valuing property by reference to what a bulk purchaser would
have paid for the block at the moment of death is not the same as estab-
lishing value in a forced sale. Obviously, the bulk seller as well as the bulk
buyer must be "willing" and neither must act under compulsion.8 69 Iden-
tifying fair market value's hypothetical sale as a bulk sale, however, no
more indicates compulsion than does identification of the property and its
potential buyers in other circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Artists and their estates confront difficult valuation problems when
large blocks of art are valued for estate and gift tax purposes. Fair market
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868. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 433 (Supp. 1992).
869. See id. (suggesting that the court in O'Keeffe seemed to be saying that the willing
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Large blocks of art should be valued, consistent with case law and the
regulations, by considering the price at which "the block" "as such" could
be sold "outside the usual market."- An annuity approach, if modified to
reflect a potential buyer's carrying costs and market risk, would provide a
reasonable result. The present value of anticipated sale proceeds (net of
expenses) discounted at a rate that compensates for market risk, should
be the price at which the block could be sold to the only purchasers in the
market for large blocks of art-purchasers for resale.8 70 Such a buyer nec-
essarily pays wholesale prices.
Courts should not hesitate to determine value for large blocks of art
by reference to what are, admittedly, wholesale prices. While Treasury
Regulations generally provide that value is to be determined in the retail
market, they recognize an exception where blockage is relevant. The rea-
sons courts long ago permitted valuation of large blocks of stock by refer-
ence to wholesale prices in secondary offerings also justify valuation of
large blocks of art in alternative markets.
870. See Schaengold, supra note 799, at 172. The author reached a similar conclusion but
suggested that an artist's works be valued as a business rather than under blockage:
In the context of valuing a business, the position that the valuation should be estab-
lished on the basis of what a purchaser for resale would pay for the property in its
entirety is logical, realistic, and consistent with the regulations. It would follow,
therefore, that the procedure for ascertaining the value should follow along the line
of what the O'Keeffe experts actually did: provide evidence on what a willing buyer
for profit purposes would pay for the property on the basis of a fair return on invest-
ment after deducting selling and all other expenses necessarily incurred in realizing
a profit.
Id. Valuation of an artist's art works as a business, however, should not result in a different
valuation than under blockage properly applied. The valuation would be determined largely
on the basis of the art inventory.
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